>
> How can deconstruction affirm? It does not. It works out of the Hegelian
> Negative. But from a Deleuzian perspective it not only does not affirm,
> it remains within representation. From a scientific point of view, it
> remains with Newtonian-Hegelian physics-ontology. Determination: X not Y.
> rather than modern quantum physics and non-equalibrium thermodynamics:
> X does not equal X, whether or not X does not qual Y.
Actually, I like Geof Bennington's formulation
of the operation of differance: neither A nor B nor both
nor neither, which, to recall my days as an analytic
philosopher, is an aporia of identity: a repetition of
X =/= X? Of course, the question then rebounds: can
D&G affirm from a critique of identity? Massumi assumes
it can, as a BOTH/AND of radical empiricism. I'm inclined
to this, but what happens to difference without negation
(cf. Descombes' discussion of Nietzsche & Philosophy)?
Emission of singularities, you say? Well, in that case,
how the hell does one talk about a reactive force (or
a sad passion, or a molar identity, etc.)?
As for deconstruction as affirmation, Derrida
frequently refers to the always-already of the future
anterieur (in Deleuzian terms, something like the splitting
of Aion) as an Event which "there is": this is the "yes,
yes" affirmation of the play of differance (see "Nombre
de oui," the last selection in _Psyche_).
>
> and still more from DIFFERENCE & REPETITION:
>
> Hegelian contradiction appears to push difference to the likmit, but this
> path is a dead end which brings it back to identity, making identty the
> sufficient condition for difference to exist and be thouht. .It is only
> in relation to the identical, as a function of the identical [called trace
> by Derrida], that contradiction is the greatest difference. The
> intoxications adn the giddiness are feigned, the obscure is already
> clarified from the outset [differance; we know that we can't know].
Differance is not a knowledge. It's more
like the plane of immanence.
Note that Deleuze has somewhat tempered his
cruelty towards Hegel in the intro to _What Is Philosophy?_
Cordially,
M.
------------------
> How can deconstruction affirm? It does not. It works out of the Hegelian
> Negative. But from a Deleuzian perspective it not only does not affirm,
> it remains within representation. From a scientific point of view, it
> remains with Newtonian-Hegelian physics-ontology. Determination: X not Y.
> rather than modern quantum physics and non-equalibrium thermodynamics:
> X does not equal X, whether or not X does not qual Y.
Actually, I like Geof Bennington's formulation
of the operation of differance: neither A nor B nor both
nor neither, which, to recall my days as an analytic
philosopher, is an aporia of identity: a repetition of
X =/= X? Of course, the question then rebounds: can
D&G affirm from a critique of identity? Massumi assumes
it can, as a BOTH/AND of radical empiricism. I'm inclined
to this, but what happens to difference without negation
(cf. Descombes' discussion of Nietzsche & Philosophy)?
Emission of singularities, you say? Well, in that case,
how the hell does one talk about a reactive force (or
a sad passion, or a molar identity, etc.)?
As for deconstruction as affirmation, Derrida
frequently refers to the always-already of the future
anterieur (in Deleuzian terms, something like the splitting
of Aion) as an Event which "there is": this is the "yes,
yes" affirmation of the play of differance (see "Nombre
de oui," the last selection in _Psyche_).
>
> and still more from DIFFERENCE & REPETITION:
>
> Hegelian contradiction appears to push difference to the likmit, but this
> path is a dead end which brings it back to identity, making identty the
> sufficient condition for difference to exist and be thouht. .It is only
> in relation to the identical, as a function of the identical [called trace
> by Derrida], that contradiction is the greatest difference. The
> intoxications adn the giddiness are feigned, the obscure is already
> clarified from the outset [differance; we know that we can't know].
Differance is not a knowledge. It's more
like the plane of immanence.
Note that Deleuze has somewhat tempered his
cruelty towards Hegel in the intro to _What Is Philosophy?_
Cordially,
M.
------------------