BACKGROUND TO WASHINGTON'S WAR ON TERROR
Al-Qaida, the sect
Al-Qaida has been thought of as a global or national political movement, or
representative of an entire religion. It isn't. It's just another of the
many death-obsessed sectarian movements to emerge in the past 20 years.
by PIERRE CONESA
All that was necessary for the events of 11 September 2001 was present
before the tragedy. But as with all strategic revolutions, the attacks
brought together accelerating trends, causing the first conflict between a
state and a sect, and the first war without a front, its aim not territorial
conquest but the physical destruction of an adversary. This strategic
revolution demands a complete reappraisal of concepts on which western
analysts have based their reasoning.
Few observers have examined changes in the Islamic world with regard to the
sectarian movements that have spread through the world over the last two
decades. Islam gives believers considerable freedom to interpret religious
texts, and does not treat recent Islamist groups as sects. Al-Qaida has much
in common with other sects, in particular its millennarian ideology and
fascination with death.
Osama bin Laden has been operating in an exclusively religious frame of
reference. In a statement, broadcast by Al Jazeera television, he said: "Our
nation has been tasting this humiliation and contempt for more than 80
years." This is a reference neither to Palestine nor Iraq, but to Kemal
Ataturk's abolition of the Caliphate in 1924. He added that the US would not
"enjoy security before we can see it as a reality in Palestine [with
Jerusalem liberated] and before all the infidel armies leave the land of
Muhammad [Saudi Arabia]". Significantly, he did not refer to local political
issues, such as the embargo on Iraq or the situation in Algeria.
Bin Laden, a follower of Salafi Sunnism, does not express absolute
solidarity with all Muslims. The assassination of Ahmad Shah Massoud, also a
Muslim, meant nothing to him. Nor does he claim to have the support of the
regime in Iran, which is Islamist, but also Shia.
The religious intensity ties with the millenarian beliefs underlying Bin
Laden's statements; politics play a poor second role. Military Studies in
the Jihad Against the Tyrants, a 200-page document found in the UK in 2000,
enjoins combatants to "martyrdom for the purpose of establishing the
religion of majestic Allah on earth" (1). As with all sects, religion takes
precedence over politics and renders them pointless, announcing instead the
advent of paradise on earth.
This new radical Islamism has fed on a growing awareness of political and
ideological setbacks. The third world no longer counts as a political force,
Arab socialism is bankrupt, and political Islamism has reached a dead end
(2). All this coincides with a realisation that Arab governments have
nationalised their official religious authorities (as Egypt has done with
al-Azhar university).
None of the terrorists who died on 11 September had a militant background.
None was linked to an Islamist political party. As Trotsky refused the
notion of "socialism in one country", Bin Laden rejects the idea of Islamism
in one country. He does not have a national strategy because he is working
for the global triumph of Allah.
A fascination with death
Another sect-type characteristic of this form of Islam is its fascination
with death. Hamas suicide bombers are not isolated. In Algeria, the Armed
Islamic Group (GIA) and the Salafi Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC)
made no attempt to justify their atrocities as political legitimacy or
strategic necessity. Bloodshed became the method of war. Bin Laden borrowed
the notion of martyrdom from the Shia in Iran, for whom it is commonplace?
as demonstrated by the bassiji, young volunteers the Khomeini regime sent to
the front against Iraq to defend Islam and the revolution (3).
All the attacks attributed to al-Qaida ? the 1998 bombings of US embassies
and the strike on the USS Cole in 2000 ? required the sacrifice of men. The
death of the believer is necessary, the price for paradise ? a recurrent
feature of group suicides (the People's Temple in Guyana, Heaven's Gate in
California). It recurs in the punishment for betraying a political sect
(Japanese Red Army, Tamil Tigers) or a religious sect (Aum Shinrikyo in
Japan).
Sects see innocent victims as necessary to their objectives. The will in
Muhammad Atta's luggage shows no pity for those about to die, sometimes
referred to as enemies simply because they were not Muslims. Aum Shinrikyo,
which carried out a sarin nerve gas attack in the Tokyo underground in 1995
(4), promised both victims and combatants a speedy passage to paradise.
There are many millennarian sects and some even uphold the myth of magical
invincibility. Combatants of Uganda's Holy Spirit Movement walk into enemy
fire, convinced it cannot harm them.
A guru is also essential. Members of Bin Laden's inner circle call him
Sheikh Osama or Emir bin Laden in respect (he is not a religious scholar)
(6). In the first videos, he was standing in front of a cave, a reference to
Muhammad's banishment from Mecca. He implicitly identifies with the Prophet
in exile, with Saladin driving out the crusaders, or with Hassan Ibn
al-Sabbah, the "Old Man of the Mountain", head of the Nizari sect, better
known as the Assassins.
His ideology is based on the intellectual comfort provided by unequivocal
racism. The enemy are "Jews and the crusaders" according to the 1998 fatwa
supporting Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman, convicted for the first bombing of the
World Trade Centre: "The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies ?
civilians and military ? is an individual duty for every Muslim."" This is
close to other simplistic sect-originated ideas, such as the claim that the
Jews invented the Shia to weaken the Sunni.
Bin Laden's racism surfaces in his obsession with the idea that the Jews
rule the financial world. Although the attacks did not target the Vatican,
the Knesset or the Statue of Liberty, but the World Trade Centre,
demonstrating an anti-globalisation ideaology rather than a war of religion.
Bin Laden condemned the US as "the modern world's symbol of paganism". This
mixture of theology and anti-globalisation mirrors the deep schizophrenia of
Saudi society, which enjoys abroad what it will not allow at home. At the
same time it considers anywhere else, particularly the US, hell. Yet that
inferno is much like paradise, since wine and women will greet the martyr,
according to the notebook in Atta's bag.
There are three generations of al-Qaida combatants. The founding fathers are
all from the Middle East, veterans of the jihad against the Soviets in
Afghanistan (Bin Laden himself and his right-hand man Ayman al-Zawahri). The
second generation date from 1992-93; these are the attackers of 11 September
(Ramzi Yousef). They are outcasts by necessity, children of marriages
between parents with complicated backgrounds, immigrants without papers.
They are not Palestinians. Some come from Pakistan, others from the
Philippines or East Africa (such as Zacarias Moussaoui or Samir al-Jarrah).
Life in the West radicalised them. As in sects, recruits must break with
family, birthplace and home country.
A one-way trip
For many this is the start of a one-way trip. If they go home, they face
prison, even the death penalty. Afghanistan was a refuge for all those who
wanted or had to flee. Martyrdom is a perfect way out of this. Bin Laden
sifted through these exiles and bright-eyed kamikazes. The Taliban put him
in charge of recruiting non-Afghan jihadi. This generation lived through the
failure of Islamist parties in various countries and backed the fight
against the new enemy, the West. The number of Saudis among the perpetrators
of 11 September ? between a half and two-thirds ? highlights the political
and moral crisis in their country. Like the Russian Nihilists, these men ?
children of upper middle-class families, with a university education ? form
an intelligentsia that speaks to the people through attacks designed to
provoke it into action.
The most recent generation are youths in revolt. In the 1960s they would
have joined a Maoist movement. Now they convert to Islam, following a
similar route to John Walker Lindh, the American who joined the Taliban.
They have not lost their citizenship. Some hold several nationalities. Wadi
al-Hajwas born in Lebanon, but holds a US passport. (He was convicted for
the first World Trade Centre attack. ) They enjoyed rapid early promotion,
followed by setbacks, and, disappointed, were an easy prey for
radicalisation (Moussaoui and Kamel Daoudi). The recruiting agencies are
based in mosques around the West. They are particularly active in Tabligh
centres ? Finsbury Park in London, Mantes La Jolie near Paris, Brooklyn.
Al-Qaida is like a holding company run by a council (shura) including
representatives of terrorist movements. It verges on totalitarianism, with
sub-divisions to manage key functions: ideology, media, administration and
military action. This organisation provides all the backup terrorist
operations need, probably including care for the families of martyrs. It may
make alliances, terrorist joint ventures, with other movements with which it
has links, the Egyptian Jihad or the Abu Sayyaf group in the Philippines
(7).
The list of 27 targets of anti-terrorist action published by the US, to
which 39 more objectives was later added, includes groups, charities and
personalities ? a reflection of the complexity of the web that Bin Laden has
woven. Al-Qaida, like any self-respecting sect, controls a financial network
that handles donations and other income, transforming them into covert
funds. The US is convinced that major Islamic foundations, such as
al-Barakat, are a party to these.
Islam is prey to the sectarianism that exacerbates the excesses common to
any creed. It is unsurprising that al-Qaida has launched an all-inclusive
condemnation of the US, the official Muslim authorities, Israel, the UN and
the global economy.
(1) New York Times, 28 October 2001.
(2) See Olivier Roy on the end of political Islam, Esprit, Paris,
August-September 2001.
(3) Well analysed by Farhad Khoskhokavar (Cavard) in Cultures et conflits,
n° 29-30, L'Harmattan, Paris, 1997.
(4) See Sylvaine Trinh, Cultures et conflits, ibid.
(5) According to millenarian belief the Messiah will reign on earth for
1,000 years after the Last Judgement.
(6) Interview with Bin Laden by Hamid Mir, editor of Daily Aussaf,
Islamabad.
(7) See Jean-François Daguzan, L'Hyper-terrorisme, edited by François
Heisbourg and published by the Foundation for Strategic Research and Odile
Jacob, Paris, 2001.
Translated by Harry Forster
http://MondeDiplo.com/2002/01/07sect
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