Cologne, 24 June 1996
A. Peter Durigon quotes the 'Beitraege' Section 83 "(Kein Buddhismus! das
Gegenteil.)" As a parenthetical remark set next to a text proper, it relies
heavily on the context and, in its brevity, is cryptic. I quote the con-text:
"Da-sein is the grounding of the truth of beyng.
The less being humankind becomes, the less humankind insists on being the being
as which it finds itself to be, the closer it comes to being. (Nothing to do
with Buddhism! [In fact,] the opposite!)"
I take the reference to Buddhism in this context as demarcating a difference
>from the insistence on being the being one finds oneself to be, since Buddhism
itself is a movement from being immersed in beings with one's interests to
letting-go of one's situation amongst beings (inter-esse), thus opening oneself
to nothingness (the Buddhist Nichts).
Thus, in this context, the Buddhist Nichts is set in relation to Sein, which
humankind can come closer to. But this Buddhist nothingness is the opposite of
beyng, according to this passage.
The less humankind insists on being a being amongst beings (as in the
metaphysical epoch(s)), the closer it comes to beyng by itself trans-forming
into Da-sein. But, as the passage says, "Da-sein is the founding of the truth of
beyng."
Thus one could say, the truth of beyng is the opposite of Buddhist nothingness.
It should be kept in mind that Heidegger, when writing the Beitraege in 1937/38,
has already had fifteen years of personal contact with visiting Japanese
philosophers, starting with Hajime Tanabe in 1922. So the reference to Buddhism
is presumably based on his dialogues with these visitors.
In the same section 83: "Metaphysics thinks being can be found in beings and
that in such a way that thinking goes beyond beings." For metaphysics, beyng as
such is nothing. For Hegel, e.g. beyng is simply the most abstract concept
and, because of this empty abstractness, the same as nothingness as void.
For Heidegger, the truth of beyng is rich; its sway is the sway of Western
history from the first beginning. Does that mean that the Buddhist nothingness
hinted at in this passage is understood as the void? Perhaps.
The larger context of the passage cited is Part III Das Zuspiel (passing on the
ball of beyng by beyng itself), where all the "historical lectures" are
explicitly given as global reference (GA65 S.167), i.e. the larger context is
history as the history of beyng.
This means that with the reference to Buddhism, the history of the (Far) East is
set into contraposition to Western history (as based on the "bas-ic metaphysical
positions of Western thinking").
In Section 83, the first-cited passage above is an answer to the question: "But
how is the metaphysical renunciation of beings, that is, the renunciation of
metaphysics, possible without falling prey to 'nothingness'?", where nothingness
is in scare(d) quotes.
This scary nothingness is presumably the void and is to be contrasted with the
richness of the truth of beyng from whose transformations and transpositions
Western history has come and is to come. This passing-the-ball in the
Zuspiel is the grounding of the there in human being. The other beginning.
So, are we beginning the other beginning by thinking? Who can tell.
Michael Eldred ° artefact text and translation \\\ /// '''''''
artefact@xxxxxxxxxxx °°° made by art °°° ( ~ L ~ ) [ ° U ° ]
http://www.webcom.com/artefact/ { <-> } *( \_/ )*
vox: (++49 221) 9520 333 fax: (++49 221) 9520 334 \___/ / \
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A. Peter Durigon quotes the 'Beitraege' Section 83 "(Kein Buddhismus! das
Gegenteil.)" As a parenthetical remark set next to a text proper, it relies
heavily on the context and, in its brevity, is cryptic. I quote the con-text:
"Da-sein is the grounding of the truth of beyng.
The less being humankind becomes, the less humankind insists on being the being
as which it finds itself to be, the closer it comes to being. (Nothing to do
with Buddhism! [In fact,] the opposite!)"
I take the reference to Buddhism in this context as demarcating a difference
>from the insistence on being the being one finds oneself to be, since Buddhism
itself is a movement from being immersed in beings with one's interests to
letting-go of one's situation amongst beings (inter-esse), thus opening oneself
to nothingness (the Buddhist Nichts).
Thus, in this context, the Buddhist Nichts is set in relation to Sein, which
humankind can come closer to. But this Buddhist nothingness is the opposite of
beyng, according to this passage.
The less humankind insists on being a being amongst beings (as in the
metaphysical epoch(s)), the closer it comes to beyng by itself trans-forming
into Da-sein. But, as the passage says, "Da-sein is the founding of the truth of
beyng."
Thus one could say, the truth of beyng is the opposite of Buddhist nothingness.
It should be kept in mind that Heidegger, when writing the Beitraege in 1937/38,
has already had fifteen years of personal contact with visiting Japanese
philosophers, starting with Hajime Tanabe in 1922. So the reference to Buddhism
is presumably based on his dialogues with these visitors.
In the same section 83: "Metaphysics thinks being can be found in beings and
that in such a way that thinking goes beyond beings." For metaphysics, beyng as
such is nothing. For Hegel, e.g. beyng is simply the most abstract concept
and, because of this empty abstractness, the same as nothingness as void.
For Heidegger, the truth of beyng is rich; its sway is the sway of Western
history from the first beginning. Does that mean that the Buddhist nothingness
hinted at in this passage is understood as the void? Perhaps.
The larger context of the passage cited is Part III Das Zuspiel (passing on the
ball of beyng by beyng itself), where all the "historical lectures" are
explicitly given as global reference (GA65 S.167), i.e. the larger context is
history as the history of beyng.
This means that with the reference to Buddhism, the history of the (Far) East is
set into contraposition to Western history (as based on the "bas-ic metaphysical
positions of Western thinking").
In Section 83, the first-cited passage above is an answer to the question: "But
how is the metaphysical renunciation of beings, that is, the renunciation of
metaphysics, possible without falling prey to 'nothingness'?", where nothingness
is in scare(d) quotes.
This scary nothingness is presumably the void and is to be contrasted with the
richness of the truth of beyng from whose transformations and transpositions
Western history has come and is to come. This passing-the-ball in the
Zuspiel is the grounding of the there in human being. The other beginning.
So, are we beginning the other beginning by thinking? Who can tell.
Michael Eldred ° artefact text and translation \\\ /// '''''''
artefact@xxxxxxxxxxx °°° made by art °°° ( ~ L ~ ) [ ° U ° ]
http://www.webcom.com/artefact/ { <-> } *( \_/ )*
vox: (++49 221) 9520 333 fax: (++49 221) 9520 334 \___/ / \
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---