Paul Murphy (responding to Michael Eldred) writes:
> >My own feeling is that a so-called *question of violence* cannot be posed
> >directly at all and that it borders on arrogance to want to say anything at
> >all
> >about bodily human suffering on the level of thoughtful discourse.
> >
(snip)
> Leaving aside the indeed broad and complex issue of the question of
> violence for now, I'd like to address the issue of 'bodiliness' in general
> (because the question would then not only address bodily human suffering,
> but also bodily human pleasure). Thinking is wary of addressing this
> question, it seems...
One of H's accomplishments was to address the tradition in such a way
that our lived experience becomes not only the basis for, but part and
parcel of our capacity to think. While in Kant, space and time are of
the world as aspects of our perceiving/thinking it, spatiality and
temporality are our ways of being in the world, and this world to which
we are both thrown, and for which we are responsible on account of our
creative and disclosive capacities of it, is not dependent upon our
thought or our structures of perception. Our thinking begins from what
our lived experience is disclosive of. What could be more basic to this
than our embodiment? How, in fact to make sense of finitude at all,
vis-a-vis the tradition without waking up to the import of our mortality,
and its root, the fact that we are as human, fleshly creatures, with all
the vulnerability and singularity that involves?
These considerations have an impact on the "question of violence" as
well. I think that it is right to bring discussion of the question
toward a conception of our embodiment. One clue to this is how
viscerally we seem to conceive of violence itself; at the basis of the
myriad paradigms represented - though not reconciled - in this
discussion, seems an ambivalence about addressing the tension between the
value of, say disruption (as one way of conceiving violence) on the one
hand, and the experience of violation on the other.
Regards, Chris
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
> >My own feeling is that a so-called *question of violence* cannot be posed
> >directly at all and that it borders on arrogance to want to say anything at
> >all
> >about bodily human suffering on the level of thoughtful discourse.
> >
(snip)
> Leaving aside the indeed broad and complex issue of the question of
> violence for now, I'd like to address the issue of 'bodiliness' in general
> (because the question would then not only address bodily human suffering,
> but also bodily human pleasure). Thinking is wary of addressing this
> question, it seems...
One of H's accomplishments was to address the tradition in such a way
that our lived experience becomes not only the basis for, but part and
parcel of our capacity to think. While in Kant, space and time are of
the world as aspects of our perceiving/thinking it, spatiality and
temporality are our ways of being in the world, and this world to which
we are both thrown, and for which we are responsible on account of our
creative and disclosive capacities of it, is not dependent upon our
thought or our structures of perception. Our thinking begins from what
our lived experience is disclosive of. What could be more basic to this
than our embodiment? How, in fact to make sense of finitude at all,
vis-a-vis the tradition without waking up to the import of our mortality,
and its root, the fact that we are as human, fleshly creatures, with all
the vulnerability and singularity that involves?
These considerations have an impact on the "question of violence" as
well. I think that it is right to bring discussion of the question
toward a conception of our embodiment. One clue to this is how
viscerally we seem to conceive of violence itself; at the basis of the
myriad paradigms represented - though not reconciled - in this
discussion, seems an ambivalence about addressing the tension between the
value of, say disruption (as one way of conceiving violence) on the one
hand, and the experience of violation on the other.
Regards, Chris
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---