Michael Eldred wrote:
Nor do I
>think that Heidegger had a deprecating attitude towards bodiliness (Paul:
>"bodily experience is only Erlebnis, lived experience, somatic tingling
>severed
>from genuine Erfahrung"). Rather, he regards it as one of the hardest things
>to
>gain a view of phenomenologically.
I generally agree. My point was stated perhaps too polemically, and on the
basis of a passage I've always found puzzling from "Letter on Humanism". It
turns out that part of my puzzlement is rooted in a questionable
translation. The passage in question runs (in the Capuzzi and J.G. Grey in
_Basic Writings_):
"Of all the beings that are, presumably the most difficult to think about
are living creatures, because on the one hand they are in a certain way
most closely related to us, and on the other are at the same time separated
>from our ek-sistent essence by an abyss. However, it might also seem as
though the essence of divinity is closer to us than what is foreign in
other living creatures, closer, namely, in an essential distance which
however distant is nonetheless more familiar to our ek-sistent essence than
is our appalling and scarcely conceivable bodily kinship with the beast"
(206, 1st Edition).
This term 'appalling' is what I've found objectionable, because of its
moralizing overtones, its sense of disgust and horror. The German original
is less hysterical -- "die kaum auszudenkende abgruendige leibliche
Verwandtschaft mit dem Tier" (Wegmarken, 2nd Edition, p.323). This kinship
or affinity is 'abgruendig', abyssal; earlier, Heidegger asserts that the
human body is 'essentially other than an animal organism', without thereby
asserting in more 'positive' terms what the difference is. Whether
Heidegger ever approaches thinking on this abyssal difference and kinship
is questionable, however. (By the way, the translation of 'Tier' as 'beast'
strikes me as unnecessarily Biblical).
In the Humanismusbrief, these topics of animality and bodiliness are
sketched very briefly; I understand that the topic of animality and
worldhood is treated in considerable detail in GA29/30, which I have yet to
read. Perhaps this text sheds some light on the question?
Cheers,
Paul
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
Nor do I
>think that Heidegger had a deprecating attitude towards bodiliness (Paul:
>"bodily experience is only Erlebnis, lived experience, somatic tingling
>severed
>from genuine Erfahrung"). Rather, he regards it as one of the hardest things
>to
>gain a view of phenomenologically.
I generally agree. My point was stated perhaps too polemically, and on the
basis of a passage I've always found puzzling from "Letter on Humanism". It
turns out that part of my puzzlement is rooted in a questionable
translation. The passage in question runs (in the Capuzzi and J.G. Grey in
_Basic Writings_):
"Of all the beings that are, presumably the most difficult to think about
are living creatures, because on the one hand they are in a certain way
most closely related to us, and on the other are at the same time separated
>from our ek-sistent essence by an abyss. However, it might also seem as
though the essence of divinity is closer to us than what is foreign in
other living creatures, closer, namely, in an essential distance which
however distant is nonetheless more familiar to our ek-sistent essence than
is our appalling and scarcely conceivable bodily kinship with the beast"
(206, 1st Edition).
This term 'appalling' is what I've found objectionable, because of its
moralizing overtones, its sense of disgust and horror. The German original
is less hysterical -- "die kaum auszudenkende abgruendige leibliche
Verwandtschaft mit dem Tier" (Wegmarken, 2nd Edition, p.323). This kinship
or affinity is 'abgruendig', abyssal; earlier, Heidegger asserts that the
human body is 'essentially other than an animal organism', without thereby
asserting in more 'positive' terms what the difference is. Whether
Heidegger ever approaches thinking on this abyssal difference and kinship
is questionable, however. (By the way, the translation of 'Tier' as 'beast'
strikes me as unnecessarily Biblical).
In the Humanismusbrief, these topics of animality and bodiliness are
sketched very briefly; I understand that the topic of animality and
worldhood is treated in considerable detail in GA29/30, which I have yet to
read. Perhaps this text sheds some light on the question?
Cheers,
Paul
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