Re: Oedipal issues

Thinking of the parricide named in the _Sophist_ leads me to Derrida's
discussion in "Plato's Pharmacy":

"Is it by chance that, for the Stranger in the _Sophist_, the necessity and
inevitability of parricide, 'plain enough, as they say, for even the blind
(*tuphloi*) to see' (one ought to say, *especially* for the blind to see),
are the condition of the possibility of a discourse on the false, the idol,
the icon, the mimeme, the phantasm, and 'the arts concerned with such
things'?" (p.164, English translation of _Dissemination_).

Which leads me to the introduction to SZ, particularly the passage on
'phenomenon', how Heidegger relates this term to the Greek 'phainesthai',
self-showing, shining-forth, which he distinguishes from the derivate
senses of semblance or dissemblance ('appearance', 'mere appearance'). It
is on the basis of this determination of the Gk phainomenon that the Being
of beings in SZ is discussed as the showing of that which shows itself as
it is in itself. This discussion recurs in almost identical fashion in the
"Sein und Schein" section of _Introduction to Metaphysics_. And it is from
this determination that the project of phenomenology, as the wresting of
the truth of beings from its everyday or customary understanding, from the
propensity of beings to hide or dissemble their being, is undertaken. (A
familiar topic to us, this wresting business).

The question of being and non-being might perhaps be developed from this
theme of phainesthai in SZ, to the extent that H. wishes to rescue
appearance (zur Sache selbst = sokein ta phainomena?) from the Platonic
onto-logic -- the art-work in "Origin" is no phantasm, no mimetic copy, but
a site of unconcealment, of aletheia. The Platonic parricide would be
(according to "Plato's Doctrine of Truth") the oblivion of aletheia, the
founding word of Parmenides (it is not accidental that the GA53 lecture on
P. is an extended meditation on the history of truth and of falsity).
Perhaps this parricide might be the inadvertent, ignorant act of the tragic
hero (whereby Plato doesn't just 'forget' aletheia, but it is always
already forgotten, the oblivion having happened anterior to Plato's
thought-action; the 'oblivion of aletheia' would then be ambiguous, a
'double-genitive' of which Heidegger is so fond).

The Hegelian "Being-Nothing-Becoming" triad would also proceed from the
oblivion of aletheia ... Heid. says as much in "Hegel und die Griechen"
>from _Wegmarken_: aletheia is the "ungedachte Denkwuerdige".

Cheers,
Paul N. Murphy




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