Sorry for the extraneous ">" marks; I mistyped the address. Try again...
>Aside from the A-1 Oedipus polemic, I do think that Tom Blancato has been
>posing important (if not 'essential') questions concerning _Being and
>Time_, specifically the second part of the First (and only) Division.
>Heidegger does involve himself in dogged aporia in this part of the book,
>to which he repeatedly returned, maybe not to Tom's satisfaction. Still,
>the being-towards-death / guilt / conscience nexus is worthy of
>questioning, vis-a-vis the issue of 'individuation' (Vereinzelung) which
>the thematizing of death (in principle resistent to substitution by others,
>unsurpassable by individual Dasein) draws sharply into relief. Here is
>where both Adorno and Levinas sharpen their polemical knives, to greater or
>lesser effect and astuteness, calling for a reconsideration of aspects of
>Mitsein not elaborated in SZ, of the 'midzone' to which Tom refers.
>
>Yes, the opposition of the everyday and authentic resoluteness seems at
>times to be contrived. Tom refers to 'dispersion' (if I remember
>correctly); *Zerstreuung* is a defining word for das Man, meaning
>dispersion and distraction, into which Dasein falls (or falls apart).
>Gathering together in the Augenblick of anticipatory resoluteness is
>alleged to be the prime accomplishment of Dasein in its encounter with its
>own mortality (an encounter in principle unavailable to the animal, which
>only perishes). This self-gathering also comes to pass in authentically
>responding to the call of conscience. Left out, as Tom has taken great
>pains to show, is a responsiveness to others, which falls decidedly by the
>wayside. A case in point: the death of an other is mentioned in passing in
>the 'Death' chapter, by way of referring to a Tolstoy story, almost in a
>'privative' manner; the issue of 'substitutibility' covers over access to
>the way in which others die for me, the individualized Dasein (for whom my
>being is an issue). Heidegger never mourns others, never mourns their
>irrevocable passing. The existential loss goes unremarked. Antigone's grief
>for the lost brother -- a grief defying the order of public mores and
>political rectitude -- is conspicuously absent from both of Heidegger's
>discussions of the Sophoclean tragedy (EM & Hoelderlins Der Ister). It
>almost seems as though Heidegger were heeding the advice of Plato, who (in
>the Republic) counsels the virile citizen to avoid unseemly displays of
>anguish at the loss of a loved-one (not to mention admonishing the poet and
>the actor for imitating such debased models of comportment).
>
>This said, Heidegger's questioning does not cease with SZ. Michael Eldred's
>fulminations are justified on at least this point: KEEP READING. The
>'later' Heidegger approaches the question of being from a considerably
>altered perspective. I've said it before, but once again: the posing of the
>question of the opening of nonviolence (insert asterisks where you want)
>occurs in Heidegger's writings. Read _Discourse on Thinking_ for starters.
>Or here's a quotation from "On the Essence of Truth", section 5:
>
>"The essence of truth reveals itself as freedom. The latter is ek-sistent,
>disclosive letting beings be. Every mode of open comportment flourishes in
>letting beings be and in each case is a comportment to this or that being."
>
>Seinlassen, letting be, is the condition of free openness towards beings,
>perhaps towards others. Let others be does not mean, ignore them; it means
>non-dominating engagement with their being, bringing it forth solicitously.
>Heidegger, to his detriment, does not elaborate this theme with respect to
>others, but this is a task for thinking to come.
>
>Hoping this isn't incoherent,
>Best regards,
>Paul N. Murphy
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>Aside from the A-1 Oedipus polemic, I do think that Tom Blancato has been
>posing important (if not 'essential') questions concerning _Being and
>Time_, specifically the second part of the First (and only) Division.
>Heidegger does involve himself in dogged aporia in this part of the book,
>to which he repeatedly returned, maybe not to Tom's satisfaction. Still,
>the being-towards-death / guilt / conscience nexus is worthy of
>questioning, vis-a-vis the issue of 'individuation' (Vereinzelung) which
>the thematizing of death (in principle resistent to substitution by others,
>unsurpassable by individual Dasein) draws sharply into relief. Here is
>where both Adorno and Levinas sharpen their polemical knives, to greater or
>lesser effect and astuteness, calling for a reconsideration of aspects of
>Mitsein not elaborated in SZ, of the 'midzone' to which Tom refers.
>
>Yes, the opposition of the everyday and authentic resoluteness seems at
>times to be contrived. Tom refers to 'dispersion' (if I remember
>correctly); *Zerstreuung* is a defining word for das Man, meaning
>dispersion and distraction, into which Dasein falls (or falls apart).
>Gathering together in the Augenblick of anticipatory resoluteness is
>alleged to be the prime accomplishment of Dasein in its encounter with its
>own mortality (an encounter in principle unavailable to the animal, which
>only perishes). This self-gathering also comes to pass in authentically
>responding to the call of conscience. Left out, as Tom has taken great
>pains to show, is a responsiveness to others, which falls decidedly by the
>wayside. A case in point: the death of an other is mentioned in passing in
>the 'Death' chapter, by way of referring to a Tolstoy story, almost in a
>'privative' manner; the issue of 'substitutibility' covers over access to
>the way in which others die for me, the individualized Dasein (for whom my
>being is an issue). Heidegger never mourns others, never mourns their
>irrevocable passing. The existential loss goes unremarked. Antigone's grief
>for the lost brother -- a grief defying the order of public mores and
>political rectitude -- is conspicuously absent from both of Heidegger's
>discussions of the Sophoclean tragedy (EM & Hoelderlins Der Ister). It
>almost seems as though Heidegger were heeding the advice of Plato, who (in
>the Republic) counsels the virile citizen to avoid unseemly displays of
>anguish at the loss of a loved-one (not to mention admonishing the poet and
>the actor for imitating such debased models of comportment).
>
>This said, Heidegger's questioning does not cease with SZ. Michael Eldred's
>fulminations are justified on at least this point: KEEP READING. The
>'later' Heidegger approaches the question of being from a considerably
>altered perspective. I've said it before, but once again: the posing of the
>question of the opening of nonviolence (insert asterisks where you want)
>occurs in Heidegger's writings. Read _Discourse on Thinking_ for starters.
>Or here's a quotation from "On the Essence of Truth", section 5:
>
>"The essence of truth reveals itself as freedom. The latter is ek-sistent,
>disclosive letting beings be. Every mode of open comportment flourishes in
>letting beings be and in each case is a comportment to this or that being."
>
>Seinlassen, letting be, is the condition of free openness towards beings,
>perhaps towards others. Let others be does not mean, ignore them; it means
>non-dominating engagement with their being, bringing it forth solicitously.
>Heidegger, to his detriment, does not elaborate this theme with respect to
>others, but this is a task for thinking to come.
>
>Hoping this isn't incoherent,
>Best regards,
>Paul N. Murphy
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---