Eric Champion wrote:
>Can one be sympathetic to both sides, to mathematical /analytical rigour;
and to the poetic expression
>of metaphor be it Kantian, Nietzschean, Heideggerean or otherwise?
>
>One might well ask: what do we want from the notion of truth, and how must
it satisfy such conditions?
>
>Is it the correspondence theory, or is it some form of personal
heimlichkeit, of attunement to one's world,
>for after all, the world of self is not created by mathematical proofs?
>[...]
>If truth only has meaning independent of us, I question the validity of
even discussing it.
>Yet I am not suggesting an argument for the title above.
>
I feel we just need to settle with the notion of "truth" as a highly
multi-valent concept, as many words in one, all of which may be insidiously
related to each other, but no one of which may be said to be the exclusive
or even dominate sense. The truth is whatever happens to be the case. The
truth is that which conceals nothing. These are two different assertions of
the character of truth, coming at it from different angles, and yet, I can't
help but feel, meeting in the middle.
Why not an argument for the title above? It seems to me that either Socrates
or Protagoras is right. Nietzsche rather sides with Protagoras, I believe.
Heidegger?
Steve
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>Can one be sympathetic to both sides, to mathematical /analytical rigour;
and to the poetic expression
>of metaphor be it Kantian, Nietzschean, Heideggerean or otherwise?
>
>One might well ask: what do we want from the notion of truth, and how must
it satisfy such conditions?
>
>Is it the correspondence theory, or is it some form of personal
heimlichkeit, of attunement to one's world,
>for after all, the world of self is not created by mathematical proofs?
>[...]
>If truth only has meaning independent of us, I question the validity of
even discussing it.
>Yet I am not suggesting an argument for the title above.
>
I feel we just need to settle with the notion of "truth" as a highly
multi-valent concept, as many words in one, all of which may be insidiously
related to each other, but no one of which may be said to be the exclusive
or even dominate sense. The truth is whatever happens to be the case. The
truth is that which conceals nothing. These are two different assertions of
the character of truth, coming at it from different angles, and yet, I can't
help but feel, meeting in the middle.
Why not an argument for the title above? It seems to me that either Socrates
or Protagoras is right. Nietzsche rather sides with Protagoras, I believe.
Heidegger?
Steve
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---