THE TRUTH -- For me a true statement is a correct description of the manner
in which an entity or entities exist, or a correct description of the actual
way, modality or manner in which an entity exists in relation to the way
another entity or entities exist, subject to and depending upon, the statement
being capable of being verified as to the actuality of the entity or
entities - it's as simple as that.
I recognise the importance of using abstractional mathematical signification
in calculations, as long as they truly correspond to the way in which some
[any] entitic [base proof-object of last resort] exists. Even the notion of
'time' to my way of thinking, is tied to the way objects exist. As far as
motion is concerned, it can only be measured in relation to the motion or stasis
of some other entity, whether that entity be the earth's movement around the
sun, sand or water dribbling through a small hole in a piece of glass, or
the regular pulsing of an atomic particle. '
Truth, reality, time, motion, causality — in fact in the case of any one of
Richard Sansom's eight elements of 'The Way The World is,' (TWTWI ) or
Aristotle's catergorical version] and my own 'existential octet,' entities of
ultimate reduction are mapped in ALL existential categorisations as 'examples of
last resort' [like the golden meter rod in the Louvre.] Without entities there
wouldn't even be a 'null set' of TWTWI elements. That is not to say that I
believe 'sets' exist either, but that 'sets' and 'time' and 'number', etc.,
provide important ways for our transient little species to understand TWTWI
while we are still around to do so in this relentless and ever-changing cosmos
of ours.
My own view regarding the matter of truth is that the human statement:
'correctness of statement,' is an abstract concept or idea not associated with any
specific instance. Furthermore, it presupposes a Platonic form of
'correctness,' that is floating around somewhere waiting for somebody to apply it or
incorporate it into a suitable statement.
In other words — the information provided by definer (A) about the world
described by a truth statement claimed as correct, may well be rejected as
erroneous by definer (B). The question is, does the rejection of a truth claim by
(B) as defined by (A) which is claimed as embodying: 'correctness of
statement' invalidate it — or does the very fact that it is defined by the Platonist
definer as being a 'correct statement' ensure that the claim is indeed
truthful? I think not.
On the other hand, in the case of an actual entity, [any entity] no
statement of any sort whatsoever is required — indeed any statement [truth claim or
otherwise] regarding its actuality is superfluous, redundant and tautologous,
for all that is required is to draw somebody's attention to it so that it may
be physically apprehended.
Sadly, 'statemental correctness,' or 'predicational veracity' is a semantic
variable, and whilst some people claim correctness as residing in some
statement, others would dispute the claim and counter with the opposite — that
such and such a thing is incorrect. In the absence of some heavenly enthroned
Plato acting as an arbitrator in the matter, the whole thing might well descend
into disputation and chaos, which is EXACTLY what the result of such
obfuscational logic has led to over the course of the last two thousand years.
If on the other hand I silently slip a pebble into your hand, it is beyond
dispute that what you hold in your palm is actual, and what is actual
corresponds to the human concept of truth, therefore [metaphorically speaking] you
are like a god holding truth in the palm of your hand. The notion of appearing
godlike and in possession of truth will no doubt appeal to many
Heideggerians, and it is to hoped that they do not all immediately rush out and strip the
beaches of pebbles - leaving no shelter for crabs and other shoreline fauna.
Incorrectness regarding the actuality of the pebble would not be an issue,
for if I didn't draw your attention to it, or place it in your hand, then you
would not be aware of its actuality, and you would therefore have no notion of
its actuality at all, and be prevented from either ascertaining the truth
of it, or rejecting any putative falsity of its actuality. Even if you were
under the impression that it was NOT a pebble that you held in your hand, and
represented it as being something else, that would not change the entitic
actuality of the object, for it would continue to be a truthful existential
actualisation of what it really was - it would simply mean that your denotatum was
false.
The way I see it, any statement incorporating claims about both 'truth' and
'existence' are made possible as concepts by their respective counter concepts
'falsehood' and 'non-existence,' which are available for verificational
purposes in the actuality of the 'entities of last recourse' or 'ultimate
reduction', or 'exhibits of physical actuality' or some such title...take your
pick.
Therefore an abstract truth claim such as: 'The Americans are pulling out of
Baghdad," can only be truly verified by a physical check upon the human
entities mapped by the statement — the actualities that are the American
personnel and their military and civilian accoutrements that are, or are not actually
vacating the de facto soil of Iraq.
I doubt very much whether the Iraqi people, or the voters of the US and
Britain would be willing to accept the way that Bush and Blair talk about
entities — they would much prefer to make sure and have somebody physically check
out the US tanks and hardware in the raw so to speak.
For me 'entity + language = truth' is not acceptable. Just think of Blair's
statement about the so-called 'entities' of mass destruction, and the
'language' he used to describe their existence, in which he included the 'fact' that
they could be launched within 15-minutes. All falsity, and all 'entity +
language' that equalled misrepresentation. For me then only 'entity= truth is
relevant, and THAT is precisely the reason for my battles with the
transcendentalists, because their notion of an 'entity' is so primitive and slippery
[abstract objects and so on] it obscures truth — and my small side-show of a
battle is ultimately about the meaning of truth.
Nullius in Verba
_http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/index.htm_
(http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/index.htm)
JUD EVANS - XVANS XPERIENTIALISM
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in which an entity or entities exist, or a correct description of the actual
way, modality or manner in which an entity exists in relation to the way
another entity or entities exist, subject to and depending upon, the statement
being capable of being verified as to the actuality of the entity or
entities - it's as simple as that.
I recognise the importance of using abstractional mathematical signification
in calculations, as long as they truly correspond to the way in which some
[any] entitic [base proof-object of last resort] exists. Even the notion of
'time' to my way of thinking, is tied to the way objects exist. As far as
motion is concerned, it can only be measured in relation to the motion or stasis
of some other entity, whether that entity be the earth's movement around the
sun, sand or water dribbling through a small hole in a piece of glass, or
the regular pulsing of an atomic particle. '
Truth, reality, time, motion, causality — in fact in the case of any one of
Richard Sansom's eight elements of 'The Way The World is,' (TWTWI ) or
Aristotle's catergorical version] and my own 'existential octet,' entities of
ultimate reduction are mapped in ALL existential categorisations as 'examples of
last resort' [like the golden meter rod in the Louvre.] Without entities there
wouldn't even be a 'null set' of TWTWI elements. That is not to say that I
believe 'sets' exist either, but that 'sets' and 'time' and 'number', etc.,
provide important ways for our transient little species to understand TWTWI
while we are still around to do so in this relentless and ever-changing cosmos
of ours.
My own view regarding the matter of truth is that the human statement:
'correctness of statement,' is an abstract concept or idea not associated with any
specific instance. Furthermore, it presupposes a Platonic form of
'correctness,' that is floating around somewhere waiting for somebody to apply it or
incorporate it into a suitable statement.
In other words — the information provided by definer (A) about the world
described by a truth statement claimed as correct, may well be rejected as
erroneous by definer (B). The question is, does the rejection of a truth claim by
(B) as defined by (A) which is claimed as embodying: 'correctness of
statement' invalidate it — or does the very fact that it is defined by the Platonist
definer as being a 'correct statement' ensure that the claim is indeed
truthful? I think not.
On the other hand, in the case of an actual entity, [any entity] no
statement of any sort whatsoever is required — indeed any statement [truth claim or
otherwise] regarding its actuality is superfluous, redundant and tautologous,
for all that is required is to draw somebody's attention to it so that it may
be physically apprehended.
Sadly, 'statemental correctness,' or 'predicational veracity' is a semantic
variable, and whilst some people claim correctness as residing in some
statement, others would dispute the claim and counter with the opposite — that
such and such a thing is incorrect. In the absence of some heavenly enthroned
Plato acting as an arbitrator in the matter, the whole thing might well descend
into disputation and chaos, which is EXACTLY what the result of such
obfuscational logic has led to over the course of the last two thousand years.
If on the other hand I silently slip a pebble into your hand, it is beyond
dispute that what you hold in your palm is actual, and what is actual
corresponds to the human concept of truth, therefore [metaphorically speaking] you
are like a god holding truth in the palm of your hand. The notion of appearing
godlike and in possession of truth will no doubt appeal to many
Heideggerians, and it is to hoped that they do not all immediately rush out and strip the
beaches of pebbles - leaving no shelter for crabs and other shoreline fauna.
Incorrectness regarding the actuality of the pebble would not be an issue,
for if I didn't draw your attention to it, or place it in your hand, then you
would not be aware of its actuality, and you would therefore have no notion of
its actuality at all, and be prevented from either ascertaining the truth
of it, or rejecting any putative falsity of its actuality. Even if you were
under the impression that it was NOT a pebble that you held in your hand, and
represented it as being something else, that would not change the entitic
actuality of the object, for it would continue to be a truthful existential
actualisation of what it really was - it would simply mean that your denotatum was
false.
The way I see it, any statement incorporating claims about both 'truth' and
'existence' are made possible as concepts by their respective counter concepts
'falsehood' and 'non-existence,' which are available for verificational
purposes in the actuality of the 'entities of last recourse' or 'ultimate
reduction', or 'exhibits of physical actuality' or some such title...take your
pick.
Therefore an abstract truth claim such as: 'The Americans are pulling out of
Baghdad," can only be truly verified by a physical check upon the human
entities mapped by the statement — the actualities that are the American
personnel and their military and civilian accoutrements that are, or are not actually
vacating the de facto soil of Iraq.
I doubt very much whether the Iraqi people, or the voters of the US and
Britain would be willing to accept the way that Bush and Blair talk about
entities — they would much prefer to make sure and have somebody physically check
out the US tanks and hardware in the raw so to speak.
For me 'entity + language = truth' is not acceptable. Just think of Blair's
statement about the so-called 'entities' of mass destruction, and the
'language' he used to describe their existence, in which he included the 'fact' that
they could be launched within 15-minutes. All falsity, and all 'entity +
language' that equalled misrepresentation. For me then only 'entity= truth is
relevant, and THAT is precisely the reason for my battles with the
transcendentalists, because their notion of an 'entity' is so primitive and slippery
[abstract objects and so on] it obscures truth — and my small side-show of a
battle is ultimately about the meaning of truth.
Nullius in Verba
_http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/index.htm_
(http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/index.htm)
JUD EVANS - XVANS XPERIENTIALISM
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