When Strauss lastly holds on to an absolute truth,
reproaching Heidegger that the resolve/Entschlossenheit
of BT leads right to the dubious engagement in 1933,
it's time to look a bit closer.
Wwhere does Strauss' own proposal lead to?
The sticking to an absolute truth - here a revelated
religious one, which to him is undoubtable - in the face
of threatening relativism, seems to be the only thing left.
And fits wonderfully together with the struggle for the
conservation, and that means enhancement, of political and
economic power in the new land of milk and honey.
Strangely, what can be seen here, is that the absolute
truth, that should do it, is *itself grounded with help of the
terror of the alternative. So a conscient WILLING of what IN ITSELF
is not coercive at all. That is not religion, but will to power.
And will to power the extremest form of subjectivism, insofar
a foundation is framed successfully in terms of will - the inherent
truth of what one believes is in this respect not relevant - , and,
secondly, insofar truth is considered in function of security.
So it is probably also only true in the system-immanent sense, what
he accuses Heidegger of: that H's historical relativizations lead to
the destruction of all truth. Instead one can see Heidegger asking
incessantly for the essence of truth itself, for the sake of truth
*itself* (openness) as the one necessary question, after nihilism has
become unavoidable.
It is important now to see that this far more risky and difficult
undertaking of Heidegger MUST be blackened and larded with Auschwitz,
in order to save one's own truth - legitimately according to one's
own standards. What can be detected then, is the fearful monomanic,
autistic core of such a position, which, seeing no possibilities
(abilities) to make contact with what is apparently threatening,
sees no alternative but enmity.
And, looking a bit further than Strauss alone, generally the consequence
of an insufficient critique of subjectivism, understood as relativism:
enmeshment in a more fundamental subjectivism, that one is not ready to
consider, because the obsession with one's safety leaves no room for it.
rdb
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
reproaching Heidegger that the resolve/Entschlossenheit
of BT leads right to the dubious engagement in 1933,
it's time to look a bit closer.
Wwhere does Strauss' own proposal lead to?
The sticking to an absolute truth - here a revelated
religious one, which to him is undoubtable - in the face
of threatening relativism, seems to be the only thing left.
And fits wonderfully together with the struggle for the
conservation, and that means enhancement, of political and
economic power in the new land of milk and honey.
Strangely, what can be seen here, is that the absolute
truth, that should do it, is *itself grounded with help of the
terror of the alternative. So a conscient WILLING of what IN ITSELF
is not coercive at all. That is not religion, but will to power.
And will to power the extremest form of subjectivism, insofar
a foundation is framed successfully in terms of will - the inherent
truth of what one believes is in this respect not relevant - , and,
secondly, insofar truth is considered in function of security.
So it is probably also only true in the system-immanent sense, what
he accuses Heidegger of: that H's historical relativizations lead to
the destruction of all truth. Instead one can see Heidegger asking
incessantly for the essence of truth itself, for the sake of truth
*itself* (openness) as the one necessary question, after nihilism has
become unavoidable.
It is important now to see that this far more risky and difficult
undertaking of Heidegger MUST be blackened and larded with Auschwitz,
in order to save one's own truth - legitimately according to one's
own standards. What can be detected then, is the fearful monomanic,
autistic core of such a position, which, seeing no possibilities
(abilities) to make contact with what is apparently threatening,
sees no alternative but enmity.
And, looking a bit further than Strauss alone, generally the consequence
of an insufficient critique of subjectivism, understood as relativism:
enmeshment in a more fundamental subjectivism, that one is not ready to
consider, because the obsession with one's safety leaves no room for it.
rdb
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---