In a message dated 18/06/2004 19:08:08 GMT Standard Time,
[email protected]_ (mailto:allen.scult@xxxxxxxxx) writes:
Allen writes:
The following is submitted in a condition even more raw than usual:
Jud:
A person should steer clear of those sort of clubs. The older one gets the
longer the weals take to heal, and one could end up as the only one on the
beach with his shirt on. ;-)
Allen:
I'm reading Cavell on Wittgenstein and thinking about how community,
especially philosophical community-or more especially THIS community-- is
constituted to the extent that we can speak WITH one another at all. By speaking with
one another, I mean that some of us presume that Heidegger speaks for us, at
least insofar as we presume he is not merely projecting his own way of being
conscious onto ours. He presumed a similar presumption which I presume enabled
him to speak for himself as a Dasein in the way that he does. Jud: The
hopeless unquestioning cases Allen refers to - the ones that presume that Heidegger
speaks for them are thankfully not the majority on this list. There are many
that question Heidegger and use his notions in their own modified version as
a way of understanding their own lives. The best example of a pragmatic,
constructive, questioning phenomemologist on this list is in my opinion Malclom,
as his last message confirms. He has a great deal of commonsense.
Jud:
As to whether the conjunction of Heidegger's presumptions and Allen's
illations is an example of a felicitous confluence of two independently formed and
arrived at Weltanschauungen based upon the acceptance of similar
circumstantial evidence thus concluding in analogous coincidental conclusions, or an
example of Heidegger successfully exerting his malign influence on and
overwhelming Allen's discriminatory faculties - I think the latter.
Once the neologic and obfuscatory argot of Heideggerianism is accepted and
utilised in philosophical discussion the victim is lost and can virtually be
written off as having a mind of his own. With certain notable exceptions, what
emerges from the conceptual chrysalis is a fully fledged Heidegger-clone
mindlessly mouthing metaphysical meaninglessness. The result? Continual attempts
to discover additional aspects of the world that can be successfully written
about in order to cut the conceptual cloth to new clothes, and there seems
to be a never-ending search for new 'angles,' where Heidegger's material can
be made relevant to some new gimmicky interpretation of the world.
It is more likely that Allen, like most people, chanced upon and was simply
taken in by Heidegger's clever obnubilated and mythologic rhetoric. Some
people are more attracted to an ascendant or dominant other, and subjugate their
critical faculties in order to feel more secure in the bosom of a perceived
certainty. If, once the decision is made to throw in one's passive lot with a
dominant other or paramount leader, others [perhaps staff members or
students] in their peer group do the same, it reinforces and provides confirmation
that the choice of idol is the rightful one. It would be a great mistake to
believe that Heidegger was not projecting his own way of being conscious as a
cognitive exemplar, and was unconcerned as to whether or not his ideas would
influence others and be taken up by them, his whole style [even his questioning
is a hectoring] is declamatory, and Basic Concepts is sheer demagoguery in
the style of the 'thinking man's thug — not to mention the disgusting Rectoral
Nazi diatribe.
Allen:
What gives Heidegger the "right" to speak of Dasein as he does-as if it's
any more than a projection? More importantly, why do I trust him, give him the
right, to "speak for me" at least most of the time. . . and Jud doesn't?
Jud:
Once one throws in one's lot with what amounts to no more than a
philosophical cult with 'Being' situated in place of God, giving the right to speak on
one's behalf is natural and unquestioning.
Although most people think of cults as being religious, they can also be
found in political, athletic, philosophical, racial or psychotherapeutic arenas.
Compare these classical cult criteria with their attitudes of the committed
Heideggerians on this list
(1) The acceptance of a charismatic leader [most often male] as being
dominant. Like Heidegger, many cult leaders truly are charismatic people, and are
able to influence people to believe them.
(2) The use of an esoteric vocabulary of neologisms particular to the cult.
(3) The continual use of fear. "The end is nigh - Only God can help us now."
(4) Evasive and obfuscatory tactics when questioned by people outside of the
group.
(5) Refuseniks who reject the doctrine are said to be not capable of
understanding rather than being percipient rejectionists.
(6) Opponents are seen as being evil [faggots] because they do not accept
the doctrines.
(7) Opposing views are denigrated as false and 'untrustworthy.' Allen:
Allen:
This is almost a "primal" matter of philosophy, one which Cavell suggests,
at another level, preoccupies Wittgenstein when he argues for the impossibility
of a "private language." In Cavell's words: "What is the presumption which
asks us to look to ourselves to find whether we share another's secret
consciousness? What gives one the right?"
Jud:
No '"right" is required. It is a natural part of human behaviour to evaluate
the ideas of others and take up a position of agreement or disagreement.
There is no childishly conceived "secret consciousness" — a person either
reveals what he or she thinks — or does not. We may make guesses as to what is left
unsaid based upon the way they behave in relation to other things, and we do
this in order to understand the other as part of our social interaction and
ultimately in relation to our survival as individuals. 'Philosophy' doesn't
exist as such — it is simply the way that humans act — for thinking is an
action. Committed [unquestioning] Heideggerian cultists act in similar ways to
Heidegger, i. e., they copy the cognitive actions of the person who is for him
the dominant [philosophical] male. That is not to say that they also copy
all of his social or political actions, and run around everywhere Seig Heiling
anything that moves and proclaiming His God Hitler as the font of all wisdom.
Allen:
He goes on to say this line of questioning is wrong for philosophy, because
philosophy "ought to point away from the self not towards it." (20) But in
this very pointing away, the question is preserved, for it is saying that the
philosophy of which it is a part is not mere projection. I may explain other
philosophizing as one kind of projection or another ( as Jud does Heidegger's)
but not my own, nor those that speak for me. The presumption of those
philosophies, by the very fact that it is Heidegger's presumption, mine, and
perhaps yours, remains an open question--no, the open question-- which is at the
core of said philosophies.
Jud:
Personally I find it difficult to imagine how it would be possible to
totally point away from 'the self' not towards it, or to comment on the world from
any other standpoint other than their own neuronal activity. The ground of
any feeling, thinking or cognitive pointing is the embrained body or human
holism [which is continually confused with the notion of 'self.'] Even when we
attempt to put our selves 'into the mind of another person,' it is our OWN
version of what WE think is going on in the 'mind' of the other. Most people
address a subject as seen from their own perspective, even when that subject
is their favourite subject — themselves. Heidegger attempts [unsuccessfully]
to universalise the 'self' with his creation of Dasein as a robot-like human
cog in a revitalised and idealised right-wing Germany based upon the Greek
slave-based society he so admired.
Some people, of which the unthinking type Heideggerian is a prime example,
have a 'need' to 'belong' — to share a common presumption or belief system
with an extended 'family of fellow thinkers', to construct a 'togetherness'
which is perhaps missing in other areas of their lives - I do not.
Best regards,
Jud.
Nullius in Verba
_http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/index.htm_
(http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/index.htm)
JUD EVANS - XVANS XPERIENTIALISM
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[email protected]_ (mailto:allen.scult@xxxxxxxxx) writes:
Allen writes:
The following is submitted in a condition even more raw than usual:
Jud:
A person should steer clear of those sort of clubs. The older one gets the
longer the weals take to heal, and one could end up as the only one on the
beach with his shirt on. ;-)
Allen:
I'm reading Cavell on Wittgenstein and thinking about how community,
especially philosophical community-or more especially THIS community-- is
constituted to the extent that we can speak WITH one another at all. By speaking with
one another, I mean that some of us presume that Heidegger speaks for us, at
least insofar as we presume he is not merely projecting his own way of being
conscious onto ours. He presumed a similar presumption which I presume enabled
him to speak for himself as a Dasein in the way that he does. Jud: The
hopeless unquestioning cases Allen refers to - the ones that presume that Heidegger
speaks for them are thankfully not the majority on this list. There are many
that question Heidegger and use his notions in their own modified version as
a way of understanding their own lives. The best example of a pragmatic,
constructive, questioning phenomemologist on this list is in my opinion Malclom,
as his last message confirms. He has a great deal of commonsense.
Jud:
As to whether the conjunction of Heidegger's presumptions and Allen's
illations is an example of a felicitous confluence of two independently formed and
arrived at Weltanschauungen based upon the acceptance of similar
circumstantial evidence thus concluding in analogous coincidental conclusions, or an
example of Heidegger successfully exerting his malign influence on and
overwhelming Allen's discriminatory faculties - I think the latter.
Once the neologic and obfuscatory argot of Heideggerianism is accepted and
utilised in philosophical discussion the victim is lost and can virtually be
written off as having a mind of his own. With certain notable exceptions, what
emerges from the conceptual chrysalis is a fully fledged Heidegger-clone
mindlessly mouthing metaphysical meaninglessness. The result? Continual attempts
to discover additional aspects of the world that can be successfully written
about in order to cut the conceptual cloth to new clothes, and there seems
to be a never-ending search for new 'angles,' where Heidegger's material can
be made relevant to some new gimmicky interpretation of the world.
It is more likely that Allen, like most people, chanced upon and was simply
taken in by Heidegger's clever obnubilated and mythologic rhetoric. Some
people are more attracted to an ascendant or dominant other, and subjugate their
critical faculties in order to feel more secure in the bosom of a perceived
certainty. If, once the decision is made to throw in one's passive lot with a
dominant other or paramount leader, others [perhaps staff members or
students] in their peer group do the same, it reinforces and provides confirmation
that the choice of idol is the rightful one. It would be a great mistake to
believe that Heidegger was not projecting his own way of being conscious as a
cognitive exemplar, and was unconcerned as to whether or not his ideas would
influence others and be taken up by them, his whole style [even his questioning
is a hectoring] is declamatory, and Basic Concepts is sheer demagoguery in
the style of the 'thinking man's thug — not to mention the disgusting Rectoral
Nazi diatribe.
Allen:
What gives Heidegger the "right" to speak of Dasein as he does-as if it's
any more than a projection? More importantly, why do I trust him, give him the
right, to "speak for me" at least most of the time. . . and Jud doesn't?
Jud:
Once one throws in one's lot with what amounts to no more than a
philosophical cult with 'Being' situated in place of God, giving the right to speak on
one's behalf is natural and unquestioning.
Although most people think of cults as being religious, they can also be
found in political, athletic, philosophical, racial or psychotherapeutic arenas.
Compare these classical cult criteria with their attitudes of the committed
Heideggerians on this list
(1) The acceptance of a charismatic leader [most often male] as being
dominant. Like Heidegger, many cult leaders truly are charismatic people, and are
able to influence people to believe them.
(2) The use of an esoteric vocabulary of neologisms particular to the cult.
(3) The continual use of fear. "The end is nigh - Only God can help us now."
(4) Evasive and obfuscatory tactics when questioned by people outside of the
group.
(5) Refuseniks who reject the doctrine are said to be not capable of
understanding rather than being percipient rejectionists.
(6) Opponents are seen as being evil [faggots] because they do not accept
the doctrines.
(7) Opposing views are denigrated as false and 'untrustworthy.' Allen:
Allen:
This is almost a "primal" matter of philosophy, one which Cavell suggests,
at another level, preoccupies Wittgenstein when he argues for the impossibility
of a "private language." In Cavell's words: "What is the presumption which
asks us to look to ourselves to find whether we share another's secret
consciousness? What gives one the right?"
Jud:
No '"right" is required. It is a natural part of human behaviour to evaluate
the ideas of others and take up a position of agreement or disagreement.
There is no childishly conceived "secret consciousness" — a person either
reveals what he or she thinks — or does not. We may make guesses as to what is left
unsaid based upon the way they behave in relation to other things, and we do
this in order to understand the other as part of our social interaction and
ultimately in relation to our survival as individuals. 'Philosophy' doesn't
exist as such — it is simply the way that humans act — for thinking is an
action. Committed [unquestioning] Heideggerian cultists act in similar ways to
Heidegger, i. e., they copy the cognitive actions of the person who is for him
the dominant [philosophical] male. That is not to say that they also copy
all of his social or political actions, and run around everywhere Seig Heiling
anything that moves and proclaiming His God Hitler as the font of all wisdom.
Allen:
He goes on to say this line of questioning is wrong for philosophy, because
philosophy "ought to point away from the self not towards it." (20) But in
this very pointing away, the question is preserved, for it is saying that the
philosophy of which it is a part is not mere projection. I may explain other
philosophizing as one kind of projection or another ( as Jud does Heidegger's)
but not my own, nor those that speak for me. The presumption of those
philosophies, by the very fact that it is Heidegger's presumption, mine, and
perhaps yours, remains an open question--no, the open question-- which is at the
core of said philosophies.
Jud:
Personally I find it difficult to imagine how it would be possible to
totally point away from 'the self' not towards it, or to comment on the world from
any other standpoint other than their own neuronal activity. The ground of
any feeling, thinking or cognitive pointing is the embrained body or human
holism [which is continually confused with the notion of 'self.'] Even when we
attempt to put our selves 'into the mind of another person,' it is our OWN
version of what WE think is going on in the 'mind' of the other. Most people
address a subject as seen from their own perspective, even when that subject
is their favourite subject — themselves. Heidegger attempts [unsuccessfully]
to universalise the 'self' with his creation of Dasein as a robot-like human
cog in a revitalised and idealised right-wing Germany based upon the Greek
slave-based society he so admired.
Some people, of which the unthinking type Heideggerian is a prime example,
have a 'need' to 'belong' — to share a common presumption or belief system
with an extended 'family of fellow thinkers', to construct a 'togetherness'
which is perhaps missing in other areas of their lives - I do not.
Best regards,
Jud.
Nullius in Verba
_http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/index.htm_
(http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/index.htm)
JUD EVANS - XVANS XPERIENTIALISM
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