RE: Will de Power and the Burning Bush



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GEVANS613@xxxxxxx
Verzonden: dinsdag 22 juni 2004 0:33
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Onderwerp: Re: Will de Power and the Burning Bush






Jud:
EVERYONE speaks with words that they DID make. It is physically impossible
to speak other people's words — only THEY can do that. It IS possible
however
to speak the SAME words as another person — but THAT is a COMPLETELY
DIFFERENT
thing. The trouble with that is that OTHER PEOPLE'S WORDS may not carry the
SAME MEANING as YOUR own use of the same words.

Rene:
But that is a problem only AFTER they've understood the meaning of the word,
without which they even could not quarrel over the meaning.
This everyday understanding, common sense if you will, is not reducible to a
relation of name and object, because this always already (factical) situation
is characterized by a *structure* of meanings. To Dasein's world, being
amidst
things which also always already have their place in a meaning pattern,
belongs
what Heidegger calls Bedeutsamkeit, significance. (BT, par. 18) Through us,
through being-in-the-world, also things at hand are in a world. And all talk
of
the things themselves, also the scientific variant, can only recur to this
originary
situation, never transcend it! It would be like (but not the same) asking in
the
case of a centimetre, what it is apart from the metrical system.

Jud:
Heidegger employs Bedeutsamkeit with the same effect as a one-legged man in
an arse-kicking competition — he hasn't got a bloody clue.


See, you're leaving the arena before having really begun. I, or Heidegger
make a point, merely a starting-point, and you're already gone,
into the always ready position of outsider, with only one worry: get out
and stay out. Just that in your case it's more clear than with followers
of the man, who, when reaching that point, start being original, or show other
kinds of lying towards what they cannot handle. The question of Bedeutsamkeit
is real, there's a real problem hidden there, it has nothing to do with left
or right, but they don't want it. Widerwille.

When Heidegger is talking in BT of the being, whose Being is essential a
problem to itself, he adds later that note: but this being is geschichtliches
being-in-the-world. The lying is historically retrievable.



Here Heidegger makes his TERRIBLE and FUNDAMENTAL mistake.
He takes it for granted that having been 'thrown into the world' [as I was
and the rest of the millions of positivists/analyticals/nominalists/don't give
a damnists]
that most non Germans ACCEPT the right wing crap that we are presented with.
For Heidegger with his fantasies of Teutonic conservative conceptualism
one is shunted or parachuted into a world and immediately ACCEPTS all of the
crap that the older generation has set up in readiness for the arrival and
uncomplainingly dons the junior version of the uniform and jackboots and can
be safely relied upon to act accordingly.
This is UTTER PHILOSOPHICAL BILGEWATER. Most people nowadays — and I am not
speaking about Zombie Germany in the 1920s/1930s - DO NOT accept the barrel of
existentialist diarrhoea with its philosophical floaters into which they
are deposited post partem. They MAY HAVE DONE in the mid twentieth century when
the education of the working classes was pitched at a level necessary for
the production of shop assistants and waitresses — but nowadays the attitude of
even a moderately educated person of the lower classes to Heideggerians is
one of ribald laughter — and rightly so, for as a viable way of looking at
the world it's totally and utterly passé — ridiculous and clapped out —
finitio — caput — it cannot even be graced by the name of 'philosophy' — it's
just a load of old crap. I just CANNOT understand any aspiring academic with his
or her eye on the career-ball staying with it as a long-term vocational
option — if I was an academic with any hopes of preferment - I would drop
Heideggerianism as if I had the wrong end of a shitty stick.
The name of the game is to put as much distance between you and
Heideggerianism as rapidly and quietly as possible before you are presented with the
dreaded red card. You don't agree? Then just remember my words.
West under attack? Twin towers? Beheadings? "Only God can help us now!"
GO FIGURE!

SNIP
Jud: [früher]
in order to create a combination of sounds that convey a meaning. It started
with basic verbal signs like ugh-ugh,
and developed from there. Between ugh-ugh and a meaningful world there is
only an abyss. We're not
reducible to animals, or proto-humans. Knowledge of (pre)history has its
source in being-in-the-world, not the other way around. Words have different
meanings however — the word
Faggot is an extremely offensive word in America, whereas in Britain it is
either
a bundle of wood for a fire, or a type of fried food found in the north of
England. Some words do not cause problems — proper names like Rene and Jud
for
example — but the abstract nouns so beloved of Heidegger are the most tricky
and
dangerous words that anybody can use.

Rene:
Very true.

Jud: [früher]
That is why slippery old Heidegger likes
them so much — being virtually meaningless semantically — it is well nigh
impossible to pin them down — and so transcendentalist conversation drones
on
and on like a pilotless plane which has lost contact with ground-control.

Rene:
Why is everybody telling lies about words? Like that they would be
neurophysiological or instruments of communication. Trusting scientific
witchcraft,
Jud?

Jud:
When people use words in philosophical conversation, they are NOT telling
lies with words — they are using words in a way that has a DIFFERENT MEANING
for
them as they conceived of by others. Problems begin when people come to
believe that the ONLY CORRECT meanings of words is the meaning which is
meaningful for THEM.

Rene:
When i am right that words always include things and a world, and mortal
being-in-the-world, then a real philosophical fight is not a fight over
'mere' words. You analysts and positivists are trying to escape into some
sort of untouchableness (like Anthony), but there is no escaping from
being-in-the world, there is only a taking over of it. Also analyzing
essential problems away, is being-in-the-world and responding to facticity.

Jud:
I am LESS like Anthony than a flea's rectum compared to George Bush's
condom-polluted swimming pool.
WORDS are just SIGNS. They are SIGNIFICATIONS that represent people's
THOUGHTS.
They don't 'INCLUDE' F--- ALL - they merely act as a METHOD of COMMUNICATION
of the IDEAS of HUMAN entities.
There is no BEING IN THE WORLD - there is only THOSE THAT BE. Look in the
mirror Rene and you will see
WHAT IT IS ALL REALLY ABOUT. There can be no 'taking over of Being in the
World - simply because there is NO 'being in the world
there is only what IS IN THE WORLD - which is you and me and your computer
and your dear son and your toilet seat and lavatory paper and your bike
and the library and the Town Hall and the kettle in the kitchen and that
book of Holderlin's poetry and the can opener and that tree next door which
sheds its leaves over your lawn and the bus that refused to stop for you and that
pretty girl in the library and...

Very true, Jud, but i cannot help to read a poetical tinge in that summation.
I stressed before that being and truth etc. are nothing beyond or behind
the things of everyday, they are the nothing of these things themselves,
the nothing wherein they are floating, incl. ourselves. In fact, it looks
so much like nothing, that thematizing it, looks like nothing too.
That is the lousy nothing as the lousy basis of lousy nihilism: please let's not
take the world, and that means oneself, seriously. It only makes one feel like an
idiot. But he has shown, to me that is, that staying in that impossible position,
pays off. Like, differently, the poets, who are telling the things of the world.
Rimbaud:

Au bois, il y a un oiseau, son chant vous arrête et vous fait rougir.
Il y a une horloge qui ne sonne pas.
Il y a une fondrière avec un nid de bêtes blanches.
Il y a une cathédrale qui descend et un lac qui monte.
Il y a une petite voiture abandonnée dans le taillis, ou qui descend le sentier en courant, enrubannée.
Il y a une troupe de petits comédiens en costumes, aperçus à travers la lisière de bois.
Il y a enfin, quand l'on a faim et soif, quelqu'un qui vous chasse.

This is certainly more childish and less effective than the inventory of a grocery,
but still... The exclusive attention to these randomly named things, unconnected,
evokes paradoxically something else that is not there: let's call it the Bedeutsamkeit,
the lack of a signification, possibly even a greatness, of all these things.
Indeed, all that is important in Heidegger, 'does not exist', and as such is nothing,
but it is a nothing that touches us, calls for us. And that might turn everything
existing away from the enslavement of the merely extant. Because 'really' the existence
of a thing as such is not much, and fleeting existING all there 'is'.

cheers
rene











the rest later during the course of what life remains for you Rene - thanks.…


Cheers,

Jud.





Nullius in Verba

_http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/index.htm_
(http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/index.htm)
JUD EVANS - XVANS XPERIENTIALISM



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