MICHAELP: Nothing [literally] could be less an ab-straction than be-ing. To see be-ing as an ab-straction one would have to proceed from beings, calculate their
> common-ness, work out what was most general, shared, either empirically or
> through the ex-traction of some principle(s) that all things/beings were
> grounded in, etc; thus extracting be-ing from beings.
GCM: REFORMULATION: If being is not an abstraction from beings then // being // is something wholly different from beings. This is simply incoherent. When Heidegger said the ontological was grounded in the ontic, ontology is definitely a type of generalization about the being-ness of beings and is still derived from beings. Actually, his point was, There is ONE special being, the purely, absolutely, specifically ontic from which all possible knowledge of ontology can only be derived, that is, my own existence, a most specific and particularly ontic // being //.
MICHAELP: Then we would not in any way whatsoever be dealing with anything Heidegger means by be-ing: precisely HIS critique of all previous metaphysics, that be-ing is identified with 'beingness' (what is common/general/shared amongst all beings) if it is not identified with some highest (god(s)), most common (matter/energy), ubiquitous ('society'), etc, particular being.
GCM: I can't make heads or tails of this.
MICHAELP: So, briefly, if you label be-ing as an abstraction, then you can not be speaking of what Heidegger means by "be-ing";
GCM: I don't think you meant this as an authoritarian dictum that is to be simply accepted and not understood.
MICHAELP: Of course, you can speak of other conceptions of being as abstractions.
GCM: Thank you.
MICHAELP: Note, I am not talking of what and what does not exist -- that is a problem for nominalists, not for me -- just concerning the business of labelling be-ing as an abstraction (which would effectively be 'deriving' be-ing from (an
> ex-traction from) beings, which would make be-ing equivalent to a
> common-ness of beings, or beingness; whereas, _on the contrary_, it [is]
> be-ing that grants beings their being (that being) at all).
GCM: What Heidegger meant by ES GIBT was a pure and literal // There is //, that is, all beings are just . . . there . . . for you. No explanation is at all obvious, though many are willing to append one. It is a matter of surprize as in "Why is there anything, anything at all, rather than nothing?" Each specific being as well as beings as a whole are all // given // as in a mathematical, geometrical, or logical axiom, that is, something must be // given // before the problem can be understood. BUT THERE IS NO GIVER ever even implied in Heidegger. // Being // also is // given // however being is considered. And if the ground of the ontological is the ontic, then that ground isw an object, an object that can be scrutinized and sub-divided and broken down into parts that can be sub-divided and . . . etc., etc.
It essentially becomes a problem very much like William James' attempt to define // religious experience // in such a way it can be scientifically studied -- HE HAS TO GO AROUND THE PERIFERY! HE CAN NEVER GET TO THE CORE OF THE MATTER! Actually, if one thinks of any // experience // this way, as an object of scientific study in itself, one will have the same problem every time Micheal Foucault has clearly shown this in the historical variations of the concept of sex. After studying a number of conceptions of sex, each which only covers an extracted and dissassociated part alone, one begins to realize one has a number of parts that CANNOT BE PUT TOGETHER AGAIN! They are not homogenous! Each concept of sex is a different thing to the individual mind that conceives it. Communication becomes distorted, bogged down, totally confused. No one can figure out what another person is precisely talking about when they talk about sex. And all your confidence that you know what sex is, is, when
expounded, shown to be a mere personal, private emotion that corresponds to no one else.
This is exactly Heidegger's quandery with // Being //. If it is ontological, it is grounded on the ontic, an object, a unique, absolutely personal object, and as such can communicate absolutely nothing to anyone else. If it is not a personal object, then it is an indifferent thing, and no one is interested. If it is only ontological, then it is merely the study of generalizing, and very few people are interested. If it is ME, then at least I am interested, but I can not tell you why I am interesting. "Who . . . I mean, WHO the shit does he think he is . . . anyways? He's just another 'Joe' just like me."
Later
'Sincerely'
Gary C. Moore
>
> Hope this is clear (and helps).
>
> regards
>
> michaelP
>
>
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