In his post of 9/1/95, Malcolm Riddoch describes his attempt (if I
understand it correctly) to interpret authenticity in BT as a phenomenon
of will, more specifically as a mode of will to power, and thus as
something that the later Heidegger would reject because it obliterates
the space in which being manifests itself.
As a context for considering this line of interpretation (though
obviously it doesn't decide the matter), it might be useful to look at
Heidegger's various remarks about will and willing in BT itself. Does
BT present authenticity as a phenomenon of will?
On the one hand, Heidegger does associate authenticity with
"willing to have a conscience" [Gewissenhabenwollen--"wanting to have a
conscience" in the Macquarrie translation]. On the other hand, he also
says that willing is a derivative phenomenon, based on structures
operative at a more fundamental level. In this latter vein, he
describes will and drive as "modifications of care" (SZ 211/254), and
says that willing is possible only on the basis of a prior disclosure
and self-projecting (SZ 194/238). Here he seems to associate willing with
matters of concern or solicitude (i.e. with worldly things or with
others), not with care for one's own way of being.
Heidegger makes the point that "to any willing, there belongs
something willed [ein Gewolltes], which has already made itself definite
in terms of a 'for-the-sake-of-which'" (SZ 194/239). Authenticity
doesn't seem to me to fit this characterization of a "something willed"
very well. It isn't something that can be made definite in the way a
specific course of action can be. Authenticity implies a certain way of
understanding what we do, a certain disposition toward what we do, a
certain way of talking about what we do--but not that we do any specific
kind of thing or act for the sake of any specific end. Thus I am inclined
to say that the Heidegger of BT, in his more considered moments at
least, wants shy away from saying that we "will" to be authentic.
Of course, there are no doubt other ways of construing will.
Maybe it could be shown that the later Heidegger, reading Nietszche and
moving away from phenomenology, has developed a different understanding
of will. And maybe that understanding would make it more plausible to
interpret authenticity in BT as a phenomenon of will. In any case, I
hope we'll see more discussion of Malcolm's post.
-- Phil Miller
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
------------------
understand it correctly) to interpret authenticity in BT as a phenomenon
of will, more specifically as a mode of will to power, and thus as
something that the later Heidegger would reject because it obliterates
the space in which being manifests itself.
As a context for considering this line of interpretation (though
obviously it doesn't decide the matter), it might be useful to look at
Heidegger's various remarks about will and willing in BT itself. Does
BT present authenticity as a phenomenon of will?
On the one hand, Heidegger does associate authenticity with
"willing to have a conscience" [Gewissenhabenwollen--"wanting to have a
conscience" in the Macquarrie translation]. On the other hand, he also
says that willing is a derivative phenomenon, based on structures
operative at a more fundamental level. In this latter vein, he
describes will and drive as "modifications of care" (SZ 211/254), and
says that willing is possible only on the basis of a prior disclosure
and self-projecting (SZ 194/238). Here he seems to associate willing with
matters of concern or solicitude (i.e. with worldly things or with
others), not with care for one's own way of being.
Heidegger makes the point that "to any willing, there belongs
something willed [ein Gewolltes], which has already made itself definite
in terms of a 'for-the-sake-of-which'" (SZ 194/239). Authenticity
doesn't seem to me to fit this characterization of a "something willed"
very well. It isn't something that can be made definite in the way a
specific course of action can be. Authenticity implies a certain way of
understanding what we do, a certain disposition toward what we do, a
certain way of talking about what we do--but not that we do any specific
kind of thing or act for the sake of any specific end. Thus I am inclined
to say that the Heidegger of BT, in his more considered moments at
least, wants shy away from saying that we "will" to be authentic.
Of course, there are no doubt other ways of construing will.
Maybe it could be shown that the later Heidegger, reading Nietszche and
moving away from phenomenology, has developed a different understanding
of will. And maybe that understanding would make it more plausible to
interpret authenticity in BT as a phenomenon of will. In any case, I
hope we'll see more discussion of Malcolm's post.
-- Phil Miller
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
------------------