I have a slightly different take on the subjects Chris has been
talking about (there is, though, I am sure, plenty of 'space' where
we overlap). Anyway, I'll toss it out and see if there are any
responses.
I think that in very broad terms most every "posty" type (I say
that since obviously alot of them -- i.e., Lacanians -- position
themselves strictly against 'post-structuralism' -- which,
unfortunately, means they often don't know who their friends are)
advances through different degrees and different measures, the
following ontology:
(1) There is nothing outside the whole;
(2) The whole is not 'whole'
(3) This 'nothing' is not 'good for nothing'.
The usual method (by no means the only one) for advancing this is
to show how language, consciousness, the subject, or some such
category, presupposes or invokes a 'beyond' that provides its
'conditions of possibility and impossibility' -- i.e., Foucault's
man and his doubles, Derrida's differance and other
infrastructures, Lacan's kernel of the Real, Nietzsche's force and
will to power, Deleuze's (non)-being or ?-being (or Ideas,
ordinals, etc., he has employs alot of different terms), etc. This
is how these guys (and gals, though I haven't mentioned any here)
oppose 'metaphysical' theories which show how the subject,
consciousness, etc., presupposes a stable ground which nourishes it
but has no 'deconstructive' character. What is advanced is a
thesis that indicates a 'rift in being', a 'structural
incompleteness', etc. Now while these various thinkers are
proceeding down similar paths, this does not mean that there are
not (very often) substantial differences and divergences between
them. I don't want to suggest that they are all saying the same
thing, but rather that they share a similar initial direction.
Important issues arise around how this beyond is to be
characterized. In EXTREMELY general terms, is it to be
characterized by 'excess' or 'lack' -- i.e., will the subject be
characterized as the site of a lack in being, the symbolic system,
or whatever? or will it be seen as the site of an immense realm of
desire and life exceeding any particular identity placed upon it?
Further, what are the political, moral or other implications of
different characterizations? In again VERY general terms, we might
put Deleuze, Foucault, Bill Connolly, Donna Haraway, Judith Butler
(to throw in some Americans and some females) and Nietzsche
(depending on the reading) in the 'excess' camp, and Lacan, Zizek,
perhaps Derrida (at many, but not all points) and Nietzsche (again,
depending on how you read him) in the 'lack' camp.
A significant question from the point of view of the 'excess' camp
is whether the 'lack' characterization can produce a truly multiple
affirmation. This is, I think, an important part of Deleuze's
critique (I am much less familiar with D&G's collective work) of
those advocates who proceed through 'the negative' to reach a
beyond characterized as a 'lack'. As Deleuze says in DIFFERENCE
AND REPETITION, "The critique of the negative is radical and well
grounded only when it carries out a genesis of affirmation and,
simultaneously, the genesis of the appearance of negation. For the
question is to know how affirmation itself can be multiple, or how
difference as such can be the object of pure affirmation. This is
possible only to the extent that affirmation as a mode of the
proposition is produced from extra-propositional genetic elements
(the imperative questions or original ontological affirmations),
then 'carried through' or determined by way of problems
(multiplicities or problematic Ideas, ideal positivities). Under
these conditions, it must be said in effect that the negative in
the proposition sits alongside affirmation, but only as the shadow
of the problem to which the proposition is thought to respond -- in
other words, like the shadow of the genetic instance which produces
the affirmation itself" (p. 206).
Deleuze thus replaces the passage through 'negativity' with one of
positivity -- an explication of sufficient reason required for the
'complete determination' and positing of a system (such as a
Deleuzian Idea). In Deleuze's terms, a system is posited to the
extent that it is 'completely determined', which does not mean that
it is fixed in some rock-solid ground, but rather that it is
"complete and unlimited", affixed, so to speak, in a 'groundless
ground'.
Anyway, I'll stop for now.
Nathan
widder@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
------------------
talking about (there is, though, I am sure, plenty of 'space' where
we overlap). Anyway, I'll toss it out and see if there are any
responses.
I think that in very broad terms most every "posty" type (I say
that since obviously alot of them -- i.e., Lacanians -- position
themselves strictly against 'post-structuralism' -- which,
unfortunately, means they often don't know who their friends are)
advances through different degrees and different measures, the
following ontology:
(1) There is nothing outside the whole;
(2) The whole is not 'whole'
(3) This 'nothing' is not 'good for nothing'.
The usual method (by no means the only one) for advancing this is
to show how language, consciousness, the subject, or some such
category, presupposes or invokes a 'beyond' that provides its
'conditions of possibility and impossibility' -- i.e., Foucault's
man and his doubles, Derrida's differance and other
infrastructures, Lacan's kernel of the Real, Nietzsche's force and
will to power, Deleuze's (non)-being or ?-being (or Ideas,
ordinals, etc., he has employs alot of different terms), etc. This
is how these guys (and gals, though I haven't mentioned any here)
oppose 'metaphysical' theories which show how the subject,
consciousness, etc., presupposes a stable ground which nourishes it
but has no 'deconstructive' character. What is advanced is a
thesis that indicates a 'rift in being', a 'structural
incompleteness', etc. Now while these various thinkers are
proceeding down similar paths, this does not mean that there are
not (very often) substantial differences and divergences between
them. I don't want to suggest that they are all saying the same
thing, but rather that they share a similar initial direction.
Important issues arise around how this beyond is to be
characterized. In EXTREMELY general terms, is it to be
characterized by 'excess' or 'lack' -- i.e., will the subject be
characterized as the site of a lack in being, the symbolic system,
or whatever? or will it be seen as the site of an immense realm of
desire and life exceeding any particular identity placed upon it?
Further, what are the political, moral or other implications of
different characterizations? In again VERY general terms, we might
put Deleuze, Foucault, Bill Connolly, Donna Haraway, Judith Butler
(to throw in some Americans and some females) and Nietzsche
(depending on the reading) in the 'excess' camp, and Lacan, Zizek,
perhaps Derrida (at many, but not all points) and Nietzsche (again,
depending on how you read him) in the 'lack' camp.
A significant question from the point of view of the 'excess' camp
is whether the 'lack' characterization can produce a truly multiple
affirmation. This is, I think, an important part of Deleuze's
critique (I am much less familiar with D&G's collective work) of
those advocates who proceed through 'the negative' to reach a
beyond characterized as a 'lack'. As Deleuze says in DIFFERENCE
AND REPETITION, "The critique of the negative is radical and well
grounded only when it carries out a genesis of affirmation and,
simultaneously, the genesis of the appearance of negation. For the
question is to know how affirmation itself can be multiple, or how
difference as such can be the object of pure affirmation. This is
possible only to the extent that affirmation as a mode of the
proposition is produced from extra-propositional genetic elements
(the imperative questions or original ontological affirmations),
then 'carried through' or determined by way of problems
(multiplicities or problematic Ideas, ideal positivities). Under
these conditions, it must be said in effect that the negative in
the proposition sits alongside affirmation, but only as the shadow
of the problem to which the proposition is thought to respond -- in
other words, like the shadow of the genetic instance which produces
the affirmation itself" (p. 206).
Deleuze thus replaces the passage through 'negativity' with one of
positivity -- an explication of sufficient reason required for the
'complete determination' and positing of a system (such as a
Deleuzian Idea). In Deleuze's terms, a system is posited to the
extent that it is 'completely determined', which does not mean that
it is fixed in some rock-solid ground, but rather that it is
"complete and unlimited", affixed, so to speak, in a 'groundless
ground'.
Anyway, I'll stop for now.
Nathan
widder@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
------------------