Well, several have asked me to continue so i will do so.
In describing the "differences" between d&g and derrida i was attempting
to describe the different ways in which these "authors" conceive the
"effect" of subjectivity. I was in the middle of describing how signs
do not differ and defer because signs do not communicate.
Signs do not differ and defer. Rather, the energy that constitutes all
bodies endlessly bifurcates (intensity). Once again, our language is the
effect of the fusion of Homo sapien physiology adn its relationship to
the earth and cosmos, not vice versa. Hence D&G argue that all
semiotic movement is produced by social conditions. In order to grasp
signs in their fractal state it is necessary to get hold of these conditions,
or at least acknowledge them. This is precisely what Derrida omits when
he attempts to delineate subjectivity through negative semiotic difference.
As Massumi pointed out in his USER'S GUIDE when writing of Saussurian
semioticians, Derrida's differance reduced power relations to a signified,
which is understanding the slippage of the signifier, adn them claimed to
have abolished the signified. But in any event, human beings do not become
subjects by virtue of their sign systems alone. Subjectivity is the effect
of the coding, channeling and folding of energy-matter. (Humans are assem-
blages of energy-matter). See ch. 3 of Anti-Oedipus for more on this.
(3)"SELF"/OTHER, PRESENCE/ABSENCE ARE RECAPITULATIONS OF THE DIALECTIC:
MORE NEGATION. Just as subjectivity does not arise from sign systems alone
neither is the subject an effect of the play of presence/absence, or of
the dialectic self/other. Clearly, there can be an other in relation to a
self only if there is a self to condition the other to begin with (this is
perhaps more Lacanian than Derridean). If the othr becomes other by virtue
of a self, then the subject was never put into question. For D&G, the "self"
is merely a word thrown about in undergraduate psychology text books and
pop magazines. It is the spiritualistic spsychologiests attemtp to
subjectify humanoid bodies. In WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY? D&G write; "Subject
and object give a poor approximation of thought. Thinking is neithr a line
drawn between subject and object nor a revolving of one around teh other.
Rather, thinking takes place in the relationship of territory and the
earth." (p. 85) The attempt to delineate subjectivity as a splitting arising
from the play of presence / absence also begs the question. What is absent
if sameness has been abolished and only difference returns? How can Being
be absent unless it is being subordinated to the rules of representation
adn identity? Whther or not Heidegger was willing to admit, such a concept
subordinates the expression of Being to the negative of representation.
According to Deleuze, Heidegger's, adn doubtless by implication Derrida's
(after all, differance is Heideggerian presence/absence) concept of the
unveiling or presencing of Being assumes what it denies: Sameness within
the concept as the human ability or lack of ablity to identify steady
and stable qualities. (Deleuze develops a short critique of Heidegger in
DIFFERENCE & REPETITION, pp. 64-6) Wehn dealing with Time, Deleuze also
rejects the concept of Time based upon the now or present, but rather
than conceiving of a past present that conditions the current present,
Deleuze follows Bergson and writes that the past coexist with the present
that it has been. Deleuze's BERGSONISM, DIFFERENCE & REPETITION and THE
LOGIC OF SENSE deal with this a great deal. Time therefoe does not consti-
tute the subject. Rather the folds of divergent series dissolve the
subject as the abstract machine tries to force it into existence.
more later
chris dacus
cnd7750@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
------------------
In describing the "differences" between d&g and derrida i was attempting
to describe the different ways in which these "authors" conceive the
"effect" of subjectivity. I was in the middle of describing how signs
do not differ and defer because signs do not communicate.
Signs do not differ and defer. Rather, the energy that constitutes all
bodies endlessly bifurcates (intensity). Once again, our language is the
effect of the fusion of Homo sapien physiology adn its relationship to
the earth and cosmos, not vice versa. Hence D&G argue that all
semiotic movement is produced by social conditions. In order to grasp
signs in their fractal state it is necessary to get hold of these conditions,
or at least acknowledge them. This is precisely what Derrida omits when
he attempts to delineate subjectivity through negative semiotic difference.
As Massumi pointed out in his USER'S GUIDE when writing of Saussurian
semioticians, Derrida's differance reduced power relations to a signified,
which is understanding the slippage of the signifier, adn them claimed to
have abolished the signified. But in any event, human beings do not become
subjects by virtue of their sign systems alone. Subjectivity is the effect
of the coding, channeling and folding of energy-matter. (Humans are assem-
blages of energy-matter). See ch. 3 of Anti-Oedipus for more on this.
(3)"SELF"/OTHER, PRESENCE/ABSENCE ARE RECAPITULATIONS OF THE DIALECTIC:
MORE NEGATION. Just as subjectivity does not arise from sign systems alone
neither is the subject an effect of the play of presence/absence, or of
the dialectic self/other. Clearly, there can be an other in relation to a
self only if there is a self to condition the other to begin with (this is
perhaps more Lacanian than Derridean). If the othr becomes other by virtue
of a self, then the subject was never put into question. For D&G, the "self"
is merely a word thrown about in undergraduate psychology text books and
pop magazines. It is the spiritualistic spsychologiests attemtp to
subjectify humanoid bodies. In WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY? D&G write; "Subject
and object give a poor approximation of thought. Thinking is neithr a line
drawn between subject and object nor a revolving of one around teh other.
Rather, thinking takes place in the relationship of territory and the
earth." (p. 85) The attempt to delineate subjectivity as a splitting arising
from the play of presence / absence also begs the question. What is absent
if sameness has been abolished and only difference returns? How can Being
be absent unless it is being subordinated to the rules of representation
adn identity? Whther or not Heidegger was willing to admit, such a concept
subordinates the expression of Being to the negative of representation.
According to Deleuze, Heidegger's, adn doubtless by implication Derrida's
(after all, differance is Heideggerian presence/absence) concept of the
unveiling or presencing of Being assumes what it denies: Sameness within
the concept as the human ability or lack of ablity to identify steady
and stable qualities. (Deleuze develops a short critique of Heidegger in
DIFFERENCE & REPETITION, pp. 64-6) Wehn dealing with Time, Deleuze also
rejects the concept of Time based upon the now or present, but rather
than conceiving of a past present that conditions the current present,
Deleuze follows Bergson and writes that the past coexist with the present
that it has been. Deleuze's BERGSONISM, DIFFERENCE & REPETITION and THE
LOGIC OF SENSE deal with this a great deal. Time therefoe does not consti-
tute the subject. Rather the folds of divergent series dissolve the
subject as the abstract machine tries to force it into existence.
more later
chris dacus
cnd7750@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
------------------