(this may have less and less to do with film specifically--sorry to those
on seminar-10)
Thanks to Chris for his further elucidations. Re. transcendence: I am
trying to work this out at present, as I struggle through _Difference and
Repetition_, where, as you point out, transcendence seems have a
different valence than it does in D(&G)'s later works (eg. _ATP_). I may
have more thoughts on that later.
However, re. ideology, how about this passage from _ATP_:
"It would be an error to believe that content determines expression by
causal action, even if expression is accorded the power not only to
'reflect' content but to react upon it in an active way. This kind of
ideological conception of the statement, which subordinates it to a
primary economic content, runs into all kinds of difficulties inherent to
dialectics [side-note: D is more forgiving of dialectics in _D&R_ too]...
We must recognize that expression is independent and that this is
precisely what enables it to react upon contents. This independence,
however, has been poorly conceived. If contents are said to be economic,
the form of content cannot be said to be economic and is reduced to a
pure abstraction, namely, the production of goods and the means of that
production considered in themselves. Similarly, if expressions are said
to be ideological, the form of expression is ont said to be ideological
and is reduced to language as abstraction, as the availability of a good
shared by all. Those who take this approach claim to characterize
contents and expressions by all the struggles and conflicts pervading
them in two different forms, but these forms themselves are exempt from
struggle and conflict, and the relation between them remains entirely
indeterminate. [ftnote to Stalin and Bakhtin] The only way to define the
relation is TO REVAMP THE THEORY OF IDEOLOGY by saying that expressions
and statements intervene directly in productivity, in the form of a
production of meaning or sign-value. The category of production
doubtless has the advantage fo breaking with schemas of representation,
information, and communication. But is it any more adequate than these
schemas? Its application to language is very ambiguous in that it
appeals to an ongoing dialectical miracle of the transformation of matter
into meaning, content into expression, the social process into a
signifying system." (_ATP_ 89f., emphasis mine)
Sorry about the length of that. All pretty ambiguous at the end, I know.
An attemtp to salvage Althusserianism? A critique thereof? How would
this fit with Zizek (or, I would add, Bourdieu) in terms of an immanent
conecption of the ideological?
I will come up with some Deleuze-on-film stuff soon, too.
Jon
Jon Beasley-Murray
Literature Program
Duke University
jpb8@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
------------------
on seminar-10)
Thanks to Chris for his further elucidations. Re. transcendence: I am
trying to work this out at present, as I struggle through _Difference and
Repetition_, where, as you point out, transcendence seems have a
different valence than it does in D(&G)'s later works (eg. _ATP_). I may
have more thoughts on that later.
However, re. ideology, how about this passage from _ATP_:
"It would be an error to believe that content determines expression by
causal action, even if expression is accorded the power not only to
'reflect' content but to react upon it in an active way. This kind of
ideological conception of the statement, which subordinates it to a
primary economic content, runs into all kinds of difficulties inherent to
dialectics [side-note: D is more forgiving of dialectics in _D&R_ too]...
We must recognize that expression is independent and that this is
precisely what enables it to react upon contents. This independence,
however, has been poorly conceived. If contents are said to be economic,
the form of content cannot be said to be economic and is reduced to a
pure abstraction, namely, the production of goods and the means of that
production considered in themselves. Similarly, if expressions are said
to be ideological, the form of expression is ont said to be ideological
and is reduced to language as abstraction, as the availability of a good
shared by all. Those who take this approach claim to characterize
contents and expressions by all the struggles and conflicts pervading
them in two different forms, but these forms themselves are exempt from
struggle and conflict, and the relation between them remains entirely
indeterminate. [ftnote to Stalin and Bakhtin] The only way to define the
relation is TO REVAMP THE THEORY OF IDEOLOGY by saying that expressions
and statements intervene directly in productivity, in the form of a
production of meaning or sign-value. The category of production
doubtless has the advantage fo breaking with schemas of representation,
information, and communication. But is it any more adequate than these
schemas? Its application to language is very ambiguous in that it
appeals to an ongoing dialectical miracle of the transformation of matter
into meaning, content into expression, the social process into a
signifying system." (_ATP_ 89f., emphasis mine)
Sorry about the length of that. All pretty ambiguous at the end, I know.
An attemtp to salvage Althusserianism? A critique thereof? How would
this fit with Zizek (or, I would add, Bourdieu) in terms of an immanent
conecption of the ideological?
I will come up with some Deleuze-on-film stuff soon, too.
Jon
Jon Beasley-Murray
Literature Program
Duke University
jpb8@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
------------------