in replay to Erik.
there is a lot on habit in Deleuze adn D&G. I don't think i am prepared
to summarize its potential for an enacted nomadology though. Followig, Hume
Deleuze defines subjectivity along the lines of habit. Deleuze alos relates
habit to ontological contraction as a fusional synthesis. Although habit
may imply a sense of the lived, D&G point out that plants and rocks have
something that 'senses' and acts like a brain. (See WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY,
pp. 212-5). This is why i keep pointing out that ideology is, for D&G,
something of a fairy tale. The brain is not a 'mind,' but a 'chaoid
automaton.' "The brain is the junction--not the unity--of the three
planes." (WIP, p. 208) The three planes are immanence (philosophy),
composition (art), and reference (science). All this talk of the brain
should not be taken as a crude biologism--but not a rejection of biological
restraints either. I'm sorry if this is vague and doesn't answer your
question (i know it does not), but i don't know how to relate it to the
lived when Deleuze himself breaks down the notion of natural difference
between organic and inorganic.
Does anyone have an answer they feel might better answer Erik's question?
I was objecting to reducing ideology to habit, as i understtod Jon's
description of Bourdie's concept of immanent ideology. Why should ideology and
habit be equated unless one wants some kind thought-energy distinction
to remain latently present? i know i'm picking, but it seems important
to D&G's rejection of ideology. Again, i'm sorry Erik, i just can't answer
your question without a good deal of time to work it out.
chris
------------------
there is a lot on habit in Deleuze adn D&G. I don't think i am prepared
to summarize its potential for an enacted nomadology though. Followig, Hume
Deleuze defines subjectivity along the lines of habit. Deleuze alos relates
habit to ontological contraction as a fusional synthesis. Although habit
may imply a sense of the lived, D&G point out that plants and rocks have
something that 'senses' and acts like a brain. (See WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY,
pp. 212-5). This is why i keep pointing out that ideology is, for D&G,
something of a fairy tale. The brain is not a 'mind,' but a 'chaoid
automaton.' "The brain is the junction--not the unity--of the three
planes." (WIP, p. 208) The three planes are immanence (philosophy),
composition (art), and reference (science). All this talk of the brain
should not be taken as a crude biologism--but not a rejection of biological
restraints either. I'm sorry if this is vague and doesn't answer your
question (i know it does not), but i don't know how to relate it to the
lived when Deleuze himself breaks down the notion of natural difference
between organic and inorganic.
Does anyone have an answer they feel might better answer Erik's question?
I was objecting to reducing ideology to habit, as i understtod Jon's
description of Bourdie's concept of immanent ideology. Why should ideology and
habit be equated unless one wants some kind thought-energy distinction
to remain latently present? i know i'm picking, but it seems important
to D&G's rejection of ideology. Again, i'm sorry Erik, i just can't answer
your question without a good deal of time to work it out.
chris
------------------