Gene writes:
Could Chris Dacus (and/or anyone else) explain the sense in which it
s said that ideology entails "some sort of error or transcendence"?
s that true of the Althusserian notion of ideology -- as when a
"Marxist
eology" (one informed by science, I gather) is invoked?
I think D&G'
"mots d'ordre" might come close to Zizek's "lived
ideology" (as cited by
on).
I believe D&G think 'ideology' implies some sort of autonomous realm
for 'human thought,' which implies what they call transcendence. Again,
for D&G everyting is REAL, including all 'day dreams' etc. They point out
that 'thought' is as energetically material as a computer. (Machinic
assemblages, abstract machines, Mechanosphere, etc.) Ideology presupposes
that there is a subject or true position. Now, you might say that this
is not necessarily so, that everyone has an ideology and thre is really
no way to not have one. This is probably close to what D&G are saying,
but then why call it an 'ideology' when it is merely an expression
that is neither right nor wrong.
D&G address Althusser's concept of ideology on p. 130 of ATP:
>...there is no subject, only collective assemblages of enunciation.
>Subjectification is merely one such assemblage and designates a formali-
>zation of expression or a regime of signs rahter than a condition internal
>to language. Neither is it a question of a movement characteristic of
>ideology, as Althusser says: Subjectification as a regime of signs or a
>form of expression is tied to an assemblage, in ohter words, an organi-
>zation of power that is alreadly fully functioning in the economy, rather
>than superposing itself on contents and relations...
Michael Hardt addresses the Althusserian concept of ideology and Deleuze's
reasons for rejecting such a conception in his GILLES DELEUZE: AN
APPRENTICESHIP IN PHILOSOPHY, University of Minnesota Press, 1993.
Hardt writes:
>Thus we can hazard a preliminary Deleuzian response to our first
>Althusserian critique: Bringing cognitive production to center stage in
>philosophy maskes the fundamental productive dynamic of being that is
>really antecedent to the intellect, in logical and ontological terms.
GILLES DELEUZE: AN APPRENTICESHIP IN PHILOSOPHY, p. 78.
Does this clear it up any? I think the best way to think of all this is
to consider Deleuze's ontology of univocal being, then consider his
ontology of subjectivity. For Deleuze subjectification is ontological,
not psychological. D&G write that the study of the unconscious belongs
to the realm of physics, not linguistics on page 283 of ANTI-OEDIPUS.
chris dacus
------------------