Reply to: RE>metaphor and ideology
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Could someone expand a little on D&G's rejection of metaphor? Is the
rejected
sense of metaphor contrasted to a preferable literal?
Thanks
Richard Wilkerson
RCWilk@xxxxxxx
Metaphor has come up here before. Mer for instance has commented on the
socio-political affects of the concepts D&G borrow from other domains, and
Erik Davis on the role of figures or models in thought as such, via the case
of scientific thought. In What is Philosophy? D&G seem to distinguish
concept from figure with reference to the institution of a plane of
immanence.
But a few points from Deleuze on his own interest with regard to the issue:
In rejecting metaphor I don't think Deleuze retains any notion of
distinctively literal meaning. On the pragmatic approach in TP, the
operative concern is force or effect rather than meaning, literal or
metaphoric. Metaphor can be considered, in these terms, as a distinctive use
of language, but it is not a use especially pertinent to the institution or
transformation of power relations which are D&G's concern here. For instance
metaphor can feature in a command or a plea, but it is not of immediate
relevance to the force of either.
Given this Deleuze is perhaps commenting on a possibly distinctive effect or
force of metaphor when he says: "Thereare no literal words neither are ther
metaphors (all metaphors are sullied words, or else make them so)" (Dial.3).
Metaphor here seems to be equated with innuendo, double-entendre: saying one
thing to covertly imply another.
This is certainly a use of language, but perhaps not one that interests
Deleuze. For he continues "There are only inexact words to designate
something exactly." Which it seems is what interests him. Deleuze does speak
of meaning (sens) in The Logic of Sense, but here relativises it to a
problem in such a fashion that ther is no operative notion of a prior or
standard meaning against which a current use could be assessed as
metaphorical.
Deleuze concern with the issue of textuality, the surface of language at
which, it might be said, metaphor is operative, is perhaps made apparent in
a round table discussion that followed presentation of 'Nomad Thought": "AAs
for the method of deconstruction, I see what it is, I admire it a lot, but
it has nothing to do with my method. I do not present myself as a
commentator on texts. A text, for me, is nothing but a little cog in an
extra-textual practiseA" (Nietzsche aujourd'hui?).
The relevance of metaphor to the univocity of being is interesting. Is the
univocity of being comparable to the 'smooth surface' spoken of elsewhere?
Is part of the idea that there is no immutable ontology, no intrinsic
structure to the essence of things, such as would constrain linguistic
expressions thereof, for instance enabling the distinction between
adequate-literal and inadequate-metaphorical linguistic expression?
PC Sydney Aust.
------------------
--------------------------------------
Could someone expand a little on D&G's rejection of metaphor? Is the
rejected
sense of metaphor contrasted to a preferable literal?
Thanks
Richard Wilkerson
RCWilk@xxxxxxx
Metaphor has come up here before. Mer for instance has commented on the
socio-political affects of the concepts D&G borrow from other domains, and
Erik Davis on the role of figures or models in thought as such, via the case
of scientific thought. In What is Philosophy? D&G seem to distinguish
concept from figure with reference to the institution of a plane of
immanence.
But a few points from Deleuze on his own interest with regard to the issue:
In rejecting metaphor I don't think Deleuze retains any notion of
distinctively literal meaning. On the pragmatic approach in TP, the
operative concern is force or effect rather than meaning, literal or
metaphoric. Metaphor can be considered, in these terms, as a distinctive use
of language, but it is not a use especially pertinent to the institution or
transformation of power relations which are D&G's concern here. For instance
metaphor can feature in a command or a plea, but it is not of immediate
relevance to the force of either.
Given this Deleuze is perhaps commenting on a possibly distinctive effect or
force of metaphor when he says: "Thereare no literal words neither are ther
metaphors (all metaphors are sullied words, or else make them so)" (Dial.3).
Metaphor here seems to be equated with innuendo, double-entendre: saying one
thing to covertly imply another.
This is certainly a use of language, but perhaps not one that interests
Deleuze. For he continues "There are only inexact words to designate
something exactly." Which it seems is what interests him. Deleuze does speak
of meaning (sens) in The Logic of Sense, but here relativises it to a
problem in such a fashion that ther is no operative notion of a prior or
standard meaning against which a current use could be assessed as
metaphorical.
Deleuze concern with the issue of textuality, the surface of language at
which, it might be said, metaphor is operative, is perhaps made apparent in
a round table discussion that followed presentation of 'Nomad Thought": "AAs
for the method of deconstruction, I see what it is, I admire it a lot, but
it has nothing to do with my method. I do not present myself as a
commentator on texts. A text, for me, is nothing but a little cog in an
extra-textual practiseA" (Nietzsche aujourd'hui?).
The relevance of metaphor to the univocity of being is interesting. Is the
univocity of being comparable to the 'smooth surface' spoken of elsewhere?
Is part of the idea that there is no immutable ontology, no intrinsic
structure to the essence of things, such as would constrain linguistic
expressions thereof, for instance enabling the distinction between
adequate-literal and inadequate-metaphorical linguistic expression?
PC Sydney Aust.
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