Well i will give two long quotes from Deleuze's DiFFERENCE & REPETITION,
write what will probably be the last section of my rant, and see what
others have to say.
Before i begin with Deleuze, however, I would like to address what Nathan
mention before. (No, Nathan and I are not flaming, we discuss this stuff
privately all the time.)
There is a lot at stake here. Nomadology, which is not a post anything, is
in D&G's passionate elucidations, first and formost, an ethical philosophy,
that is, a way of life. For D&G, and for Nietzshe and Spinoza as well,
human ethics must 'flow' with the cosmos. Ethics and ontology re therefore
tied together. (This is why Nietzsche spoke of christian and humanist
morality as anti-nature, because it tried to negate the WILL TO POWER, which
Nietzsche called nihilism). All of Deleuze's affirmation combines ethics,
ontology, art, science...,everything. But Deleuze stronly supports his
ontology and his ethics, and not simply one for the sake of the other.
How can deconstruction affirm? It does not. It works out of the Hegelian
Negative. But from a Deleuzian perspective it not only does not affirm,
it remains within representation. From a scientific point of view, it
remains with Newtonian-Hegelian physics-ontology. Determination: X not Y.
rather than modern quantum physics and non-equalibrium thermodynamics:
X does not equal X, whether or not X does not qual Y. Nomadology is an
ecologism that affirms life; Deconstruction is an anti-epistemology.
>From DIFFERENCE AND REPETITION:
The great discovery of Nietzsche's philosophy, which marks his break with
Schopenhauer and goes under the name of will to pwer or the Dionysian world,
is the following: no doubt the I and Self must be replaced by an
undifferenciated abyss, but this abyss in neither an impersonal nor an
abstract Universal beyond individuation. On the contrary, it is the I and
the self which are the abstract univrsals. They must be replaced, but
in and by individuation, in the direction of the individuating factors
which consume them and whcich constittute the fluid world of dionysus. What
cannot be replaced is individuation itself. Beyond the self and the I we
find not the impersonal but the individual and its factors, individuation
and its fields, individuality and its pre-individual singularities. ...
That is why the individual in intensity finds its psychic image neither
in the organisation of the self nor in the determination of the species
of the I, but rather in the fractured I and the dissolved self, and in the
correlation of the fractured I with the dissolved self. This correlation
seems clear, like that of the thinker and the thought, or that of the
clear-confused thinker with distinct-obscure Ideas (the Dionysian thiker).
pp. 258-9
and still more from DIFFERENCE & REPETITION:
Hegelian contradiction appears to push difference to the likmit, but this
path is a dead end which brings it back to identity, making identty the
sufficient condition for difference to exist and be thouht. .It is only
in relation to the identical, as a function of the identical [called trace
by Derrida], that contradiction is the greatest difference. The
intoxications adn the giddiness are feigned, the obscure is already
clarified from the outset [differance; we know that we can't know]. Nothing
shows this more clearly than the insipid monocentricity of the cricles in
the Hegelian negative dialectic.
p. 263.
I had one more section to post (BODIES, BRAINS, MACHINES, CHAOS) but
I think I will wait and see what happens first.
chris dacus
cnd7750@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
------------------
write what will probably be the last section of my rant, and see what
others have to say.
Before i begin with Deleuze, however, I would like to address what Nathan
mention before. (No, Nathan and I are not flaming, we discuss this stuff
privately all the time.)
There is a lot at stake here. Nomadology, which is not a post anything, is
in D&G's passionate elucidations, first and formost, an ethical philosophy,
that is, a way of life. For D&G, and for Nietzshe and Spinoza as well,
human ethics must 'flow' with the cosmos. Ethics and ontology re therefore
tied together. (This is why Nietzsche spoke of christian and humanist
morality as anti-nature, because it tried to negate the WILL TO POWER, which
Nietzsche called nihilism). All of Deleuze's affirmation combines ethics,
ontology, art, science...,everything. But Deleuze stronly supports his
ontology and his ethics, and not simply one for the sake of the other.
How can deconstruction affirm? It does not. It works out of the Hegelian
Negative. But from a Deleuzian perspective it not only does not affirm,
it remains within representation. From a scientific point of view, it
remains with Newtonian-Hegelian physics-ontology. Determination: X not Y.
rather than modern quantum physics and non-equalibrium thermodynamics:
X does not equal X, whether or not X does not qual Y. Nomadology is an
ecologism that affirms life; Deconstruction is an anti-epistemology.
>From DIFFERENCE AND REPETITION:
The great discovery of Nietzsche's philosophy, which marks his break with
Schopenhauer and goes under the name of will to pwer or the Dionysian world,
is the following: no doubt the I and Self must be replaced by an
undifferenciated abyss, but this abyss in neither an impersonal nor an
abstract Universal beyond individuation. On the contrary, it is the I and
the self which are the abstract univrsals. They must be replaced, but
in and by individuation, in the direction of the individuating factors
which consume them and whcich constittute the fluid world of dionysus. What
cannot be replaced is individuation itself. Beyond the self and the I we
find not the impersonal but the individual and its factors, individuation
and its fields, individuality and its pre-individual singularities. ...
That is why the individual in intensity finds its psychic image neither
in the organisation of the self nor in the determination of the species
of the I, but rather in the fractured I and the dissolved self, and in the
correlation of the fractured I with the dissolved self. This correlation
seems clear, like that of the thinker and the thought, or that of the
clear-confused thinker with distinct-obscure Ideas (the Dionysian thiker).
pp. 258-9
and still more from DIFFERENCE & REPETITION:
Hegelian contradiction appears to push difference to the likmit, but this
path is a dead end which brings it back to identity, making identty the
sufficient condition for difference to exist and be thouht. .It is only
in relation to the identical, as a function of the identical [called trace
by Derrida], that contradiction is the greatest difference. The
intoxications adn the giddiness are feigned, the obscure is already
clarified from the outset [differance; we know that we can't know]. Nothing
shows this more clearly than the insipid monocentricity of the cricles in
the Hegelian negative dialectic.
p. 263.
I had one more section to post (BODIES, BRAINS, MACHINES, CHAOS) but
I think I will wait and see what happens first.
chris dacus
cnd7750@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
------------------