Cologne, 3 July 1996
Dear Laurence,
You seem to have delved into the question of the turning more deeply than I
have. My reading has been driven by other questions. I do not think I have yet
'got' what is mo(ti)v(at)ing your thinking. So I will reread your communications
and the passages you have suggested.
The passage "Die Zeitlichkeit als ekstatische Zeitigung" in the appendix to the
Schelling Lectures does indeed shed light on SZ in its multiple meanings: as
"name for an event in beyng itself", as "formula for a meditation within the
history of thinking" and as "the title of a treatise that attempts an execution
of this thinking". "We distinguish therefore the necessity designated by the
name 'Sein und Zeit' from the 'book' with this title." (S.229 1971 edition).
This says plainly, even though not in the way of thinking (it is Heidegger here
giving an opinion on his own thinking from the outside - thus his caveats "these
remarks are therefore already an overstepping of the limit", etc), that
Heidegger thinks only one thing: the same, an event in beyng itself that passes
through him. Even the particular topics you refer to, such as technology and
language, are only different aspects of the same issue for thinking.
In this passage Heidegger names once again "time as the preliminary/provisional
name of the area of drafting the truth of being". This phrasing corresponds to
the two passages I have previously quoted, one earlier (1929), one later (1962).
Time as Temporalitaet was envisaged in the book SZ as the transcendental horizon
for the sense of being. This preliminary name was dropped after 1927.
Heidegger's entire thinking (from 1919 on), including SZ and all the apparently
special topics, stems from the "area of drafting of the truth of being", which
is then named as such from 1929 on. That is perhaps the special significance of
the turning as it applies to the precipitations of the thinking of beyng in the
thinker Heidegger: what is implicit, as yet not named, becomes explicit, named.
So we agree on the continuity of thinking, but perhaps not on the name for it.
Where you say: "This, surely, would be temporalitaet?", I point out the
provisional character of this title and replace it with "the truth of beyng".
Heidegger's thinking is guided by "a light, only vaguely made out, that falls on
something that reaches far beyond the one who is thinking." Will humankind come
to bear the turning of the truth of beyng towards it?
Strictly speaking, we should speak not of Heidegger but of a thinking of being
that has event-uated in the history of the truth of beyng. But we are unable to
do without the proper names of men. That seems to me to be also an historical
destiny.
On "humankind" as a rendering of "der Mensch": Take a passage from T.S. Eliot's
'Burnt Norton I': "Human kind / cannot bear very much reality". I would
translate this as "Der Mensch verträgt nicht allzu viel Wirklichkeit", not "Die
Menschheit...". Why? Because it is a matter of the human essence/essencing, not
of the human in general ('People cannot bear very much reality.' - a general
statement that says nothing.) So I differ with your understanding of der Mensch
as the "whole of humanity" or what is "most general". Der Mensch usually means
in Heidegger's texts: 'das Menschenwesen'. Der Mensch first has to become Dasein
historically; this is the advent of beyng as such in history and a
transformation of the truth of beyng, the being of beings and human essencing
(translating Wesen verbally). Why cannot humankind turn to and fro between
beings and beyng?
I agree with you, however, that this event in the history of beyng means a
turning of der Mensch (humankind) from beings to beyng (the mystery), although
erring does not simply cease. This seems to be what is referred to in the
Beitraege as the "founding of the there". Is this the meaning of the Kehre in
the Beitrage ("third determination of die Kehre") that you say I have "not even
covered"? The Hin- und Herwenden you cited and the Kehre are the same but not
identical, i.e. they can and must be distinguished from each other. But are you
really claiming that there is only one meaning of the Kehre?
My comment about von Herrmann is based more on hearing him speak publicly than
on reading his books. There is an overpowering immanence in his entire
presentation of Heidegger's thinking that, in my opinion, has stultifying
effects on, i.e. forecloses from the start, any attempt to see the same issue
for thinking from any other angle than in Heidegger's very words.
Regards and cheers,
Michael
Dr Michael Eldred ° artefact text and translation \\\ ° '~': '' ///
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Dear Laurence,
You seem to have delved into the question of the turning more deeply than I
have. My reading has been driven by other questions. I do not think I have yet
'got' what is mo(ti)v(at)ing your thinking. So I will reread your communications
and the passages you have suggested.
The passage "Die Zeitlichkeit als ekstatische Zeitigung" in the appendix to the
Schelling Lectures does indeed shed light on SZ in its multiple meanings: as
"name for an event in beyng itself", as "formula for a meditation within the
history of thinking" and as "the title of a treatise that attempts an execution
of this thinking". "We distinguish therefore the necessity designated by the
name 'Sein und Zeit' from the 'book' with this title." (S.229 1971 edition).
This says plainly, even though not in the way of thinking (it is Heidegger here
giving an opinion on his own thinking from the outside - thus his caveats "these
remarks are therefore already an overstepping of the limit", etc), that
Heidegger thinks only one thing: the same, an event in beyng itself that passes
through him. Even the particular topics you refer to, such as technology and
language, are only different aspects of the same issue for thinking.
In this passage Heidegger names once again "time as the preliminary/provisional
name of the area of drafting the truth of being". This phrasing corresponds to
the two passages I have previously quoted, one earlier (1929), one later (1962).
Time as Temporalitaet was envisaged in the book SZ as the transcendental horizon
for the sense of being. This preliminary name was dropped after 1927.
Heidegger's entire thinking (from 1919 on), including SZ and all the apparently
special topics, stems from the "area of drafting of the truth of being", which
is then named as such from 1929 on. That is perhaps the special significance of
the turning as it applies to the precipitations of the thinking of beyng in the
thinker Heidegger: what is implicit, as yet not named, becomes explicit, named.
So we agree on the continuity of thinking, but perhaps not on the name for it.
Where you say: "This, surely, would be temporalitaet?", I point out the
provisional character of this title and replace it with "the truth of beyng".
Heidegger's thinking is guided by "a light, only vaguely made out, that falls on
something that reaches far beyond the one who is thinking." Will humankind come
to bear the turning of the truth of beyng towards it?
Strictly speaking, we should speak not of Heidegger but of a thinking of being
that has event-uated in the history of the truth of beyng. But we are unable to
do without the proper names of men. That seems to me to be also an historical
destiny.
On "humankind" as a rendering of "der Mensch": Take a passage from T.S. Eliot's
'Burnt Norton I': "Human kind / cannot bear very much reality". I would
translate this as "Der Mensch verträgt nicht allzu viel Wirklichkeit", not "Die
Menschheit...". Why? Because it is a matter of the human essence/essencing, not
of the human in general ('People cannot bear very much reality.' - a general
statement that says nothing.) So I differ with your understanding of der Mensch
as the "whole of humanity" or what is "most general". Der Mensch usually means
in Heidegger's texts: 'das Menschenwesen'. Der Mensch first has to become Dasein
historically; this is the advent of beyng as such in history and a
transformation of the truth of beyng, the being of beings and human essencing
(translating Wesen verbally). Why cannot humankind turn to and fro between
beings and beyng?
I agree with you, however, that this event in the history of beyng means a
turning of der Mensch (humankind) from beings to beyng (the mystery), although
erring does not simply cease. This seems to be what is referred to in the
Beitraege as the "founding of the there". Is this the meaning of the Kehre in
the Beitrage ("third determination of die Kehre") that you say I have "not even
covered"? The Hin- und Herwenden you cited and the Kehre are the same but not
identical, i.e. they can and must be distinguished from each other. But are you
really claiming that there is only one meaning of the Kehre?
My comment about von Herrmann is based more on hearing him speak publicly than
on reading his books. There is an overpowering immanence in his entire
presentation of Heidegger's thinking that, in my opinion, has stultifying
effects on, i.e. forecloses from the start, any attempt to see the same issue
for thinking from any other angle than in Heidegger's very words.
Regards and cheers,
Michael
Dr Michael Eldred ° artefact text and translation \\\ ° '~': '' ///
artefact@xxxxxxxxxxx °°° made by art °°° °~ \ ' ) ''' | . \ - °
http://www.webcom.com/artefact/ _ °/ ~ : ~:~ \./''/
vox: (++49 221) 9520 333 fax: (++49 221) 9520 334 .{.\ ~. ' ~ { } .\ : ~
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