I'd like to follow on J. Ben Ahron's comments:
>
>To me H.'s rhetorical greatness lies in his hermeneutics, and not vise
>versa; it is precisely because he does succeed , - at least at certain times
>and directions, not everywhere and anytime- in hearing/speaking the "call of
>Being", and in speaking it, let *It* speak in and through his "own" voice;
>and therefore for me it's not suprising that this occurs especially when he
>interperts the word of *others*, e.g., discovering Being's presence and
>speech where it already took some place and some time.
>Does anybody share that feeling that Heidegger is indeed at "his"
>outmost truthfulness only when truth is not his, when he reaches to origins,
>and at his deepest errancy the more he strives to be an originator of
>("new") origings?
I think I agree, and I'm wondering if we might pursue the possibility that
it is the case that Heidegger's rendering of the call of being rings most
true when he is hearing/interpreting/speaking the words of others, and ask
why that might that be the case. Heidegger himself suggests that the
discourse which is constitutive of dasein and discloses its existence might
be more a matter of hearing while keeping silent ( Schweigen), then of
speaking per se. Heidegger again emphasizes silence later on as the
appropriate condition for hearing the call of conscience. And then in On
the Way to Language, he seems to imply the hermeneutical primacy of hearing
once more when he says that it is language itself which does the speaking (
Die Sprache spricht).
How does one "hear" language speaking? And in what sort of situation can
langauge be said to speak in a way which is significantly attentive to the
call of being? It seems to me that when Heidegger finds himself in the
hearing presence of the words of Parmenides, for example, we have a case
of a sort of hermeneutical Schweigen on Heidegger's part. He is not so
much inventing his own thought-speech in such a moment as giving himself
over to Parmenides' words, and then trying to reflect as best he can, in
the echoing language he shows to us, what he hears. You might notice that
in preparation for this hearing/ speaking, he first stands with his auditor
before the text, reflecting on its power, but saying little more. Quite
different he is, in the opening moments of the Nietzsche lectures where,
though he praises Nietzsche mightily, he also "puts him in his place," so
to speak, and sets the framework and direction for his interpretation. So
isn't it only in relation to certain other texts he interprets, where H.
assumes the hermeneutical posture you are suggesting? And how might we
characterize H's relation to those texts?
Allen
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>
>To me H.'s rhetorical greatness lies in his hermeneutics, and not vise
>versa; it is precisely because he does succeed , - at least at certain times
>and directions, not everywhere and anytime- in hearing/speaking the "call of
>Being", and in speaking it, let *It* speak in and through his "own" voice;
>and therefore for me it's not suprising that this occurs especially when he
>interperts the word of *others*, e.g., discovering Being's presence and
>speech where it already took some place and some time.
>Does anybody share that feeling that Heidegger is indeed at "his"
>outmost truthfulness only when truth is not his, when he reaches to origins,
>and at his deepest errancy the more he strives to be an originator of
>("new") origings?
I think I agree, and I'm wondering if we might pursue the possibility that
it is the case that Heidegger's rendering of the call of being rings most
true when he is hearing/interpreting/speaking the words of others, and ask
why that might that be the case. Heidegger himself suggests that the
discourse which is constitutive of dasein and discloses its existence might
be more a matter of hearing while keeping silent ( Schweigen), then of
speaking per se. Heidegger again emphasizes silence later on as the
appropriate condition for hearing the call of conscience. And then in On
the Way to Language, he seems to imply the hermeneutical primacy of hearing
once more when he says that it is language itself which does the speaking (
Die Sprache spricht).
How does one "hear" language speaking? And in what sort of situation can
langauge be said to speak in a way which is significantly attentive to the
call of being? It seems to me that when Heidegger finds himself in the
hearing presence of the words of Parmenides, for example, we have a case
of a sort of hermeneutical Schweigen on Heidegger's part. He is not so
much inventing his own thought-speech in such a moment as giving himself
over to Parmenides' words, and then trying to reflect as best he can, in
the echoing language he shows to us, what he hears. You might notice that
in preparation for this hearing/ speaking, he first stands with his auditor
before the text, reflecting on its power, but saying little more. Quite
different he is, in the opening moments of the Nietzsche lectures where,
though he praises Nietzsche mightily, he also "puts him in his place," so
to speak, and sets the framework and direction for his interpretation. So
isn't it only in relation to certain other texts he interprets, where H.
assumes the hermeneutical posture you are suggesting? And how might we
characterize H's relation to those texts?
Allen
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