Dr. Eldred,
Thank you so much for your reply. It helps. I am aware of the issue of
re-presentation, inner v. outer, and the basic problem of the modern
paradigm. Please alow me to elaborate on my question regarding the nature
of the unconscious:
As I understand it, there are two modes of consciousness posited by
phenomenology; the pre-reflective, which might be analogous to the
experience of the +moment+ in psychology, and the reflective mode, wherein
the one (one+s ego that is) thinks +about+ the pre-reflective experience.
Don Idhe talks in terms of the +what+ (pre-reflective --i.e., noematic) and
the +how+ (reflective --i.e., noetic). One might also talk about the +for
itself+ and the +in itself+ (Sartre). The idea, as I understand it, is
similar. But traditionally, perhaps because phenomenology gets so wrapped up
with exploring consciousness (shunning the traditional --i.e., the Freudian
-- view of the unconscious) both pre-reflective and reflective experiences
are thought of as acts of consciousness, even though the prereflective mode
(in the moment) of consciousness occurs outside what we in psychology would
generally refer to as +ego awareness.+ The implication for psychologists is
that the ego can be immersed in both conscious and unconscious modes of
experience, the metaphor for which can be what Merleau-Ponty referred to as
+Body+ (something neither inside us nor outside us but, rather, occupying a
relationship as a kind of gray area between).
What I am a little uncomfortable with is the implications of the term
+pre-reflective consciousness.+ While the ego may relate to intentional
objects in both conscious and unconscious ways, to propose a consciousness
that relates to intentional objects in unconscious ways seems
self-contradicting. One might propose an autonomous
unconscious-consciousness (granting the unconscious psyche its autonomy, for
instance) and make a case of sorts. But it seems a bit shaky to propose that
prereflective experience is a consciousness that is itself unconscious (and
that isn+t the same as saying the unconscious may be conscious of itself). I
know, I know, Paul Riceour talks about the ego not being aware of itself at
first intending its object (ergo, pre-reflective consciousness?). This is
the way phenomenologists talk. And it is why it is so difficult to figure
out what they are talking about. But there is an implication here that
consciousness can be unaware of itself being conscious. That seems
different. It means the act of consciousness can itself be unconscious...
and that+s where I think things get confused, because consciousness in an
act. It is a verb. It is not a noun. There is no +itself+ in consciousness
in the sense of a noun referent... for that you have to go to a subject...
unless there is a transcendental ego once removed, and that gets us into a
traditional phenomenological mess we might want to steer clear of.
Now, there is a possibility that I am wallowing around in the very same mud
pile that caused the initial split between transcendental and existential
phenomenology. This may be at the core of the difference between Hussurl and
Heidegger, if indeed this is an issue of the viability of the transendant
ego (if anyone out there thinks this is the case, would you please raise
your hand?). Its kind of hard for me to figure out what I+m talking about
too, sometimes. At first blush, one way out of this mess is to propose a
transcendental ego once removed from the process of initial
reflective/pre-reflective consciousness. But for the most part, all the
smart guys who followed Hussurl didn+t think so. So I+m hesitant about going
in that direction. But let me digress just a little for a moment and then
I+ll come back to this, I promise:
Jung himself seems to have been ambiguous with respect to this
consciousness/unconscious issue. The famous quote from CW-6 reads: +By
consciousness I understand the relation of psychic contens TO THE EGO, in so
far as this relation is perceived BY THE EGO. Relations to the ego that are
not perceived as such are unconscious. Consciousness is the function or
activity which maintains the relation of psychic contents to the ego.+ And
again in the Brooke Book (p. 124): +...unconsciousness, for Jung, describes
the quality of a life that is lived yet not reflectively known.+ Here, Jung
is identified as normalizing consciousness TO THE PERCEIVING EGO. Well fine!
However, in a later work (On the Nature of the Psyche) Jung indicates that
to a greater or lesser extent, consciousness is always permeated with
unconsciousness. HOLD-IT! Muddy water ahead! If something is unconscious, it
is something not perceived by the ego (Jung), but if it is not perceived by
the ego, then it cannot be consciousness. This is an awareness thing...that
of which the ego is aware is conscious, that of which the ego is unaware is
unconscious (this would be a kind of quantitative reading of
conscious/unconscious... i.e., as awareness slips away from the ego,
eventually it is becomes unconscious).
By the same token, Jung+s reference to the fact that the unconscious
behaves +like+ a conscious subject (CW-10) might point to a concscious
unconscious, but not necessarily so. Behaving +like+ a conscious subject is
similar to consciousness in that it is an intentional act. But it is not
like consciousness in that it is outside the reflective awareness of the ego
(re: CW-6). Confusing these ideas causes trouble.
I should say that I certainly get the point about putting too many
boundaries around the experience of conscousness. If we make consciousness
only that which is reflectively known by the ego, then consciousness as a
therapeutic goal suffers. Consciousness as a goal might better be thought of
as the +Knowing-with+ Edigner describes, which is (at least initially) a
much wider reading of the idea than simply +Reflectively-known.+ In this
case, it might easily be said that the consciousness I open to my clients is
a consciousness sometimes outside their ego awareness (i.e., a form of
unconsciousness). And that is probably the direction Jung was headed. But
that isn+t the anwer here.
It sometimes seems to me that this entire argument could be made much
clearor, to return to my main point as promised, by simply dropping the
terms pre-reflective and reflective CONSCIOUSNESS (and repositioning Jung+s
comment about consciousness being permeated with unconsciousness), and using
instead the terms prereflective and reflective INTENTIONALITY. Do you (or
anyone) have any reflections on this point that might raise my level of
consciousness (or whatever)?
One convenient thought I have of my own is that consciousness is by nature
ambiguous. This may be the case, but it seems a little too convenient.
Another thought is that intentionality is in the first place, the structure
of consciousness, so the whole thing is really a moot point. Still,
intentionality is not consciousness proper. Rather, it is the +shape+ of
concsiouness... and that is different... no?
So what I am chasing here is a way of differentiating consciousness as an
awareness of the ego, from the unconsciousness act which, by Jung's
definition is not. One is presumably then at liberty to propose an
intentionality of ego awareness (reflective intentionality -- consciousness)
and an inentionality of ego unawareness (prereflective intentionality --
unconsciousness), without calling the ego unawareness (i.e.,
unconsciousness) an act of consciousness. And it seems like this would have
satisfied at least one of Jung+s reflective moments.
Michael
Michael
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