On Fri, 2 Aug 1996, M.Eldred_artefact wrote:
> =20
> Cologne, 2 August 1996
>=20
> The more I read of Tom Blancato's posts on the question of violence, the =
more I=20
> have the impression that 1) this question is not originary and 2) it is n=
ot=20
> being asked phenomenologically.=20
>=20
> Re 1) If violence is to be a question for thinking, it must be situated. =
Tom=20
> rightly points out that violence is a mode of being. This means it has to=
shown=20
> as such from an understanding of being. I would add that violence is a mo=
de of=20
> being together (Mitsein), but nowhere do I see a suggestion that the=20
> phenomenality of human beings being-together is being approached. This wo=
uld=20
> involve us, among other things, in rethinking aethos (as opposed to ethos=
), i.e.=20
> dwelling in the world as well as the being of others (how is the other op=
en AS=20
> an other?).
>=20
> I subscribe to J.Ben-Aharon's emphasizing the importance of the phenomeno=
logical=20
> interpretation of Aristotle for Heidegger. This extends beyond the Physic=
s and=20
> the Metaphysics to the Ethics (notably the Nikomachian Ethics), yet again=
a=20
> fundamental text of Western thinking that binds our thinking whether we k=
now it=20
> or not. The distinction between aethos and ethos is developed there. So g=
et=20
> yourself a Greek dictionary, Tom!=20
>=20
> Re 2) Bringing violence to speak phenomenologically is to show it as a mo=
de of=20
> being. The understanding of being itself cannot be ignored in such an att=
empt.=20
>=20
> Tom B. writes:=20
> "But the Being of the Analytic is never simply a theme, it is always a
> thrown-projectional-resolute being-towards-death-in-the-world-with- other=
s
> which is in each case "mine", someone's "mine". Though,
> phenomenologically, we know that this, too, is not the case: it is,
> rather, a child facing a saturday with no school, two people chatting in =
a
> cafe, someone making a carreer decision, a fireman on the roof of a
> burning building, someone languishing in an insitution for the elderly, a
> man being raped 65 times in two days in a prison, the reflection of an
> elderly man as portrayed in a Bergman film."=20
>=20
> What does this mean: "phenomenologically, we know that this, too, is not =
the=20
> case"? Specific 'ontic' descriptions are not already phenomenological. Th=
ey=20
> first have to be coaxed and teased to show themselves as, in this case, m=
odes of=20
> human being. The phenomenon of violence, if it is to be treated=20
> phenomenologically, has to reveal itself as a mode of human being, 'essen=
cing',=20
> dwelling. And this it cannot do unless it is disclosed in relation to an=
=20
> understanding of being (SZ is a first attempt at this). Which would bring=
us=20
> back once again to considering the trans-lation of "staendiger Anwesung"(=
which=20
> first becomes a concern for thinking after SZ). It could well turn out th=
at=20
> violence is an aspect of the virility that keeps cropping up here without=
being=20
> focussed as a phenomenon. Virility: a mode of Staendigkeit in human dwell=
ing?=20
--- I think that ontic descriptions *are* already phenomenological, in=20
some ways. I question the division into ontic and ontological, the sense=20
of pre-reflective and reflective, etc. Likewise, SZ can not be regarded=20
as a first attempt to understand Being. It is a certain development,=20
clarification, etc., but there is always already an understanding of=20
being.
--- The problem appears to me to be taking violence as a mode of=20
dwelling. I think this is part of the "latent nonviolence" and general=20
insight in Heidegger: that Dasein, in mistaking *other Daseins* as things=
=20
present at hand, as objects without the character of Dasein, etc., does a=
=20
violence to Dasein. But this *taking* AS is part of what accomplishes=20
violence. This gets complexly phenomenological. In short, I think the=20
issue of the "phenomenon" of violence is that it is a *rupture to=20
dwelling* and never simply an aspect of dwelling (via virility).=20
>=20
> As it is, this discussion of violence and nonviolence (still not explicat=
ed in=20
> its positivity) has not been situated in a perspective that would allow t=
he=20
> phenomena involved to be approached. Therefore it rambles pretty much=20
> incoherently, perhaps reeling from the effects of the moral charge of the=
=20
> question raised. The discussion of 'polemos' has not been carried through=
but=20
> only touched upon. 'To deinon' (Sophocles) surfaced once (I think it was =
Paul=20
> Murphy) only to disappear again.=20
--- Obviously, I wouldn't go so far as to call it "incoherent", nor is=20
its waywardness, in my opinion, an effect of the charge. In think, on the=
=20
contrary, that I've done a fair job of managing the charge, in the midst=20
of it. But, yes, lots of things are not developed.=20
--- Regards, =20
Tom B. (see, I *can* write a short post!)
>=20
> Maybe that's the way this particular cookie crumbles.
>=20
> Cheers,=20
> Michael=20
> \\\ =B0 '~': '' /// =B0 artefact text and translation =B0~ \ ' ) '=
'' | . \ - =B0
> .{.\ ~. ' ~ { } .\ : ~ =B0=B0=B0 made by art =B0=B0=B0 _=
=B0/ ~ : ~:~ \./''/
> http://www.webcom.com/artefact/ {.\ ~. ' ~ { } .\ : ~ artefact@t-onl=
ine.de=20
> vox: (++49 221) 9520 333 fax: (++49 221) 9520 334 Dr Michael Eld=
red=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> --- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>=20
_____________________________________________________________________
"I'll take my coffee without sugar produced in slave labor camps, third=20
world plantations and by prison chain gangs, thank you."
_____________________________________________________________________
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
> =20
> Cologne, 2 August 1996
>=20
> The more I read of Tom Blancato's posts on the question of violence, the =
more I=20
> have the impression that 1) this question is not originary and 2) it is n=
ot=20
> being asked phenomenologically.=20
>=20
> Re 1) If violence is to be a question for thinking, it must be situated. =
Tom=20
> rightly points out that violence is a mode of being. This means it has to=
shown=20
> as such from an understanding of being. I would add that violence is a mo=
de of=20
> being together (Mitsein), but nowhere do I see a suggestion that the=20
> phenomenality of human beings being-together is being approached. This wo=
uld=20
> involve us, among other things, in rethinking aethos (as opposed to ethos=
), i.e.=20
> dwelling in the world as well as the being of others (how is the other op=
en AS=20
> an other?).
>=20
> I subscribe to J.Ben-Aharon's emphasizing the importance of the phenomeno=
logical=20
> interpretation of Aristotle for Heidegger. This extends beyond the Physic=
s and=20
> the Metaphysics to the Ethics (notably the Nikomachian Ethics), yet again=
a=20
> fundamental text of Western thinking that binds our thinking whether we k=
now it=20
> or not. The distinction between aethos and ethos is developed there. So g=
et=20
> yourself a Greek dictionary, Tom!=20
>=20
> Re 2) Bringing violence to speak phenomenologically is to show it as a mo=
de of=20
> being. The understanding of being itself cannot be ignored in such an att=
empt.=20
>=20
> Tom B. writes:=20
> "But the Being of the Analytic is never simply a theme, it is always a
> thrown-projectional-resolute being-towards-death-in-the-world-with- other=
s
> which is in each case "mine", someone's "mine". Though,
> phenomenologically, we know that this, too, is not the case: it is,
> rather, a child facing a saturday with no school, two people chatting in =
a
> cafe, someone making a carreer decision, a fireman on the roof of a
> burning building, someone languishing in an insitution for the elderly, a
> man being raped 65 times in two days in a prison, the reflection of an
> elderly man as portrayed in a Bergman film."=20
>=20
> What does this mean: "phenomenologically, we know that this, too, is not =
the=20
> case"? Specific 'ontic' descriptions are not already phenomenological. Th=
ey=20
> first have to be coaxed and teased to show themselves as, in this case, m=
odes of=20
> human being. The phenomenon of violence, if it is to be treated=20
> phenomenologically, has to reveal itself as a mode of human being, 'essen=
cing',=20
> dwelling. And this it cannot do unless it is disclosed in relation to an=
=20
> understanding of being (SZ is a first attempt at this). Which would bring=
us=20
> back once again to considering the trans-lation of "staendiger Anwesung"(=
which=20
> first becomes a concern for thinking after SZ). It could well turn out th=
at=20
> violence is an aspect of the virility that keeps cropping up here without=
being=20
> focussed as a phenomenon. Virility: a mode of Staendigkeit in human dwell=
ing?=20
--- I think that ontic descriptions *are* already phenomenological, in=20
some ways. I question the division into ontic and ontological, the sense=20
of pre-reflective and reflective, etc. Likewise, SZ can not be regarded=20
as a first attempt to understand Being. It is a certain development,=20
clarification, etc., but there is always already an understanding of=20
being.
--- The problem appears to me to be taking violence as a mode of=20
dwelling. I think this is part of the "latent nonviolence" and general=20
insight in Heidegger: that Dasein, in mistaking *other Daseins* as things=
=20
present at hand, as objects without the character of Dasein, etc., does a=
=20
violence to Dasein. But this *taking* AS is part of what accomplishes=20
violence. This gets complexly phenomenological. In short, I think the=20
issue of the "phenomenon" of violence is that it is a *rupture to=20
dwelling* and never simply an aspect of dwelling (via virility).=20
>=20
> As it is, this discussion of violence and nonviolence (still not explicat=
ed in=20
> its positivity) has not been situated in a perspective that would allow t=
he=20
> phenomena involved to be approached. Therefore it rambles pretty much=20
> incoherently, perhaps reeling from the effects of the moral charge of the=
=20
> question raised. The discussion of 'polemos' has not been carried through=
but=20
> only touched upon. 'To deinon' (Sophocles) surfaced once (I think it was =
Paul=20
> Murphy) only to disappear again.=20
--- Obviously, I wouldn't go so far as to call it "incoherent", nor is=20
its waywardness, in my opinion, an effect of the charge. In think, on the=
=20
contrary, that I've done a fair job of managing the charge, in the midst=20
of it. But, yes, lots of things are not developed.=20
--- Regards, =20
Tom B. (see, I *can* write a short post!)
>=20
> Maybe that's the way this particular cookie crumbles.
>=20
> Cheers,=20
> Michael=20
> \\\ =B0 '~': '' /// =B0 artefact text and translation =B0~ \ ' ) '=
'' | . \ - =B0
> .{.\ ~. ' ~ { } .\ : ~ =B0=B0=B0 made by art =B0=B0=B0 _=
=B0/ ~ : ~:~ \./''/
> http://www.webcom.com/artefact/ {.\ ~. ' ~ { } .\ : ~ artefact@t-onl=
ine.de=20
> vox: (++49 221) 9520 333 fax: (++49 221) 9520 334 Dr Michael Eld=
red=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> --- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>=20
_____________________________________________________________________
"I'll take my coffee without sugar produced in slave labor camps, third=20
world plantations and by prison chain gangs, thank you."
_____________________________________________________________________
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---