On Sun, 11 Aug 1996 paul.murphy@xxxxxxxxxxx wrote:
> Tom:
>
> Perhaps I sounded rather rude to anticipate. This is far from my intention.
> The 'no thanks' is not my response
> -- in fact, I'm very grateful for your posing of the question of (non)violence.
> The anticipated 'no thanks' is my playful projection of what I take to be
> a position you have been articulating, especially in the context of your
> response to Dr. Eldred's citation of the _Beitraege_ on 'reservedness' --
> namely, that impatience and outrage are justified ('responsible')
> responses to prevailing historical violence. Hence, 'no thanks' would be
> *against* Heidegger's thinking-thanking, against grateful acceptance or
> affirmation of history,
> against Heidegger's skew or spin of 'responsibility' towards
> 'response-ibility' with respect to the history of being (wherein the
> response is to the call of Being and not to the call of others).
> I'm sorry if I'm misinterpreting you or putting words in your mouth.
I appreciate your explanation and precaution. No simple "no thanks" will
be forthcoming from me, any more than a simple reversal of "Heidegger",
or nearly anything. There is positive history, deconstructive history,
and what I would call enstructive history (founded on the accomplishment
of the first two). There is thinking. There is affirmation. There is the
contestation of history, as well. I think.
>
> On another note: By your discussion of
> 'responsibility' in your previous post, are you arguing for a more
> Sartrean determination of the term than one derived from Being and Time?
Right, "intention", etc. No, not Sartrean, insofar as Sartrean choice
(I think with scholarship limitations as usual) is a *highly* virile,
non-attributive mode of choice. Attributve choice means that chocie is
framed in *attribution* across *ranges* of conditions: e.g., internal,
external, conditions, skill, knowledge, load, ability, effort, luck,
form/way, etc. Thus opened up (via the opening of opening, I guess), the
strong intentional hubris softens down into the vein of being and the
there as I described it, but stays short of the Heideggerian tendency to
a "total loss of the subject", various reversals, etc.
Regards,
Tom B.
>
> Anticipating your response,
> Paul
>
>
> --- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>
_____________________________________________________________________
"I'll take my coffee without sugar produced in slave labor camps, third
world plantations and by prison chain gangs, thank you."
_____________________________________________________________________
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
> Tom:
>
> Perhaps I sounded rather rude to anticipate. This is far from my intention.
> The 'no thanks' is not my response
> -- in fact, I'm very grateful for your posing of the question of (non)violence.
> The anticipated 'no thanks' is my playful projection of what I take to be
> a position you have been articulating, especially in the context of your
> response to Dr. Eldred's citation of the _Beitraege_ on 'reservedness' --
> namely, that impatience and outrage are justified ('responsible')
> responses to prevailing historical violence. Hence, 'no thanks' would be
> *against* Heidegger's thinking-thanking, against grateful acceptance or
> affirmation of history,
> against Heidegger's skew or spin of 'responsibility' towards
> 'response-ibility' with respect to the history of being (wherein the
> response is to the call of Being and not to the call of others).
> I'm sorry if I'm misinterpreting you or putting words in your mouth.
I appreciate your explanation and precaution. No simple "no thanks" will
be forthcoming from me, any more than a simple reversal of "Heidegger",
or nearly anything. There is positive history, deconstructive history,
and what I would call enstructive history (founded on the accomplishment
of the first two). There is thinking. There is affirmation. There is the
contestation of history, as well. I think.
>
> On another note: By your discussion of
> 'responsibility' in your previous post, are you arguing for a more
> Sartrean determination of the term than one derived from Being and Time?
Right, "intention", etc. No, not Sartrean, insofar as Sartrean choice
(I think with scholarship limitations as usual) is a *highly* virile,
non-attributive mode of choice. Attributve choice means that chocie is
framed in *attribution* across *ranges* of conditions: e.g., internal,
external, conditions, skill, knowledge, load, ability, effort, luck,
form/way, etc. Thus opened up (via the opening of opening, I guess), the
strong intentional hubris softens down into the vein of being and the
there as I described it, but stays short of the Heideggerian tendency to
a "total loss of the subject", various reversals, etc.
Regards,
Tom B.
>
> Anticipating your response,
> Paul
>
>
> --- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>
_____________________________________________________________________
"I'll take my coffee without sugar produced in slave labor camps, third
world plantations and by prison chain gangs, thank you."
_____________________________________________________________________
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---