On Thu, 29 Aug 1996, Staples, Michael wrote:
> Chris, thank you as well for your response to my question concerning the
> difference between existentials and Platonic forms. I have a follow up on
> your point. You state that:
>
> "The quickest way to put it is that for Heidegger the categories of
> meaning are historical, whereas for Plato they are eternal."
>
> Are you saying "all" apriori existentials are culturally determined, or just
> "some" existentials? Now I think I understand the difference between Dasein
> making possible an existential versus Dasein determining an existential. I
> think H. makes this point with respect to truth in that Dasein makes truth
> possible, but does not determin its value.
> Certainly, you don't mean to say that H.'s view of existentials as being
> rooted in culture/history (if that IS what you are saying) is in any way
> solopsistic or DETERMINED by man... right? Could you elaborate?
There are two things to keep separated: ideas and categories. Ideas are
the "look" of things, such as the idea of humans, the idea of trees,
etc. Categories are the way we take things as something.
For Heidegger, the existentials are categories of Dasein, but they are
formal indications, which means that they enact themselves in concrete
situation in different ways. For example, one existential (not found in
BT) is the relation of man to gods: both the presence of gods and the
absence of gods are both enactments of this relationship.
Simply put, the existentials which make up Dasein are not culturally
determined, but their enactment is the determination of culture. Easiest
example: death. Humans will die one way or another, but we can learn to
be mortal, which is to say, take up an authentic relationship to death.
If we follow a hint by Derrida, a culture is established by its
relationship to death, so the enactment of the existential "death," which
is to say, our relationship to death, is the particular culture, or in
Heidegger's case, order of being. Particular orders of being within
which things come to presence are historical.
If I will be permitted a gross generalization, formal indications are the
ways "to be" of Dasein; the first part of Being and Time, the
Daseinanalytik, is an investigation of the possible ways to be, while the
second part is how we can achieve authenticity, i.e., the right way to be.
Chris
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> Chris, thank you as well for your response to my question concerning the
> difference between existentials and Platonic forms. I have a follow up on
> your point. You state that:
>
> "The quickest way to put it is that for Heidegger the categories of
> meaning are historical, whereas for Plato they are eternal."
>
> Are you saying "all" apriori existentials are culturally determined, or just
> "some" existentials? Now I think I understand the difference between Dasein
> making possible an existential versus Dasein determining an existential. I
> think H. makes this point with respect to truth in that Dasein makes truth
> possible, but does not determin its value.
> Certainly, you don't mean to say that H.'s view of existentials as being
> rooted in culture/history (if that IS what you are saying) is in any way
> solopsistic or DETERMINED by man... right? Could you elaborate?
There are two things to keep separated: ideas and categories. Ideas are
the "look" of things, such as the idea of humans, the idea of trees,
etc. Categories are the way we take things as something.
For Heidegger, the existentials are categories of Dasein, but they are
formal indications, which means that they enact themselves in concrete
situation in different ways. For example, one existential (not found in
BT) is the relation of man to gods: both the presence of gods and the
absence of gods are both enactments of this relationship.
Simply put, the existentials which make up Dasein are not culturally
determined, but their enactment is the determination of culture. Easiest
example: death. Humans will die one way or another, but we can learn to
be mortal, which is to say, take up an authentic relationship to death.
If we follow a hint by Derrida, a culture is established by its
relationship to death, so the enactment of the existential "death," which
is to say, our relationship to death, is the particular culture, or in
Heidegger's case, order of being. Particular orders of being within
which things come to presence are historical.
If I will be permitted a gross generalization, formal indications are the
ways "to be" of Dasein; the first part of Being and Time, the
Daseinanalytik, is an investigation of the possible ways to be, while the
second part is how we can achieve authenticity, i.e., the right way to be.
Chris
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