Dr. Eldred, thank you once again for the distinction between befindlichkeit
as state-of-mind and moodedness. I had been a bit confused on this point,
and I like your explanation.
Chris, thank you as well for your response to my question concerning the
difference between existentials and Platonic forms. I have a follow up on
your point. You state that:
"The quickest way to put it is that for Heidegger the categories of
meaning are historical, whereas for Plato they are eternal."
Are you saying "all" apriori existentials are culturally determined, or just
"some" existentials? Now I think I understand the difference between Dasein
making possible an existential versus Dasein determining an existential. I
think H. makes this point with respect to truth in that Dasein makes truth
possible, but does not determin its value.
In Jung's psychology, I have often thought of what he calls the "Self" as
being a kind of relative-absolute. Jung equates the Self (as organizing
principle or achetype) to man's experience of God. In this sense, the Self
is both relative in that its existence is a relative to man's experience (a
relationship), and absolute in the same sense of Being or time--i.e.,
fundamental to the human experience, and both essentially "mine" while at
the same time not specifically or "only" mine. Jung often talks about the
archetypes as universal but rooted in the Collective Unconscious (Objective
Psyche). This would place them as well in a cultural/historical position,
albeit an unconscious cultural/historical position (which H. may or may not
have a problem with). But Jung also talks about archetypes as occupying a
position in what he called the "Psychoid" region located (and I had to use
these spatial analogies, but for now it makes things easy to talk about)
well below any cultural level. In this sense, their would be an archetype of
a rock or a tree that isn't really culturally determined.
While I say this sort of archetype isn't culturally determined, I also have
to insert here that culture and not-culture is perhaps viewed as being the
same stuff in this system. What changes is, perhaps, the proximity to Dasein
in some way. So that muddies the water up a bit, and may in fact be the
result of Jung's confinment by the Platonic/Cartesian/Kantian paradigm.
Certainly, you don't mean to say that H.'s view of existentials as being
rooted in culture/history (if that IS what you are saying) is in any way
solopsistic or DETERMINED by man... right? Could you elaborate?
Michael S.
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---