I'd like to ask about the suggestive wordplay connected with Michael's
quote from SZ:
>"Understanding is always mooded (gestimmtes)" (SZ 142; also 339) and
>conversely:
>"Moodedness (Befindlichkeit) always has its respective understanding, even
>if it
>is only by way of it suppressing understanding" (SZ 142, Section 31)
>
>The stehen (standing) in Verstehen (under-standing) is noteworthy, for beings
>come to stand for Dasein in understanding, whereas moodedness (Befindlichkeit)
>is the way the world comes to lie for Dasein. Whereas understanding has limits
>within which it stands which de-lineate a meaning, moodedness is a hovering
>state of being in which the contours are not so sharp but rather hazy.
>Understanding can of course turn to its mood to interrogate and clarify it
Just as there is a noteworthy "stehen" in "verstehen," I'm fascinated by
the Stimme ( voice) in "gestimmtes." What does voice, the spoken-ness of
language so important to H., have to do with the way Dasein is beset,
besituated, by moodedness? There would seem to be a suggestion here that
the moodedness of Daein's situation comes by way of speaking and listening
to/with others. It is still originary, but perhaps co-originary with our
nature as beings who speak in language. So our moodedness still hovers in
a difficult to define haze, but isn't that haze co-terminous with our being
in langauge as spoken? I think H. suggests as much when he intimates a
close connection between our bemoodedness and everyday speech as it is
delineated in Aristotle's Rhetoric. (In that connection he speaks of
Aristotle's discussion of moods and emotions in THE RHETORIC as the
earliest and best "heneremeutics of everyday life" in ancient Greek
thought.
I would like to add one more dimension to this set of connections set off
by the root Stimme, and that is the meaning of Stimmung as a tuning, or
attunement, or even harmony. The relationship of voice to mood it seems to
me is a musical/tonal one in the capacity of the voice to reflect, elicit,
translate, understand etc. a mood. This makes speaking a crucial link in
the coming about of our befindlkichkeit ( which "comes about" for us even
as it also '"comes to lie" before us) as bestimmung. In this connection,
Aristotle makes "appropriateness" the prime "rhetorical" virtue, perhaps
because of the capacity of right speaking to somehow properly attune the
auditor to an aspect of being.
Must go now, but would be interested in your response to these connections.
Allen Scult
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
quote from SZ:
>"Understanding is always mooded (gestimmtes)" (SZ 142; also 339) and
>conversely:
>"Moodedness (Befindlichkeit) always has its respective understanding, even
>if it
>is only by way of it suppressing understanding" (SZ 142, Section 31)
>
>The stehen (standing) in Verstehen (under-standing) is noteworthy, for beings
>come to stand for Dasein in understanding, whereas moodedness (Befindlichkeit)
>is the way the world comes to lie for Dasein. Whereas understanding has limits
>within which it stands which de-lineate a meaning, moodedness is a hovering
>state of being in which the contours are not so sharp but rather hazy.
>Understanding can of course turn to its mood to interrogate and clarify it
Just as there is a noteworthy "stehen" in "verstehen," I'm fascinated by
the Stimme ( voice) in "gestimmtes." What does voice, the spoken-ness of
language so important to H., have to do with the way Dasein is beset,
besituated, by moodedness? There would seem to be a suggestion here that
the moodedness of Daein's situation comes by way of speaking and listening
to/with others. It is still originary, but perhaps co-originary with our
nature as beings who speak in language. So our moodedness still hovers in
a difficult to define haze, but isn't that haze co-terminous with our being
in langauge as spoken? I think H. suggests as much when he intimates a
close connection between our bemoodedness and everyday speech as it is
delineated in Aristotle's Rhetoric. (In that connection he speaks of
Aristotle's discussion of moods and emotions in THE RHETORIC as the
earliest and best "heneremeutics of everyday life" in ancient Greek
thought.
I would like to add one more dimension to this set of connections set off
by the root Stimme, and that is the meaning of Stimmung as a tuning, or
attunement, or even harmony. The relationship of voice to mood it seems to
me is a musical/tonal one in the capacity of the voice to reflect, elicit,
translate, understand etc. a mood. This makes speaking a crucial link in
the coming about of our befindlkichkeit ( which "comes about" for us even
as it also '"comes to lie" before us) as bestimmung. In this connection,
Aristotle makes "appropriateness" the prime "rhetorical" virtue, perhaps
because of the capacity of right speaking to somehow properly attune the
auditor to an aspect of being.
Must go now, but would be interested in your response to these connections.
Allen Scult
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---