On Tue, 27 Aug 1996, Staples, Michael wrote:
> First, Heidegger talks about discovering that which we know, that which we
> understand (verstehen) as something which exists a priori. Meaning here is
> not derived from words. Rather, words describe the meaning of something we
> already have. What then is the difference between this and the a priori
> "forms" (existentials?) of Platonic idealism??
The quickest way to put it is that for Heidegger the categories of
meaning are historical, whereas for Plato they are eternal. This does
little justice to Plato, but it works for starters. The "a priori" can
roughly be understood by what is commonly known as "cultural background,"
the meanings of things in which we already move. This is why Heidegger
believes that phenomenology must be hermeneutic; it can only begin with
the way of language we speak and through which things come to appearance.
> Second, though Heidegger is careful not to morlize about his
> authentic/inauthentic ways of Being... still, there seems to be an
> implication that authentic being is something to cherished (am I wrong about
> this?). If this is the case, I cannot find any explanation as to why. Why
> should an authentic way of Being be any better or worse than falling into
> the inauthentic "they"? Or is this strictly my own reading into Heidegger
> something which is not Heidegger's intention?
Don't let his "I'm only doing fundamental ontology" crap fool you. He is
trying to rethink the grounds of human being in the world, another way of
putting it our ethos. Authenticity is his way of thinking about properly
understanding human existence, which for him is authentically action, and
all action is directed towards the good; authenticity is the proper way
of thinking about the good.
Why would you want to be authentic? Who wouldn't? Anyway, to give an
example, authentic or inauthentic refers to ways of understanding
ourselves (which is also our way of being; way of thinking=our being),
how we take ourselves. Das Man is the same as theory; we take ourselves
as a thing. Authentically understanding ourselves we are not a thing.
When we take ourselves as a thing, we turn ourselves in the end to raw
material for the cybernetic technological domination characteristic of
the present so far as he is concerned (to take the example prevalent in
his late philosophy). This is admittedly tough to discern in Being and
Time, but it is there when one pieces together the disparate threads that
came together at this time.
Chris
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
> First, Heidegger talks about discovering that which we know, that which we
> understand (verstehen) as something which exists a priori. Meaning here is
> not derived from words. Rather, words describe the meaning of something we
> already have. What then is the difference between this and the a priori
> "forms" (existentials?) of Platonic idealism??
The quickest way to put it is that for Heidegger the categories of
meaning are historical, whereas for Plato they are eternal. This does
little justice to Plato, but it works for starters. The "a priori" can
roughly be understood by what is commonly known as "cultural background,"
the meanings of things in which we already move. This is why Heidegger
believes that phenomenology must be hermeneutic; it can only begin with
the way of language we speak and through which things come to appearance.
> Second, though Heidegger is careful not to morlize about his
> authentic/inauthentic ways of Being... still, there seems to be an
> implication that authentic being is something to cherished (am I wrong about
> this?). If this is the case, I cannot find any explanation as to why. Why
> should an authentic way of Being be any better or worse than falling into
> the inauthentic "they"? Or is this strictly my own reading into Heidegger
> something which is not Heidegger's intention?
Don't let his "I'm only doing fundamental ontology" crap fool you. He is
trying to rethink the grounds of human being in the world, another way of
putting it our ethos. Authenticity is his way of thinking about properly
understanding human existence, which for him is authentically action, and
all action is directed towards the good; authenticity is the proper way
of thinking about the good.
Why would you want to be authentic? Who wouldn't? Anyway, to give an
example, authentic or inauthentic refers to ways of understanding
ourselves (which is also our way of being; way of thinking=our being),
how we take ourselves. Das Man is the same as theory; we take ourselves
as a thing. Authentically understanding ourselves we are not a thing.
When we take ourselves as a thing, we turn ourselves in the end to raw
material for the cybernetic technological domination characteristic of
the present so far as he is concerned (to take the example prevalent in
his late philosophy). This is admittedly tough to discern in Being and
Time, but it is there when one pieces together the disparate threads that
came together at this time.
Chris
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---