I am confused about H.s view of truth. I don't understand the advantage H.s
view has over any other relativistic view. As I understand it, H.s view
might be described as a kind of pluralistic realism that contrasts the sort
of Thomas Khun relativism only in that the conclusions differ -- Kuhn
concludes that relativsm negates any sort of final version of truth, H. has
a slightly different take on this. But as far as I can tell, H. is still
firmly planted in the realm of relativism. He is still claiming that, even
though the world about which we create truth is not relative to Dasein's
Being, the truth itself is realtive to Dasein's Being. He is quick to point
out that truth is not strictly subjective (as Kuhn, it seems to me, might be
saying), but is still relative to Dasein's thrownness, culture, or whatever.
I guess my question is... what great advantage is there is H.s version of
pluralistic realism if the end result is going to be just one more version
of relativism? And, where does one draw the line with respect to nailing
down the relative parameters of truth? In other words, if I can say "Well...
it may not be a valid truth in your era (e.g., the ancient Greek era), but
it is in my era (20th Century)," then does this mean I can also say "Well...
it may not be a valid truth for you, but it is for me"? If I can say this,
then there isn't much difference between H.s version of truth and the
strictly subjective truth of an extreme relativist.
Help!
Michael S.
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