>Cologne, 13 September 1996
>
>
>> "It's tough to argue with Heidegger because there's something about his
>> philosophy that makes him immune to criticism."
>> It's tough. Maybe he's immune to criticism. But he's open to thinking.
>> There's a big difference between the two.
>
Christopher Morrissey responds:
"As for the big difference between criticism and thinking: well, just saying=
it
doesn't make it so."
M.Eldred responds (in part):
>Each thinker has to decide for him or herself whether
>s/he has appropriated and understood a thinker. There is no external yardst=
ick
>here. Every (wo)man for him(her)self.
Maybe there is no external yardstick, I don't know (if I did know then I'd
be using some external yardstick to know that). But some of this discussion
on relativism and truth and everyone thinking for themselves makes me a
little nervous. Proposing that every thinker decide for themselves what is
true sounds like the new-ageism "what's true for me may not be true for
you, man." Of course, no one should blindly follow the "thinkings " of
others without thinking for themselves, but it seems rather unhelpful to
say that truth is a matter of some vague notion of thinkings,
unconcealings, presencings, and other assorted gerunds--words whose
meanings (or if "meaning" sounds too positivistic then "suggestiveness" or
"invitation") are hard to pin down. My point is that in order to
communicate a certain "thinking," aren't we presupposing at least some
correspondence among the meanings of these concepts? Some external
yardstick? If not, then how do we distinguish (or how do we communicate a
distinction) between those unconcealings which conceal their emptiness, and
those that do not? If meanings and distinctions remain personal, then it is
hard to say that we have communicated anything significant to others. And
if we are only concerned about what my thinking means to me, then what is
true for me may not be true for you, man.
I hope that Heidegger is not taken to be a relativist. I think that many
things he had to say about Being were intended to be quite objective. I
think we should "appropriate" them accordingly. Of course, this is not to
say that there aren't relative truths, or that truth comes easy, or that it
doesn't change over time. But for Heidegger to continue to be an important
philosopher, I think he should not be immune from criticism. It seems to me
that there is plenty of room for criticism and further "thinking"
especially where concepts are fundamental, difficult, or elude certainty.
Certainly, "truth" is one of those concepts, which demands much more than
vagueness and capitulation to personal taste.
I've been reading this listserver for quite some time and I feel fully
justified in asking what is meant by "thinking," if it is not a concept by
which to circumvent coming to some kind of shared understanding of
concepts. And if the answer is "just to let beings be in their Being," then
I'll go turn on my lava lamp and light one up, man.
Chris Johns
johns.23@xxxxxxx
"I find myself torn between two conflicting feelings--a 'Chomskyan' feeling
that deep regularities in natural language must be discoverable by an
appropriate combination of formal, empirical, and intuitive techniques, and
a contrary (late) 'Wittgensteinian' Feeling that many of the 'deep
structures', 'logical forms', 'underlying semantics' and 'ontological
commitments', etc., which philosophers have claimed to discover by such
techniques are Luftgeb=E4ude." --S. Kripke
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>
>
>> "It's tough to argue with Heidegger because there's something about his
>> philosophy that makes him immune to criticism."
>> It's tough. Maybe he's immune to criticism. But he's open to thinking.
>> There's a big difference between the two.
>
Christopher Morrissey responds:
"As for the big difference between criticism and thinking: well, just saying=
it
doesn't make it so."
M.Eldred responds (in part):
>Each thinker has to decide for him or herself whether
>s/he has appropriated and understood a thinker. There is no external yardst=
ick
>here. Every (wo)man for him(her)self.
Maybe there is no external yardstick, I don't know (if I did know then I'd
be using some external yardstick to know that). But some of this discussion
on relativism and truth and everyone thinking for themselves makes me a
little nervous. Proposing that every thinker decide for themselves what is
true sounds like the new-ageism "what's true for me may not be true for
you, man." Of course, no one should blindly follow the "thinkings " of
others without thinking for themselves, but it seems rather unhelpful to
say that truth is a matter of some vague notion of thinkings,
unconcealings, presencings, and other assorted gerunds--words whose
meanings (or if "meaning" sounds too positivistic then "suggestiveness" or
"invitation") are hard to pin down. My point is that in order to
communicate a certain "thinking," aren't we presupposing at least some
correspondence among the meanings of these concepts? Some external
yardstick? If not, then how do we distinguish (or how do we communicate a
distinction) between those unconcealings which conceal their emptiness, and
those that do not? If meanings and distinctions remain personal, then it is
hard to say that we have communicated anything significant to others. And
if we are only concerned about what my thinking means to me, then what is
true for me may not be true for you, man.
I hope that Heidegger is not taken to be a relativist. I think that many
things he had to say about Being were intended to be quite objective. I
think we should "appropriate" them accordingly. Of course, this is not to
say that there aren't relative truths, or that truth comes easy, or that it
doesn't change over time. But for Heidegger to continue to be an important
philosopher, I think he should not be immune from criticism. It seems to me
that there is plenty of room for criticism and further "thinking"
especially where concepts are fundamental, difficult, or elude certainty.
Certainly, "truth" is one of those concepts, which demands much more than
vagueness and capitulation to personal taste.
I've been reading this listserver for quite some time and I feel fully
justified in asking what is meant by "thinking," if it is not a concept by
which to circumvent coming to some kind of shared understanding of
concepts. And if the answer is "just to let beings be in their Being," then
I'll go turn on my lava lamp and light one up, man.
Chris Johns
johns.23@xxxxxxx
"I find myself torn between two conflicting feelings--a 'Chomskyan' feeling
that deep regularities in natural language must be discoverable by an
appropriate combination of formal, empirical, and intuitive techniques, and
a contrary (late) 'Wittgensteinian' Feeling that many of the 'deep
structures', 'logical forms', 'underlying semantics' and 'ontological
commitments', etc., which philosophers have claimed to discover by such
techniques are Luftgeb=E4ude." --S. Kripke
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---