Eric Champion wrote:
>ok, but do you think that truth as "that which conceals nothing" is the
same as truth being a revealing?
>If we consider art and truth (via some form of Heideggerean standpoint), is
not truth something fluid and
>impossible to hold onto for any length of time?
> Can this revealing, fleeting or otherwise, really be a non-concealing, as
"that which conceals nothing" does not go towards truth as
>process of revealing rather than as product?
>Ie was your/Peirce's definition of truth more definite product than
fluid/ambiguous process?
>Is Heidegger's more process than product?
>Even if the same coin?
That truth is that which conceals nothing doesn't mean that it is not,
itself, concealed. I would take both Heidegger and Nietzsche, for instance,
as believing that no "truth" is absolutely self-evident (even mathematical
truths). In that sense, all truth operates under a concealment. Even if we
were to come upon an absolutely unconcealed truth, we could never be sure
that it itself wasn't concealing something else (that is, until we had
uncovered that something else, and then we could never be sure that it
wasn't concealing something else). Thus, even if we found _the_ Truth, we
could never be sure that it was _really_ the Truth.
The more Peircean (or perhaps Wittgensteinian) slant here (the actual
assertion is my formulation), that truth is whatever happens to be the case,
points rather to the conditions necessary for a truth (or a falsity) to be.
If there is no case, there can be no truth (or falsity). A "case" might
perhaps be defined in its most minimal sense as agreement between a subject
and a predicate. A door may be either open or closed, for instance, but it
can't be sane or crazy. The statement "The rain is falling" is not likely to
raise any eyebrows, but "The rain is rising" would. And so on. Now, poetry
(and metaphor) operates often by mismatching subject and predicate (Garcia
Lorca is probably the most extreme example of this). As I stated earlier,
the formulation, that truth is whatever happens to be the case, defines
"logical" truth. The questions of poetic truth and, perhaps even more to the
point, philosophical truth are not directly addressed by this assertion, or
at least are not included within it. Poetic truth, if we wish to grant it
the status of "truth," would be exclusive of logical truth--but it's hard
for me to see how philosophical truth could be exclusive in the same
fashion. It might be said to be inclusive, a synthesis, of both logical and
poetic truth, perhaps.
Part of the point here, perhaps, is simply that philosophical truth cannot
rely solely on logic to buttress its claims (claims to poetic truth, on the
other hand, eschew logic). To think philosophically, as opposed to just
logically, one must go beyond logic. A further question, of course, is the
degree to which one can go against logic--in the sense that the
post-structuralists and deconstructionists would seem to be trying to do
(all the same, it seems to me one can only attack logic, logically).
>Thanks for the answer, I hope my further question above is appropriate.
>NB Can I even talk of truth as ambiguous truth or am I contradicting myself?
>I guess I am.
The oft-quoted remark of Nietzsche's that "Truth is a lie" (from an
unpublished and early work) is, I think, a good example of the Liar's
Paradox, and may have been intended by Nietzsche in exactly that sense. The
difficulty is in how one might interpret such an assertion. Do we interpret
it as the literal truth? That's a trap, I can't help but feel that the
deconstructionists tend to fall into, headlong. In other words, you can't
assert the truth of the proposition without contradicting yourself.
Therefore, if you wish to not contradict yourself, you must interpret in
some kind of non-literal sense (as analogy, metaphor, etc.). Or you can hop
on the dialectical escalator and ride up to the next floor where the
opposites truth/lie are synthesized (we are in the Truth Factory, aren't we?).
>PS Someone said that one can defend Anthropomorhpic truth-is this
Heidegger? is this valid? Can truth be naything other than
>anthropomorphic or do those that deifine truth as mathematical truth
(objective etc) believe that it exists independently of them and
>anything they might believe and that any coreespondence to their own
viewpoint is neither here nor there?
As long as Heidegger is operating phenomenologically, then it seems to me he
has at least ceded that any "truths" he may uncover cannot escape the
possibility of being merely anthropormorphic. And neither Nietzsche nor
Peirce, for that matter, would concede mathematical truth (or logical truth)
as forming an exception here. Perhaps the essential question is simply
whether logic and reason can stand surety for themselves. Nietzsche
certainly doesn't believe this to be the case. To my mind, Heidegger would
also seem to believe this--its hard for me to see how he might not believe
it, without abandoning his phenomenological ground for some other kind of
ground, such as a noumenal ground substantiated (guaranteed) in an a priori
sense. Still, there is no reverse guarantee, either, although I think
Nietzsche would say that there are grounds for strongly suspecting that
truth and reason are anthropomorphic and do not correspond _absolutely_ to
anything outside of themselves (which, by the way, is not the same thing as
saying that they don't correspond to anything at all). The only grounds we
possess, in other words, for the veracity of truth and reason are pragmatic
grounds, that is, that they are capable of predicting results. What they
can't do, however, is get entirely to the bottom of Causation. Another way
of putting this, perhaps, would be to say that we are not capable of looking
out of the back of our eyes.
Steve Callihan
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>ok, but do you think that truth as "that which conceals nothing" is the
same as truth being a revealing?
>If we consider art and truth (via some form of Heideggerean standpoint), is
not truth something fluid and
>impossible to hold onto for any length of time?
> Can this revealing, fleeting or otherwise, really be a non-concealing, as
"that which conceals nothing" does not go towards truth as
>process of revealing rather than as product?
>Ie was your/Peirce's definition of truth more definite product than
fluid/ambiguous process?
>Is Heidegger's more process than product?
>Even if the same coin?
That truth is that which conceals nothing doesn't mean that it is not,
itself, concealed. I would take both Heidegger and Nietzsche, for instance,
as believing that no "truth" is absolutely self-evident (even mathematical
truths). In that sense, all truth operates under a concealment. Even if we
were to come upon an absolutely unconcealed truth, we could never be sure
that it itself wasn't concealing something else (that is, until we had
uncovered that something else, and then we could never be sure that it
wasn't concealing something else). Thus, even if we found _the_ Truth, we
could never be sure that it was _really_ the Truth.
The more Peircean (or perhaps Wittgensteinian) slant here (the actual
assertion is my formulation), that truth is whatever happens to be the case,
points rather to the conditions necessary for a truth (or a falsity) to be.
If there is no case, there can be no truth (or falsity). A "case" might
perhaps be defined in its most minimal sense as agreement between a subject
and a predicate. A door may be either open or closed, for instance, but it
can't be sane or crazy. The statement "The rain is falling" is not likely to
raise any eyebrows, but "The rain is rising" would. And so on. Now, poetry
(and metaphor) operates often by mismatching subject and predicate (Garcia
Lorca is probably the most extreme example of this). As I stated earlier,
the formulation, that truth is whatever happens to be the case, defines
"logical" truth. The questions of poetic truth and, perhaps even more to the
point, philosophical truth are not directly addressed by this assertion, or
at least are not included within it. Poetic truth, if we wish to grant it
the status of "truth," would be exclusive of logical truth--but it's hard
for me to see how philosophical truth could be exclusive in the same
fashion. It might be said to be inclusive, a synthesis, of both logical and
poetic truth, perhaps.
Part of the point here, perhaps, is simply that philosophical truth cannot
rely solely on logic to buttress its claims (claims to poetic truth, on the
other hand, eschew logic). To think philosophically, as opposed to just
logically, one must go beyond logic. A further question, of course, is the
degree to which one can go against logic--in the sense that the
post-structuralists and deconstructionists would seem to be trying to do
(all the same, it seems to me one can only attack logic, logically).
>Thanks for the answer, I hope my further question above is appropriate.
>NB Can I even talk of truth as ambiguous truth or am I contradicting myself?
>I guess I am.
The oft-quoted remark of Nietzsche's that "Truth is a lie" (from an
unpublished and early work) is, I think, a good example of the Liar's
Paradox, and may have been intended by Nietzsche in exactly that sense. The
difficulty is in how one might interpret such an assertion. Do we interpret
it as the literal truth? That's a trap, I can't help but feel that the
deconstructionists tend to fall into, headlong. In other words, you can't
assert the truth of the proposition without contradicting yourself.
Therefore, if you wish to not contradict yourself, you must interpret in
some kind of non-literal sense (as analogy, metaphor, etc.). Or you can hop
on the dialectical escalator and ride up to the next floor where the
opposites truth/lie are synthesized (we are in the Truth Factory, aren't we?).
>PS Someone said that one can defend Anthropomorhpic truth-is this
Heidegger? is this valid? Can truth be naything other than
>anthropomorphic or do those that deifine truth as mathematical truth
(objective etc) believe that it exists independently of them and
>anything they might believe and that any coreespondence to their own
viewpoint is neither here nor there?
As long as Heidegger is operating phenomenologically, then it seems to me he
has at least ceded that any "truths" he may uncover cannot escape the
possibility of being merely anthropormorphic. And neither Nietzsche nor
Peirce, for that matter, would concede mathematical truth (or logical truth)
as forming an exception here. Perhaps the essential question is simply
whether logic and reason can stand surety for themselves. Nietzsche
certainly doesn't believe this to be the case. To my mind, Heidegger would
also seem to believe this--its hard for me to see how he might not believe
it, without abandoning his phenomenological ground for some other kind of
ground, such as a noumenal ground substantiated (guaranteed) in an a priori
sense. Still, there is no reverse guarantee, either, although I think
Nietzsche would say that there are grounds for strongly suspecting that
truth and reason are anthropomorphic and do not correspond _absolutely_ to
anything outside of themselves (which, by the way, is not the same thing as
saying that they don't correspond to anything at all). The only grounds we
possess, in other words, for the veracity of truth and reason are pragmatic
grounds, that is, that they are capable of predicting results. What they
can't do, however, is get entirely to the bottom of Causation. Another way
of putting this, perhaps, would be to say that we are not capable of looking
out of the back of our eyes.
Steve Callihan
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---