On Tue, 24 Sep Steven E. Callihan writes:
>Jason B Collier wrote:
>
>>It would appear that a 'thing' and phenomena are not the same thing.
The
>>reason for this is, the ontological stance one takes in relation to the
>>thing/phenomena.
> Steven E. Callihan
>Maybe you can explain the distinction more clearly. It is difficult for
me
>to see how there can be things that are not phenomenal (that is, capable
of
>appearing, presenting themselves, in some form or fashion).
Jason again: I think that I am begining to see where you are coming from.
I think I like it to.:) I agree with you that all things present
themselves in some from or fashion, however, to make the distinction,
don't we need to ascribe an importance of the phenomenal thing over the
ordinary thing? I think this is where H gets tricky. I say this because
it would appear that all things, in a Heideggarian way, should be
understood phenomenally. The hammer should not disappear, yet it does.
>Jason B Collier writes:
>>Today we see a river as a
>>thing, but once we have built a dam to utilize the power/potentiality
of
>>the river, it becomes phenomena, something with meaning.
>
> Steven E. Callihan
The point of reversing the question was to ponder the quandary. For
>instance, that the potential of a river (like any other thing) is only
>partially manifest at any one time would seem to point to the notion
>that the river as a whole is primarily unmanifest. However, potentials,
it
>seems to me, are actualizable at some point and to some degree by
>definition. I'm perfectly willing to admit that our phenomenal
experience is >partial and fleeting, at best. A thing, however, which
could never be >experienced, e.g., never appear in any kind of phenomenal
form, would >seem to me to be no thing at all. What about the "whole" of
a thing, >however? Wholes, it seems to me, are inherently unknowable. The
missing >part is always simply the whole, in other words. We infer from
the parts to >the whole, however, and need not all the parts to do so.
Still, a thing may >be a whole, but are wholes things? Wholes, it seems
to me, are infinitudes.
>
I couldn't agree more. I would like to hear more though, it seems there
is something missing, but I can't quite pick it out. Saying "wholes, it
seems to me, are infinitudes." appears to be a little nihilistic. There
is more going on with the issue of "wholes" that needs to be addressed.
In what way is a part not a whole? If is has boundaries and is
identifiable, would it not be a whole? True we could say that it is a
"whole-part", but that does not make any sense. So, I will ask a
question, "what makes something a thing?" Regardless of wether or not it
is simply a 'thing' or a 'phenomenal thing.' Once we get that under some
semblance of control, we can proceed with a greater share of
understanding each other.
>>Jason B Collier writes:
>>However, the act of creation, of Poeisis, no longer has nay meaning.
Our >>relation to what we create has become an act to create
standing-reserve >>instead of art.
>
> Steven E. Callihan
>I'm not sure that art is expressive of the whole as much as it is, at
its
>best, a whole expression, an undivided act, if you will. The act of a
human
>occupying a particular station point, a perspectivity. Still, the artist
deals in >totalities, creating whole products, not just bits and pieces.
We see in that >product, ourselves, and if we are artists, our own
>self-production.
I think you are saying the same thing I tried to say above, but you do it
better. Again, I must ask what types of 'things' you are refering to.
Are they human-made, or natural? The difference, I would think, is
crucial. I think it is crucial because of what you said above, "...the
artist deals in totalities, creating whole products, not just bits and
pieces." My next question is, what is the difference between a natural
thing and a human made thing, and if they are different, why are they
viewed so?
Sorry if I ask more questions than I (attempt) to answer, but I like the
thread you are on and would like to hear more. :)
Jason
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>Jason B Collier wrote:
>
>>It would appear that a 'thing' and phenomena are not the same thing.
The
>>reason for this is, the ontological stance one takes in relation to the
>>thing/phenomena.
> Steven E. Callihan
>Maybe you can explain the distinction more clearly. It is difficult for
me
>to see how there can be things that are not phenomenal (that is, capable
of
>appearing, presenting themselves, in some form or fashion).
Jason again: I think that I am begining to see where you are coming from.
I think I like it to.:) I agree with you that all things present
themselves in some from or fashion, however, to make the distinction,
don't we need to ascribe an importance of the phenomenal thing over the
ordinary thing? I think this is where H gets tricky. I say this because
it would appear that all things, in a Heideggarian way, should be
understood phenomenally. The hammer should not disappear, yet it does.
>Jason B Collier writes:
>>Today we see a river as a
>>thing, but once we have built a dam to utilize the power/potentiality
of
>>the river, it becomes phenomena, something with meaning.
>
> Steven E. Callihan
The point of reversing the question was to ponder the quandary. For
>instance, that the potential of a river (like any other thing) is only
>partially manifest at any one time would seem to point to the notion
>that the river as a whole is primarily unmanifest. However, potentials,
it
>seems to me, are actualizable at some point and to some degree by
>definition. I'm perfectly willing to admit that our phenomenal
experience is >partial and fleeting, at best. A thing, however, which
could never be >experienced, e.g., never appear in any kind of phenomenal
form, would >seem to me to be no thing at all. What about the "whole" of
a thing, >however? Wholes, it seems to me, are inherently unknowable. The
missing >part is always simply the whole, in other words. We infer from
the parts to >the whole, however, and need not all the parts to do so.
Still, a thing may >be a whole, but are wholes things? Wholes, it seems
to me, are infinitudes.
>
I couldn't agree more. I would like to hear more though, it seems there
is something missing, but I can't quite pick it out. Saying "wholes, it
seems to me, are infinitudes." appears to be a little nihilistic. There
is more going on with the issue of "wholes" that needs to be addressed.
In what way is a part not a whole? If is has boundaries and is
identifiable, would it not be a whole? True we could say that it is a
"whole-part", but that does not make any sense. So, I will ask a
question, "what makes something a thing?" Regardless of wether or not it
is simply a 'thing' or a 'phenomenal thing.' Once we get that under some
semblance of control, we can proceed with a greater share of
understanding each other.
>>Jason B Collier writes:
>>However, the act of creation, of Poeisis, no longer has nay meaning.
Our >>relation to what we create has become an act to create
standing-reserve >>instead of art.
>
> Steven E. Callihan
>I'm not sure that art is expressive of the whole as much as it is, at
its
>best, a whole expression, an undivided act, if you will. The act of a
human
>occupying a particular station point, a perspectivity. Still, the artist
deals in >totalities, creating whole products, not just bits and pieces.
We see in that >product, ourselves, and if we are artists, our own
>self-production.
I think you are saying the same thing I tried to say above, but you do it
better. Again, I must ask what types of 'things' you are refering to.
Are they human-made, or natural? The difference, I would think, is
crucial. I think it is crucial because of what you said above, "...the
artist deals in totalities, creating whole products, not just bits and
pieces." My next question is, what is the difference between a natural
thing and a human made thing, and if they are different, why are they
viewed so?
Sorry if I ask more questions than I (attempt) to answer, but I like the
thread you are on and would like to hear more. :)
Jason
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---