Jason B Collier wrote:
>I agree with you that all things present
>themselves in some from or fashion, however, to make the distinction,
>don't we need to ascribe an importance of the phenomenal thing over the
>ordinary thing? I think this is where H gets tricky. I say this because
>it would appear that all things, in a Heideggarian way, should be
>understood phenomenally. The hammer should not disappear, yet it does.
I'm not sure there is such a thing as an "ordinary thing." The issue here,
of course, is the "thing." What do we mean by "thing"?
>[...]Saying "wholes, it
>seems to me, are infinitudes." appears to be a little nihilistic. There
>is more going on with the issue of "wholes" that needs to be addressed.
>In what way is a part not a whole? If is has boundaries and is
>identifiable, would it not be a whole? True we could say that it is a
>"whole-part", but that does not make any sense. So, I will ask a
>question, "what makes something a thing?" Regardless of wether or not it
>is simply a 'thing' or a 'phenomenal thing.' Once we get that under some
>semblance of control, we can proceed with a greater share of
>understanding each other.
It seems to me that every "thing" is indicative of a _whole_, but present to
us only as that indication, but never as the whole itself. A part is a thing
that has its being (identity) as part of a greater whole. The whole,
however, and I think _any_ whole, never is. It is potential, but never
entirely actual. Only the "thing" is fully actual.
>[...]Again, I must ask what types of 'things' you are refering to.
>Are they human-made, or natural? The difference, I would think, is
>crucial. I think it is crucial because of what you said above, "...the
>artist deals in totalities, creating whole products, not just bits and
>pieces." My next question is, what is the difference between a natural
>thing and a human made thing, and if they are different, why are they
>viewed so?
The whole product of the artist is much more akin to natural creation. It is
not a manufacture, but the end result of a living process. Manufacture is,
of course, not creation, but, at best, just the replication of a creation
(although it is just as likely to be the replication of a replication). The
opposition here, and I believe it is an opposition, is between cultures and
economies.
So, I think we actually have, at least, three "products." Natural products,
cultural products, and economic products. An economic product takes the
product of nature and converts it to a utility. A cultural product is only
secondarily a utility. Its primary significance, it seems to me, is
something different.
It seems to me that the distinction you are pointing toward is that between
the relative character of things as being autonomous or alienated. A chair,
for instance, is not self-definitive, but is defined by the use we would
make of it. A tree, however, is. But if the chair be a high work of art...
Steve
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>I agree with you that all things present
>themselves in some from or fashion, however, to make the distinction,
>don't we need to ascribe an importance of the phenomenal thing over the
>ordinary thing? I think this is where H gets tricky. I say this because
>it would appear that all things, in a Heideggarian way, should be
>understood phenomenally. The hammer should not disappear, yet it does.
I'm not sure there is such a thing as an "ordinary thing." The issue here,
of course, is the "thing." What do we mean by "thing"?
>[...]Saying "wholes, it
>seems to me, are infinitudes." appears to be a little nihilistic. There
>is more going on with the issue of "wholes" that needs to be addressed.
>In what way is a part not a whole? If is has boundaries and is
>identifiable, would it not be a whole? True we could say that it is a
>"whole-part", but that does not make any sense. So, I will ask a
>question, "what makes something a thing?" Regardless of wether or not it
>is simply a 'thing' or a 'phenomenal thing.' Once we get that under some
>semblance of control, we can proceed with a greater share of
>understanding each other.
It seems to me that every "thing" is indicative of a _whole_, but present to
us only as that indication, but never as the whole itself. A part is a thing
that has its being (identity) as part of a greater whole. The whole,
however, and I think _any_ whole, never is. It is potential, but never
entirely actual. Only the "thing" is fully actual.
>[...]Again, I must ask what types of 'things' you are refering to.
>Are they human-made, or natural? The difference, I would think, is
>crucial. I think it is crucial because of what you said above, "...the
>artist deals in totalities, creating whole products, not just bits and
>pieces." My next question is, what is the difference between a natural
>thing and a human made thing, and if they are different, why are they
>viewed so?
The whole product of the artist is much more akin to natural creation. It is
not a manufacture, but the end result of a living process. Manufacture is,
of course, not creation, but, at best, just the replication of a creation
(although it is just as likely to be the replication of a replication). The
opposition here, and I believe it is an opposition, is between cultures and
economies.
So, I think we actually have, at least, three "products." Natural products,
cultural products, and economic products. An economic product takes the
product of nature and converts it to a utility. A cultural product is only
secondarily a utility. Its primary significance, it seems to me, is
something different.
It seems to me that the distinction you are pointing toward is that between
the relative character of things as being autonomous or alienated. A chair,
for instance, is not self-definitive, but is defined by the use we would
make of it. A tree, however, is. But if the chair be a high work of art...
Steve
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---