> A thing, however, which could never be experienced, e.g.,
>never appear in any kind of phenomenal form, would seem to me to be no thing
>at all.
This problematic 'thing' you describe may well be the most-proper 'object'
of phenomenology.
Heidegger ultimately says (in 1973) that "phenomenology is originally the
phenomenology of the inapparent, the inconspicuous, the nonmanifest"
[Unscheinbarem]. (This has kicked off a Heideggerian debate in France
recently about the presence of the invisible.)
And already in the late 30s Heidegger was talking about the importance of
experiencing absence.
e.g.:
"The most durable and unfailing touchstone of genuineness and forcefulness
of thought in a philosopher is the question as to whether or not he or she
experiences in a direct and fundamental manner the nearness of the Nothing
in the Being of beings. Whoever fails to experience it remains forever
outside the realm of philosophy, without hope of entry." [N2 195/NI 460]
Iain
(sorry if you get this twice)
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>never appear in any kind of phenomenal form, would seem to me to be no thing
>at all.
This problematic 'thing' you describe may well be the most-proper 'object'
of phenomenology.
Heidegger ultimately says (in 1973) that "phenomenology is originally the
phenomenology of the inapparent, the inconspicuous, the nonmanifest"
[Unscheinbarem]. (This has kicked off a Heideggerian debate in France
recently about the presence of the invisible.)
And already in the late 30s Heidegger was talking about the importance of
experiencing absence.
e.g.:
"The most durable and unfailing touchstone of genuineness and forcefulness
of thought in a philosopher is the question as to whether or not he or she
experiences in a direct and fundamental manner the nearness of the Nothing
in the Being of beings. Whoever fails to experience it remains forever
outside the realm of philosophy, without hope of entry." [N2 195/NI 460]
Iain
(sorry if you get this twice)
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---