>> A thing, however, which could never be experienced, e.g.,
>>never appear in any kind of phenomenal form, would seem to me to be no thing
>>at all.
>
>This problematic 'thing' you describe may well be the most-proper 'object'
>of phenomenology.
>Heidegger ultimately says (in 1973) that "phenomenology is originally the
>phenomenology of the inapparent, the inconspicuous, the nonmanifest"
>[Unscheinbarem].
I have no problem rejecting the notion that, say, only the apparent,
conspicuous, and manifest are real. The inapparent may, in most
circumstances and things, outweigh the apparent. But does that mean that
there is an essential inapparency permanently hidden within the thing, a
thing within the thing, if you will? That the thing is otherwise, outside
and apart from that essence, false? That phenomenality is _maya_, or at
least a veil behind which is concealed a truer (a better?) world? If this is
Heidegger's position, how then might we differentiate him from Plato? Or is
Heidegger involved in seeking to unveil the hidden possibilities that are
concealed within (but not necessarily by) phenomena? This would avoid, it
seems to me, the trap of viewing phenomenality as some kind of curtain, a
veil of illusion, which requires parting, so that the non-phenomenal truth
might shine through like a revelation, I suppose.
>(This has kicked off a Heideggerian debate in France
>recently about the presence of the invisible.)
>And already in the late 30s Heidegger was talking about the importance of
>experiencing absence.
Invisibility is, it seems to me, phenomenal, as is absence. Anything that
can be referred to or that forms a reference is in some form or manner
phenomenal. Even the notion of the non-phenomenal is phenomenal. Everything
that might be thought is phenomenal (Aristotle refers to thinking as an
actuality).
>e.g.:
>"The most durable and unfailing touchstone of genuineness and forcefulness
>of thought in a philosopher is the question as to whether or not he or she
>experiences in a direct and fundamental manner the nearness of the Nothing
>in the Being of beings. Whoever fails to experience it remains forever
>outside the realm of philosophy, without hope of entry." [N2 195/NI 460]
Of course, one has to follow Heidegger's whole train of thought (and it is a
rather long train) if one is to come to grips with what he means by
"nearness of the Nothingness in the Being of beings." I don't believe,
however, that he is referring to anything that is entirely outside of the
phenomenal--note that he refers to this as something to be _experienced_ in
a direct and fundamental manner. I assume this is a philosophical experience
of some kind, not an epiphany.
Steve
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>>never appear in any kind of phenomenal form, would seem to me to be no thing
>>at all.
>
>This problematic 'thing' you describe may well be the most-proper 'object'
>of phenomenology.
>Heidegger ultimately says (in 1973) that "phenomenology is originally the
>phenomenology of the inapparent, the inconspicuous, the nonmanifest"
>[Unscheinbarem].
I have no problem rejecting the notion that, say, only the apparent,
conspicuous, and manifest are real. The inapparent may, in most
circumstances and things, outweigh the apparent. But does that mean that
there is an essential inapparency permanently hidden within the thing, a
thing within the thing, if you will? That the thing is otherwise, outside
and apart from that essence, false? That phenomenality is _maya_, or at
least a veil behind which is concealed a truer (a better?) world? If this is
Heidegger's position, how then might we differentiate him from Plato? Or is
Heidegger involved in seeking to unveil the hidden possibilities that are
concealed within (but not necessarily by) phenomena? This would avoid, it
seems to me, the trap of viewing phenomenality as some kind of curtain, a
veil of illusion, which requires parting, so that the non-phenomenal truth
might shine through like a revelation, I suppose.
>(This has kicked off a Heideggerian debate in France
>recently about the presence of the invisible.)
>And already in the late 30s Heidegger was talking about the importance of
>experiencing absence.
Invisibility is, it seems to me, phenomenal, as is absence. Anything that
can be referred to or that forms a reference is in some form or manner
phenomenal. Even the notion of the non-phenomenal is phenomenal. Everything
that might be thought is phenomenal (Aristotle refers to thinking as an
actuality).
>e.g.:
>"The most durable and unfailing touchstone of genuineness and forcefulness
>of thought in a philosopher is the question as to whether or not he or she
>experiences in a direct and fundamental manner the nearness of the Nothing
>in the Being of beings. Whoever fails to experience it remains forever
>outside the realm of philosophy, without hope of entry." [N2 195/NI 460]
Of course, one has to follow Heidegger's whole train of thought (and it is a
rather long train) if one is to come to grips with what he means by
"nearness of the Nothingness in the Being of beings." I don't believe,
however, that he is referring to anything that is entirely outside of the
phenomenal--note that he refers to this as something to be _experienced_ in
a direct and fundamental manner. I assume this is a philosophical experience
of some kind, not an epiphany.
Steve
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---