----- Original Message -----
From: "Michael Eldred" <artefact@xxxxxxxxxxx>
To: "Heidegger Agora" <heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Sunday, November 18, 2001 12:28 PM
Subject: Re: Sensuous Metaphor
> Cologne 18-Nov-2001
>
> Aristotelos alias <Gulio@xxxxxxxxxxxx> schrieb Sun, 18 Nov 2007 12:28:02
> -0800:
>
> > I don't know this thread goes on forever. It's the black and white,
> > on/off and we have a byte thing over and over again. Language barely
> > allows an expression that goes down the middle or that mixes kinds
> > even, like an oxymoron, like hybrids or any kind of porous border. I
> > take it that a symbol does that if it means a mixture of clarity and
> > obscurity which gives it it's truth quality in Heidegger's sense if
> > this means the untruth of truth. just a thought,Gulio sleeping
>
> You're really pitching high here, Aristotelos. Aiming at the best?
>
Well, excellence in overcoming difficulty I suppose.
> What you want to mix here, truth and untruth, is parasitical on what it
> wants to leave behind and simply introduces a dichotomy, just like back
> at the first beginning when philosophers dichotomized and multiplied
> being (e.g. Empedocles' dual principles of friendship and enmity, wet
> and dry, warm and cold).
>
You are right as often, the presocratic beginning is love or fire which
is like a "knot in the object" as Aristotle says in Book III, Chapter
one 995a in the translation I have at this moment, kind of like the
"now" difficult to think. And further on he says that this is precisely
the hardest thing of all and the most perplexing, "whether unity and
being, as the pythagoreans and Plato said, are not attributes of
something else but are the substance of existing things, or this is
not the case, but the substratum is something else,-- as Empedocles
says, love; as someone says, fire..."
> Before starting to concoct mixtures it is important to get the simple
> ingredients well thought. Here they are truth and untruth, truth and
> determinate negation (of truth). So what is the phenomenon of truth?
>
Perhaps, also important is to state the difficulties well because as
Aristotle says, "it is impossible to untie a knot one does not know
well." There is hardly much decisive progress on this matter. Witness
Schelling's constant struggle with knots, contradictory logic and
antinomies.
> In Greek, the question is the other way round: Truth is _alaetheia_, the
> determinate negation and overcoming of _laethae_, which is primary.
> Truth can only be arrived at by robbing phenomena of their hiddenness,
> thus bringing them to light. That is not a black-and-white, binary
> endeavour, but requires following the multiplicity of often polyvalent
> and polysemic signs. Nevertheless, the aim is not to remain stumbling
> around in the obscurity of semi-darkness, but to strive to bring things
> to disclosure as far as we are able.
>
<smile> Okay Heidegger, if you say so.
> Philosophy is not 'love of wisdom'. _philein_ can mean 'to love', but
> more originarily (e.g. in Homeros) it means 'to appropriate, to make
> one's own'. Philosophy is thus the orientation toward and striving to
> appropriate knowledge, knowledge being what has been disclosed,
> decrypted, brought out of hiding (cf. Wolfgang Schadewaldt "Die Anfaenge
> der Philosophie bei den Griechen" stw Frankfurt/M. 1995 S.13).
>
This means that knowledge then aims at peaking underneath a phenomena's
veil so to speak but Heidegger, at least as I read him, comes to put the
emphasis on showing that which remains hidden as hidden, withdrawn
as such. Which means that our striving is questioned. I think you are going
too
fast in your quest for disclosive truths. The polyvance is of course always
good to tease out that's what poets are good at and what makes philosophers
nervous.
Shoot me, but I was just thinking, to make something my own is to hold it
close, adhere to it as to a subject matter in a conversation one doesn't
get distracted from. It sounds like a trivial thing to say but adhering in
this way is just perhaps appropriation but that is listening as much as
a more active manner of thinking. My eye is a mirror to use
a representation of transcendental thinking, an ecstasis that is neither a
subject
nor an object but true to it's subject matter, the secret of phenomena.
To withdraw intentionality is to hold it all close by like tightening a
streched
coil or preparing to shoot an arrow. Neutral energy so to speak, yep, that's
my topos, my place.
Waking up a little,
Gulio
> Michael
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>
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: Michael Staples
> > To: heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > Sent: Sunday, November 18, 2001 8:33 AM
> > Subject: RE: Sensuous Metaphor
> >
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: owner-heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > [mailto:owner-heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]On
> > Behalf Of Michael Pennamacoor
> > Sent: Saturday, November 17, 2001 8:48 PM
> > To: heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > Subject: Re: Sensuous Metaphor
> >
> > John Foster presented us with the following
> > recently:
> >
> > >Music and art in general have these virtual
> > powers of placing into
> > >parenthesis all forms of objectivity; thus the
> > power of the interaction
> > >enabling secondary illusions as 'sensuous
> > metaphor', and 'harmonic space'....
> > >
> > >Music therefore is a form of symboling which
> > borrows from natural forms.
> >
> > I'm wondering, (maybe not) on the contrary whether
> > music enables us to think the ("natural") world,
> > to sing it, to at-tune to it. Tuning, ringing,
> > vibing, etc are not overwhelmingly metaphorical in
> > musical-cum-acoustical language; they arise from
> > the very substantiality of music itself, as do the
> > sometimes dialogical (canonic polyphony,
> > antiphonal passages, jazzy-conversational, etc),
> > sometimes monological, 'lines' and 'threads' and
> > 'passages' and 'movements', etc, in the speech of
> > musical composition. Weaves spun in time: of time,
> > perhaps?
> >
> > Perhaps the 'literal' is a special form of the
> > metaphorical? In the same sense that 'false'
> > speech (speech that does not speak under the
> > auspices of being) is a special kind of 'true'
> > speech (that does speak being); that false speech
> > belongs to true speech [in Parmenides]?
> >
> > just a thought... [but, of what kind?]
> >
> > MichaelP
> >
> > [Michael Staples] The thing here is that as long
> > as we continue to bring terms like "metaphor" into
> > the forground of the discussion, we cannot help
> > but bring its meanings along with it. The issue
> > here is not how to attempt to weave a set of new
> > meanings for words like metaphor and symbol. The
> > issue is how to extract ourselves from the baggage
> > these words impose upon us. This is why H. goes to
> > such lengths to create new words, no? So, when you
> > are talking about how the literal does this with
> > regard to the metaphorical doing
> > that...implicitly, you are still moving within the
> > assumptions of the division of language into
> > literal v. metaphorical meanings. Why not drop it
> > and spend the time trying to rethink altogether
> > the original phenomenon this lingo points
> > to? Michael S.
> >
>
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