Allen recently wrote:
But the distinctive rigor of philosophizing as Heidegger does it
doesn't stop there. He continues to exercise it by insisting that
"factical life experience must not be only the point of departure for
philososphizing but precisely that which essentially hinders
philosophizing itself."(11)
Allen this feels (sorry for lack of vigour) like the Heraclitean 'being
tends to be cryptic' or 'being likes to hide itself': that the very
revelation of beings (and thus being)-- philosophy -- is precisely the means
for its obscuration (that emerging into speech, the revelation of beings is
hidden (covered over, skipped) by the speech itself; but that is not
nothing).
Not quite the same, Michael, at least not the way that I read it. Heidegger is not talking about philosophy itself in the last phrase, but seems rather to be saying that the nature of factical life experience must be recognized (not quite right) as hindering the philosophical turn that it offers from within itself, at the same time and in the same way that it offers the possibility of philosophy. So generally speaking , Heidegger's observation might fall within that of Heraclitus, but is more deliberately and explicitly "methodological."
Best,
Allen
regards
michaelP
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