Jud:
You are wrong again Rene. Heidegger explicitly states at the beginning of B
& T:
I. The necessity of an explicit recovery of the question of Being.
"This question has today been forgotten-although our time considers itself
progressive
in again affirming "metaphysics." to me or you."
His implication is that Scotus, Aquinas and company made a hash of the
question of Being and that the idea has lain neglected for centuries.
I contest this fiercely
(Sorry, i forgot to answer this important, because common misunderstanding.)
So would i. But the criticism is only meant for his *own* time. And it is still
to be seen if it is really criticising, what he is doing.
If there would still have been 20th century Scotus's and Aquinas's, there would
not be that problem of a neglected aporia. One of the most fatal understandings
of Heidegger's Seinsgeschichte is that originally there was Being and that then
it disappeared bit by bit on account of neglect. It is understandable that the
intelligent polloi understand it that way, but reading Heidegger a bit more
closely, shows the untenability. In order to be able to diagnose decline, and
not merely share a pessimism built-in in all times, esp. the more healthy -
one should have reached already a position from where these times are judged.
In the case of Heidegger this is definitely not the physical safety of the philosopher
(Strauss). When Heidegger, like Bloom later, diagnoses the closing of the mind,
the European mind, he is already so wise, not to proclaim causes that in reality
are effects, like the decline of the university. Not even the world war can be a
cause in that sense. But, as he told in Basel in 1951, it was the enormity
of the world catastrophes which made him look for their causes there where the world's
fundamental notions had been found: with the Greeks.
- So it were the Greeks, who made the wrong choices?
Well, they never *had* a choice. Only after them, was there a choice to carry on or not.
This has been done up to German idealism. Only then the thread was lost, picked up by
Nietzsche again, but too late, as Heidegger was to find out during the thirties.
That meant, that history (Geschichte) was in ruins (Geschicht), but even that is not
merely negative, as he kept on saying. To respond to the situation (to be the Da),
that is what is decisive lastly. And not disastrous descriptions and depictions of a
disastrous world situation, which don't help, rather solidify the status quo, of which
they simply become a part.
Although Nietzsche and the rest only became clearer later, already SuZ basically says it.
At the very beginning, the Plato quote: You seem to know what you mean by the word 'being',
we too thought so, but now we have reached aporia. Then Heidegger: do we have today an
answer to this question? Not at all. Therefore we must pose again the *question for the sense
of Being*. But are we then today at least at a loss, as to the understanding of the expression
'Being'? Not at all. So all that can be done at first, is to again wake an understanding for
the meaning of such a question: asking for the sense of Being.
So Plato was embarrassed, but we cannot even be that anymore. Whether Being 'exists' or not,
is wholly irrelevant, the issue is just: can we still be aware that there's something missing,
even if it is the meaning of a simple question? Then, what does the apparently not-missing mean,
imply for the being that is traditionally the living being capable of thinking?
rene
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
You are wrong again Rene. Heidegger explicitly states at the beginning of B
& T:
I. The necessity of an explicit recovery of the question of Being.
"This question has today been forgotten-although our time considers itself
progressive
in again affirming "metaphysics." to me or you."
His implication is that Scotus, Aquinas and company made a hash of the
question of Being and that the idea has lain neglected for centuries.
I contest this fiercely
(Sorry, i forgot to answer this important, because common misunderstanding.)
So would i. But the criticism is only meant for his *own* time. And it is still
to be seen if it is really criticising, what he is doing.
If there would still have been 20th century Scotus's and Aquinas's, there would
not be that problem of a neglected aporia. One of the most fatal understandings
of Heidegger's Seinsgeschichte is that originally there was Being and that then
it disappeared bit by bit on account of neglect. It is understandable that the
intelligent polloi understand it that way, but reading Heidegger a bit more
closely, shows the untenability. In order to be able to diagnose decline, and
not merely share a pessimism built-in in all times, esp. the more healthy -
one should have reached already a position from where these times are judged.
In the case of Heidegger this is definitely not the physical safety of the philosopher
(Strauss). When Heidegger, like Bloom later, diagnoses the closing of the mind,
the European mind, he is already so wise, not to proclaim causes that in reality
are effects, like the decline of the university. Not even the world war can be a
cause in that sense. But, as he told in Basel in 1951, it was the enormity
of the world catastrophes which made him look for their causes there where the world's
fundamental notions had been found: with the Greeks.
- So it were the Greeks, who made the wrong choices?
Well, they never *had* a choice. Only after them, was there a choice to carry on or not.
This has been done up to German idealism. Only then the thread was lost, picked up by
Nietzsche again, but too late, as Heidegger was to find out during the thirties.
That meant, that history (Geschichte) was in ruins (Geschicht), but even that is not
merely negative, as he kept on saying. To respond to the situation (to be the Da),
that is what is decisive lastly. And not disastrous descriptions and depictions of a
disastrous world situation, which don't help, rather solidify the status quo, of which
they simply become a part.
Although Nietzsche and the rest only became clearer later, already SuZ basically says it.
At the very beginning, the Plato quote: You seem to know what you mean by the word 'being',
we too thought so, but now we have reached aporia. Then Heidegger: do we have today an
answer to this question? Not at all. Therefore we must pose again the *question for the sense
of Being*. But are we then today at least at a loss, as to the understanding of the expression
'Being'? Not at all. So all that can be done at first, is to again wake an understanding for
the meaning of such a question: asking for the sense of Being.
So Plato was embarrassed, but we cannot even be that anymore. Whether Being 'exists' or not,
is wholly irrelevant, the issue is just: can we still be aware that there's something missing,
even if it is the meaning of a simple question? Then, what does the apparently not-missing mean,
imply for the being that is traditionally the living being capable of thinking?
rene
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---