>From: "Tudor Georgescu" <tgeorgescu@xxxxxxx>
>To: <heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>Subject: RE: Sci-Fi about a herring
>Date: Sun, Jul 18, 2004, 11:43 am
>
>> being is not a being and thus (in your terms as well as Heidegger's
>> {although not the same as each other}) does not "exist";
>
> Agreed, but because beings are, their fact of being, it is. Being is being.
> Being is.
Tudor, yes, but "being is" is not in the same 'sense' that "beings are";
other wise being would be made over to a being (the ontological difference
would be dissolute) thus nullifying the very distinction and reason for
employing the difference. If the "is" in "Being is" is the same as the "is"
in "a being is", then I would profoundly disagree with your statement; if
the "is" in "Being is" is the same as the "is" in "a being is not" then we
have some agreement. I think this highlights a difference in thinking being:
being can be understood as (as you put it) the *fact(icity)* that a being is
(a being); and, being can be understood to be the *way* a being is such a
being (is that being, that it is rather than not); two manners of thatness.
I like to say: being is not that a being may be (= being is hidden by the
being that it is the being of, but still not nothing, just encrypted). That
is why I often employ square brackets around the word "is" when referring to
being, since I can not say that being [is], properly speaking, since it [is]
not a 'what', does not answer to "what?".
>
> Every being is, but not every being exists.
Yes, well I was (for the sake of the argument I was putting forth to Jud)
going along with Jud's extremely narrow interpretation of "existence" and
temporarily employing his terminology in order to show something else that
does not 'compute'. Jud does not employ the terminology of traditional
ontology, e.g., existentia and essentia, so when he speaks of something
existing he does not at all mean to be speaking of existentia (the thatness
of a being) although he unwittingly employs the distinction
(existentia/essentia) anyway in order to speak of existence in that way.
regards
michaelP
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>To: <heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>Subject: RE: Sci-Fi about a herring
>Date: Sun, Jul 18, 2004, 11:43 am
>
>> being is not a being and thus (in your terms as well as Heidegger's
>> {although not the same as each other}) does not "exist";
>
> Agreed, but because beings are, their fact of being, it is. Being is being.
> Being is.
Tudor, yes, but "being is" is not in the same 'sense' that "beings are";
other wise being would be made over to a being (the ontological difference
would be dissolute) thus nullifying the very distinction and reason for
employing the difference. If the "is" in "Being is" is the same as the "is"
in "a being is", then I would profoundly disagree with your statement; if
the "is" in "Being is" is the same as the "is" in "a being is not" then we
have some agreement. I think this highlights a difference in thinking being:
being can be understood as (as you put it) the *fact(icity)* that a being is
(a being); and, being can be understood to be the *way* a being is such a
being (is that being, that it is rather than not); two manners of thatness.
I like to say: being is not that a being may be (= being is hidden by the
being that it is the being of, but still not nothing, just encrypted). That
is why I often employ square brackets around the word "is" when referring to
being, since I can not say that being [is], properly speaking, since it [is]
not a 'what', does not answer to "what?".
>
> Every being is, but not every being exists.
Yes, well I was (for the sake of the argument I was putting forth to Jud)
going along with Jud's extremely narrow interpretation of "existence" and
temporarily employing his terminology in order to show something else that
does not 'compute'. Jud does not employ the terminology of traditional
ontology, e.g., existentia and essentia, so when he speaks of something
existing he does not at all mean to be speaking of existentia (the thatness
of a being) although he unwittingly employs the distinction
(existentia/essentia) anyway in order to speak of existence in that way.
regards
michaelP
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---