Hi Jud,
Thanks for this funny piece, but i am afraid the good man has a poor
understanding of Heidegger. Imho prosecutor Hughes' case against Heidegger
contains a lot rather flawed interpretations, so allow me
briefly point to some obvious misunderstandings on Hughes' part:
(1) Heidegger's denial of such a thing as *human nature*.
It is correct that Heidegger was very critical on the concept of human
nature as it was developed in the tradition of western philosophical
thought and scientific enquiry. His main criticism concerns the fact
that the elements/categories of human nature were all understood in
terms of natural (i.e. lifeless) artefacts. Plato and Aristotle f.i. thought
human nature in terms of ousia (substance), hule (matter) and eidos
(form); Descartes views human nature as the unity of a mathematically
organised body-machine and a divine spirit; Leibniz sees human nature
as a conglomerate of pre-programmed nomades; and in Nietzsche we
find that human nature is thought in terms of a Darwinistic biologism.
And in contemporary philosophy, like in Searle, Dennett and Damasio,
human nature is conceptualised in terms of computers and complex systems.)
Yet according to Heidegger all these ways of understanding human
nature are highly inadequate, because they all derive there concepts
and analyses from a limited (i.e. purely mathematical) scientific
perspective, completely overlooking and sidestepping the unique
character of the human condition (cf. Alltaeglichkeit). It is therefor
that Heidegger in SuZ proposes a radically new hermeneutic-
phenomenological methodology for the study and understanding
of human nature, one that is clearly demarcated from antropology,
psychology and biology [SuZ:45]. To accomplish this Heidegger
invents a complete new set of concepts, namely his terminology
of the *existentialia*. Let me name some of these, for us all to
familiar, existentialia: Da-sein; In-der-Welt-sein; Mit-Sein;
Vorhanden-sein; Zuhanden-sein; Entwurf; Geworfenheit; Sorge; Stimmung; das
Man; Sein-zum-Tode; Eigentlichkeit usw. As said,
the purpose of Heidegger's existentialia is to provide philosophy
(and the human sciences) with a complete new conceptual frame
for the study of human nature. Thus to claim, as Hughes does, that
Heidegger denies or lacks any concept of human nature is utter
nonsens.
(2) There is nothing about purpose in Heidegger's Dasein.
To accuse Heidegger of commiting some a-teleological fallacy
shows again a deep misunderstanding. Anyone familiar with
Heidegger's ideas about temporality, as devloped in Suz, knows
that Da-sein is Entwurf: i.e the potential and actual creative design
of the 'self' within the limits of the world, in all its past, present
and futural dimensions (cf. geworfenheit). Also in notions as
Fuersorge and Sorge (anticipated carefulness, caring for) we can
easely recognize the movement to a chosen destiny (bestimmung),
the opening-up (Erschlossenheit) of a futural mode of one own's
being (eigenste Seinkoennen). Furthermore if we look at titles of
some of Heidegger's later essays/lectures, f.e. "die Be-stimmung der
Kuenste"; "die Bestimmung des Denkens"; "die Aufgabe des Denkens";
"Unterwegs zur Sprache" it is obvious to descry a directionality to
Dasein's being-with-and-in-the-world.
It is true that Heidegger maintains to be ignorant of the existence
of some sort of a 'transcendent telos beyond' (an afterlife), but to
say that man is therefor purposeless and thus claim this as an
argument for his Nazi sympathies is pure idiocy. And besides, this
would necessay imply that everybody who is ignorant of, or denies
such, a 'trancedence' is by definition commited to some form of
Nazism.
(3) Authenticity is (only) a morality in self-actualization.
Again this is a complete distortion and blurring of Heidegger's
understanding of authenticity (Eigentlichkeit). In an exchange
with Anthony a while ago (see my post 22-5-2004), i have
already elaborated enough on this issue, so i will not dwell too
much on this subject. But let me repeat and emphasize that for
Dasein to be authentic means that he/she is a holistic unity of
all his/her possibilities; authenticity signifies the total ensemble
of a communial sharing and a natural ecological preserving of
all the past, present and futural modes of being-together-in-the-
openness-of-the-world.
This perspective and its ethical consequences go well beyond a
mere morality of personal self-actualization, on the contrary it
tries to get in view an moral awareness of truely universal
dimensions. Of course this is not a morality that is based on
or derived from some kind of transcendental entity or instance.
Heidegger's aim here is to uncover the ground-states of possible
conditions for a (futural but) strickly immanent milieu, one
wherein man can -as he would formulate later- live as mortals
savely together, as dwellers of a rich-bearing earth, under a
fascinating sky in the presence of waiting the other arrival of
hidding divinities (cf. Das Ding).
(4) Nihilism: Heidegger's philosophy of death.
It is true that, and certainly in SuZ, Heidegger had a deep interest
and preoccupation with death and heroism. As said, Sein-zum-Tode,
is one of the existentialia with describes our being in the world. It
would however be false and misleading to understand his attention
as some kind of morbid obsession. It is important to appreciate such
a book as SuZ also as an account of and place it in the 'Zeitgeist' of
the early 20th C. Heidegger wrote SuZ in the aftermath of WWI, the
first true world war, with memories of unseen destruction among an
immense scale of dead soldiers and civilians. Yet to think, as Hughes
seems to imply, that Heidegger is somehow celebrating death and
destruction, is a highly misplaced exaggeration. One has only to
remember all those many other German, French and Russian authors
wrote intense plays, novels and essays on the subject of death. Thus
to omit the issue of death in those days, would render any intellectual
to the realm of insignificance.
(5) Heidegger is guilty.
Is Heidegger guilty ? Well i guess he is. But what is he guilty of ?
Of course he is guilty of some imo superficial flirting with the
Nazi-regime, but who wasn't in this inescapable totalitarian context.
If Heidegger was guilty, he was first of all guilty of an engagement in
questioning: i.e. a questioning of the essence of human nature; a
questioning of the direction of human society; a questioning of the
morality of a "Volk" and its political regime; a questioning of our
own place, task and responsibility in thinking and feeling as human
beings. We must not forget that Heidegger's sole philosophical aim
was to ask *the question of Being* - yet never giving any definite
answers- as he once said: "Questioning means, being able to wait,
if necessary a life long." [EidM]
yours,
Jan
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
Thanks for this funny piece, but i am afraid the good man has a poor
understanding of Heidegger. Imho prosecutor Hughes' case against Heidegger
contains a lot rather flawed interpretations, so allow me
briefly point to some obvious misunderstandings on Hughes' part:
(1) Heidegger's denial of such a thing as *human nature*.
It is correct that Heidegger was very critical on the concept of human
nature as it was developed in the tradition of western philosophical
thought and scientific enquiry. His main criticism concerns the fact
that the elements/categories of human nature were all understood in
terms of natural (i.e. lifeless) artefacts. Plato and Aristotle f.i. thought
human nature in terms of ousia (substance), hule (matter) and eidos
(form); Descartes views human nature as the unity of a mathematically
organised body-machine and a divine spirit; Leibniz sees human nature
as a conglomerate of pre-programmed nomades; and in Nietzsche we
find that human nature is thought in terms of a Darwinistic biologism.
And in contemporary philosophy, like in Searle, Dennett and Damasio,
human nature is conceptualised in terms of computers and complex systems.)
Yet according to Heidegger all these ways of understanding human
nature are highly inadequate, because they all derive there concepts
and analyses from a limited (i.e. purely mathematical) scientific
perspective, completely overlooking and sidestepping the unique
character of the human condition (cf. Alltaeglichkeit). It is therefor
that Heidegger in SuZ proposes a radically new hermeneutic-
phenomenological methodology for the study and understanding
of human nature, one that is clearly demarcated from antropology,
psychology and biology [SuZ:45]. To accomplish this Heidegger
invents a complete new set of concepts, namely his terminology
of the *existentialia*. Let me name some of these, for us all to
familiar, existentialia: Da-sein; In-der-Welt-sein; Mit-Sein;
Vorhanden-sein; Zuhanden-sein; Entwurf; Geworfenheit; Sorge; Stimmung; das
Man; Sein-zum-Tode; Eigentlichkeit usw. As said,
the purpose of Heidegger's existentialia is to provide philosophy
(and the human sciences) with a complete new conceptual frame
for the study of human nature. Thus to claim, as Hughes does, that
Heidegger denies or lacks any concept of human nature is utter
nonsens.
(2) There is nothing about purpose in Heidegger's Dasein.
To accuse Heidegger of commiting some a-teleological fallacy
shows again a deep misunderstanding. Anyone familiar with
Heidegger's ideas about temporality, as devloped in Suz, knows
that Da-sein is Entwurf: i.e the potential and actual creative design
of the 'self' within the limits of the world, in all its past, present
and futural dimensions (cf. geworfenheit). Also in notions as
Fuersorge and Sorge (anticipated carefulness, caring for) we can
easely recognize the movement to a chosen destiny (bestimmung),
the opening-up (Erschlossenheit) of a futural mode of one own's
being (eigenste Seinkoennen). Furthermore if we look at titles of
some of Heidegger's later essays/lectures, f.e. "die Be-stimmung der
Kuenste"; "die Bestimmung des Denkens"; "die Aufgabe des Denkens";
"Unterwegs zur Sprache" it is obvious to descry a directionality to
Dasein's being-with-and-in-the-world.
It is true that Heidegger maintains to be ignorant of the existence
of some sort of a 'transcendent telos beyond' (an afterlife), but to
say that man is therefor purposeless and thus claim this as an
argument for his Nazi sympathies is pure idiocy. And besides, this
would necessay imply that everybody who is ignorant of, or denies
such, a 'trancedence' is by definition commited to some form of
Nazism.
(3) Authenticity is (only) a morality in self-actualization.
Again this is a complete distortion and blurring of Heidegger's
understanding of authenticity (Eigentlichkeit). In an exchange
with Anthony a while ago (see my post 22-5-2004), i have
already elaborated enough on this issue, so i will not dwell too
much on this subject. But let me repeat and emphasize that for
Dasein to be authentic means that he/she is a holistic unity of
all his/her possibilities; authenticity signifies the total ensemble
of a communial sharing and a natural ecological preserving of
all the past, present and futural modes of being-together-in-the-
openness-of-the-world.
This perspective and its ethical consequences go well beyond a
mere morality of personal self-actualization, on the contrary it
tries to get in view an moral awareness of truely universal
dimensions. Of course this is not a morality that is based on
or derived from some kind of transcendental entity or instance.
Heidegger's aim here is to uncover the ground-states of possible
conditions for a (futural but) strickly immanent milieu, one
wherein man can -as he would formulate later- live as mortals
savely together, as dwellers of a rich-bearing earth, under a
fascinating sky in the presence of waiting the other arrival of
hidding divinities (cf. Das Ding).
(4) Nihilism: Heidegger's philosophy of death.
It is true that, and certainly in SuZ, Heidegger had a deep interest
and preoccupation with death and heroism. As said, Sein-zum-Tode,
is one of the existentialia with describes our being in the world. It
would however be false and misleading to understand his attention
as some kind of morbid obsession. It is important to appreciate such
a book as SuZ also as an account of and place it in the 'Zeitgeist' of
the early 20th C. Heidegger wrote SuZ in the aftermath of WWI, the
first true world war, with memories of unseen destruction among an
immense scale of dead soldiers and civilians. Yet to think, as Hughes
seems to imply, that Heidegger is somehow celebrating death and
destruction, is a highly misplaced exaggeration. One has only to
remember all those many other German, French and Russian authors
wrote intense plays, novels and essays on the subject of death. Thus
to omit the issue of death in those days, would render any intellectual
to the realm of insignificance.
(5) Heidegger is guilty.
Is Heidegger guilty ? Well i guess he is. But what is he guilty of ?
Of course he is guilty of some imo superficial flirting with the
Nazi-regime, but who wasn't in this inescapable totalitarian context.
If Heidegger was guilty, he was first of all guilty of an engagement in
questioning: i.e. a questioning of the essence of human nature; a
questioning of the direction of human society; a questioning of the
morality of a "Volk" and its political regime; a questioning of our
own place, task and responsibility in thinking and feeling as human
beings. We must not forget that Heidegger's sole philosophical aim
was to ask *the question of Being* - yet never giving any definite
answers- as he once said: "Questioning means, being able to wait,
if necessary a life long." [EidM]
yours,
Jan
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---