rene (earlier):
>> In fact one has to be antiheidegger
>> in order to find one's ownmost
>
mP (earlier):
> rene, apart from considerations of the very quality of such antiheidegger
> stands, and the relation between follower and followed, leader and the lead,
> it has occured to me recently and in a vaguely troubled way that one does
> not necessarily have be antiheidegger since there are clues in the writing
> that heidegger did it himself.
rene (earlier):
> Michael, the sentence 'Heidegger was (is and always will be) a Nazi', just
> as the sentence 'x is a follower of a leader' - i was not thinking of you
> - are, formally, predications of a subject. Jud's dilemma lies in the fact
> that he desperately denies the possibility of essential predication, while
> he needs it even more desperately, in order to be able to pin his Heidegger
> down. (or Semite women)
Rene, given his adoption of a kind of nominalism, I think I have shown that
whilst he speaks constantly of what does not exist (what can not be
seriously predicated), that it does not exist, he constantly denies the very
ground on which he stands, because to speak of what does not exist is to
predicate (does not exist) what can not seriously be predicated (what does
not exist). All the time employing a 'restricted' version of be-ing (exists)
whilst claiming it is either nonsense (there is no such thing -- ironically,
all heideggerians would agree since be-ing is not a being) or something
familiar, disguised (the recent 'discovery' that be-ing is god; a god with
any other name would smell as bad) or a chimerical invention of heidegger's
that changes shape in the inventor's 'head' (since be-ing is never a thing
and thus not metaphorisable, it cannot be the same as it is, the perfectly
non-identical, that which differs from itself {heraclitus}, but The
Nominalist merely sees this as the inconsistent heidegger's failure to be
constant). But even in ludicrously claiming such as the identity of be-ing
and god he takes (as a nominalist) his notion of be-ing too seriously: i.e.,
since it does not exist it should not be taken seriously and thus either
claiming it is the same as something else (god) or claiming it is nothing
(does not exist) he assumes a position whereby it is possible to predicate
be-ing and thus admits that one may seriously talk of that which one should
not talk seriously about. In these and many ways Nom treads on his own tail
in trying to move forward.
rene (earlier):
> Here 'is' the preying, the nachstellen of a subject, but without, as in
> Nietzsche, the obliged reflection. It's just done, and this machination
> needs the continuing holocaust Erlebnis for its legitimation. Lastly,
> i don't see the point of taking offense here, because he so clearly shows
> the inevitability of widerwille, repulsion, for a will that does not really
> know what it wants. The intensity of his hatred - not a mere emotional
affect,
> but a deeper and clearer passion, as Heidegger explains the difference in
the
> treatment of WtP in Nietzsche 1 -, arouses annoyance, sure, but at the same
> time offers the occasion of seeing widerwille at work/in reality, to see
that
> it is not free, driven.
Rene, I catch the drift of seeing the widerville of jud as a gift (as I have
suggested several times before, and without irony, mostly...) and the point
of not being offended (why should be offended by what one regards as rubbish
or the result of an implacable process?). But, how many hundreds of times
does one have to witness this before one can accept/receive the gift as gift
(and then let it alone having taken on the given as given)? How many drops
of rain have to fall before one notices and accepts that "it is raining"?
What "rains"? The "rain". The "rain" "rains". The gift gives. Jud jud(der)s.
This has been abundantly clear from the summer of 2000 onwards. I can not
yet accept that the juddering is any kind of example of the raging
discordance (of art and truth). The rain rains, what else can it do? The Jud
judders, what else can it do? Is that it?
rene (earlier):
>There's just the one condition to accept, that knowledge
> of will and antiwill is only gainable in oneself. Will only works on will,
and
> widerwill on widerwill. - But then, the demise is not one of the list, but
in
> those leaving on account of it.
Yes, but there is more than one way to leave (by not taking the exit door,
rather by sitting quietly or by waiting...). Those who have passed on are
perhaps more courageous? Widerville is ubiquitous (no?); why do we need the
beast here? [genuine question]
rene (earlier):
> Therefore one has to take care with new predications, like my 'Jud is a
racist'.
> Instead of attributing a property to a subject, which strictly spoken makes
no
> sense anymore in this world of non-things and non-humans and non-truth, what
i
> mean by it is precisely the opposite: racism, submission of inferior life
forms,
> occupies Jud (the predicate eats the subject), as soon as his common sense
enters
> philosophy. Including his entire predication theory. He thinks to outwit us,
or
> Heidegger, or Hannah Arendt (imperialism+racism), but no, it's the other way
around.
> What a chance to become honest toward oneself, one should be grateful.
One is. But constantly? For ever? I think I understand to some extent what
you say so gracefully, so delicately: when I witness widerville as
represented on the box, it can arouse the same in my response; I can become
momentarily a rednecked slimeball screaming screaming, and I am almost
immediately seized with a horrid recognition of the judders in myself
(almost a suitable case for suicide), only for this unwelcome insight to be
replaced with a distancing and rationalisation, etc.
rene (earlier):
> Esp. now
> that he thinks that the 'demise' of the Heidegger list is his work. Maybe it
would
> seem so, for instance if a poll would be held, but one immediately
recognizes the
> same mechanism in all polls: the machination of will and widerwill.
>
> Short: one is enabled to see the role of the 'subject' - variously said -
inside
> the Gestell (a fully problematic title), its being used: the subject has
become
> Bestandstueck, piece of inventory. (and therefore not to be saved: see
below)
But does not the 'recovery', the 'restoration' of be-ing (promised),
recover/restore the beings as beings (and no longer objects, no longer
stock, no longer inventory? I remember (was it in 'What is a thing?'?)
heidegger speaking at length about really facing a cow in a field just as a
cow in a field (and not as a burger machine, an example of 'nature', a
biological specimen, source of nice safe milk, etc); for one to face just
the cow without anything in between, no ideas, no ideologies, no purpose,
etc, what is at stake is the very horizon of the question of be-ing...
mP (earlier):
> In that sense, might it be needful to open up
> a discussion concerning the notion of two heideggers, neither the early/late
> pair, nor the pre-kehre/post-kehre, but one seeking to pietistically
> preserve/recover the metaphysical tradition, the other to
> demolish/deconstruct the same? Of course, I do not mean a double
> 'personality' or any such psychologistical tosh, but something discernible
> in the texts as they battle out the future and past of thinking. [In my
> planned opera, there shall be two heideggers on stage at times, but that's
> the way of drama and not the path of thinking]. I think derrida was most
> sensitive to these two heideggers and the way they interwove as texts which
> he reperforms thoughout his complex relations (proximity and distance) with
> heidegger. Is there a space to discuss this notion without recourse to pulp
> and its purveyors?
>
rene (earlier):
> I think so, yes. The tear would go through all of us: we should be subject
> AND Dasein (as possibility).
> Everything would depend on how to take the duplicity. One can see suddenly
> the complexity of our situation: as long as the leap into Dasein is not
> made, there is only (post-)metaphysics to represent it. But metaphyical
> thinking cannot think metaphysics, its ground or Wesen, itself. (Otherwise
> there never would have been metaphysics) So everything depends on
re-thinking
> the question "What is metaphysics?", while the what-is-question (ti to on)
> is itself a metaphysical start. It would be metaphysics itself (as nihilism)
> that holds one tight on the spot. In this repulsive sphere, where one closes
> one eye, or loses one leg, in order not to experience the split, words like
> being and Dasein lose all that they have possibly in them.
> But the worst one can do, is protesting against it, because this missing
> belongs to being, which now is nothing but absence (oblivion), but as such
an
> eminent indication. As long as the staying out is not conceived in its last
> consequences, the transition to Dasein cannot be enacted. This would
advocate
> demolition, so it seems. But it is to be done with utmost care and
precision,
> because one needs metaphysics/nihilism/technology in order to turn against.
> Otherwise one enters the postmodern space where everything can be said
> indifferently.
Rene, I need to consider this last section above at length (I'll come back
on this soon), but immediately the notion of an extremely care-ful (caring?)
demolition as preparation for the transition to dasein (the promise I
referred to above?) is an intoxicating one. But, how does metaphysics twist
out (verwindung) of itself? Thanks. And thanks for this whole response.
regards
michaelP
>
> regards
> rene
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>> In fact one has to be antiheidegger
>> in order to find one's ownmost
>
mP (earlier):
> rene, apart from considerations of the very quality of such antiheidegger
> stands, and the relation between follower and followed, leader and the lead,
> it has occured to me recently and in a vaguely troubled way that one does
> not necessarily have be antiheidegger since there are clues in the writing
> that heidegger did it himself.
rene (earlier):
> Michael, the sentence 'Heidegger was (is and always will be) a Nazi', just
> as the sentence 'x is a follower of a leader' - i was not thinking of you
> - are, formally, predications of a subject. Jud's dilemma lies in the fact
> that he desperately denies the possibility of essential predication, while
> he needs it even more desperately, in order to be able to pin his Heidegger
> down. (or Semite women)
Rene, given his adoption of a kind of nominalism, I think I have shown that
whilst he speaks constantly of what does not exist (what can not be
seriously predicated), that it does not exist, he constantly denies the very
ground on which he stands, because to speak of what does not exist is to
predicate (does not exist) what can not seriously be predicated (what does
not exist). All the time employing a 'restricted' version of be-ing (exists)
whilst claiming it is either nonsense (there is no such thing -- ironically,
all heideggerians would agree since be-ing is not a being) or something
familiar, disguised (the recent 'discovery' that be-ing is god; a god with
any other name would smell as bad) or a chimerical invention of heidegger's
that changes shape in the inventor's 'head' (since be-ing is never a thing
and thus not metaphorisable, it cannot be the same as it is, the perfectly
non-identical, that which differs from itself {heraclitus}, but The
Nominalist merely sees this as the inconsistent heidegger's failure to be
constant). But even in ludicrously claiming such as the identity of be-ing
and god he takes (as a nominalist) his notion of be-ing too seriously: i.e.,
since it does not exist it should not be taken seriously and thus either
claiming it is the same as something else (god) or claiming it is nothing
(does not exist) he assumes a position whereby it is possible to predicate
be-ing and thus admits that one may seriously talk of that which one should
not talk seriously about. In these and many ways Nom treads on his own tail
in trying to move forward.
rene (earlier):
> Here 'is' the preying, the nachstellen of a subject, but without, as in
> Nietzsche, the obliged reflection. It's just done, and this machination
> needs the continuing holocaust Erlebnis for its legitimation. Lastly,
> i don't see the point of taking offense here, because he so clearly shows
> the inevitability of widerwille, repulsion, for a will that does not really
> know what it wants. The intensity of his hatred - not a mere emotional
affect,
> but a deeper and clearer passion, as Heidegger explains the difference in
the
> treatment of WtP in Nietzsche 1 -, arouses annoyance, sure, but at the same
> time offers the occasion of seeing widerwille at work/in reality, to see
that
> it is not free, driven.
Rene, I catch the drift of seeing the widerville of jud as a gift (as I have
suggested several times before, and without irony, mostly...) and the point
of not being offended (why should be offended by what one regards as rubbish
or the result of an implacable process?). But, how many hundreds of times
does one have to witness this before one can accept/receive the gift as gift
(and then let it alone having taken on the given as given)? How many drops
of rain have to fall before one notices and accepts that "it is raining"?
What "rains"? The "rain". The "rain" "rains". The gift gives. Jud jud(der)s.
This has been abundantly clear from the summer of 2000 onwards. I can not
yet accept that the juddering is any kind of example of the raging
discordance (of art and truth). The rain rains, what else can it do? The Jud
judders, what else can it do? Is that it?
rene (earlier):
>There's just the one condition to accept, that knowledge
> of will and antiwill is only gainable in oneself. Will only works on will,
and
> widerwill on widerwill. - But then, the demise is not one of the list, but
in
> those leaving on account of it.
Yes, but there is more than one way to leave (by not taking the exit door,
rather by sitting quietly or by waiting...). Those who have passed on are
perhaps more courageous? Widerville is ubiquitous (no?); why do we need the
beast here? [genuine question]
rene (earlier):
> Therefore one has to take care with new predications, like my 'Jud is a
racist'.
> Instead of attributing a property to a subject, which strictly spoken makes
no
> sense anymore in this world of non-things and non-humans and non-truth, what
i
> mean by it is precisely the opposite: racism, submission of inferior life
forms,
> occupies Jud (the predicate eats the subject), as soon as his common sense
enters
> philosophy. Including his entire predication theory. He thinks to outwit us,
or
> Heidegger, or Hannah Arendt (imperialism+racism), but no, it's the other way
around.
> What a chance to become honest toward oneself, one should be grateful.
One is. But constantly? For ever? I think I understand to some extent what
you say so gracefully, so delicately: when I witness widerville as
represented on the box, it can arouse the same in my response; I can become
momentarily a rednecked slimeball screaming screaming, and I am almost
immediately seized with a horrid recognition of the judders in myself
(almost a suitable case for suicide), only for this unwelcome insight to be
replaced with a distancing and rationalisation, etc.
rene (earlier):
> Esp. now
> that he thinks that the 'demise' of the Heidegger list is his work. Maybe it
would
> seem so, for instance if a poll would be held, but one immediately
recognizes the
> same mechanism in all polls: the machination of will and widerwill.
>
> Short: one is enabled to see the role of the 'subject' - variously said -
inside
> the Gestell (a fully problematic title), its being used: the subject has
become
> Bestandstueck, piece of inventory. (and therefore not to be saved: see
below)
But does not the 'recovery', the 'restoration' of be-ing (promised),
recover/restore the beings as beings (and no longer objects, no longer
stock, no longer inventory? I remember (was it in 'What is a thing?'?)
heidegger speaking at length about really facing a cow in a field just as a
cow in a field (and not as a burger machine, an example of 'nature', a
biological specimen, source of nice safe milk, etc); for one to face just
the cow without anything in between, no ideas, no ideologies, no purpose,
etc, what is at stake is the very horizon of the question of be-ing...
mP (earlier):
> In that sense, might it be needful to open up
> a discussion concerning the notion of two heideggers, neither the early/late
> pair, nor the pre-kehre/post-kehre, but one seeking to pietistically
> preserve/recover the metaphysical tradition, the other to
> demolish/deconstruct the same? Of course, I do not mean a double
> 'personality' or any such psychologistical tosh, but something discernible
> in the texts as they battle out the future and past of thinking. [In my
> planned opera, there shall be two heideggers on stage at times, but that's
> the way of drama and not the path of thinking]. I think derrida was most
> sensitive to these two heideggers and the way they interwove as texts which
> he reperforms thoughout his complex relations (proximity and distance) with
> heidegger. Is there a space to discuss this notion without recourse to pulp
> and its purveyors?
>
rene (earlier):
> I think so, yes. The tear would go through all of us: we should be subject
> AND Dasein (as possibility).
> Everything would depend on how to take the duplicity. One can see suddenly
> the complexity of our situation: as long as the leap into Dasein is not
> made, there is only (post-)metaphysics to represent it. But metaphyical
> thinking cannot think metaphysics, its ground or Wesen, itself. (Otherwise
> there never would have been metaphysics) So everything depends on
re-thinking
> the question "What is metaphysics?", while the what-is-question (ti to on)
> is itself a metaphysical start. It would be metaphysics itself (as nihilism)
> that holds one tight on the spot. In this repulsive sphere, where one closes
> one eye, or loses one leg, in order not to experience the split, words like
> being and Dasein lose all that they have possibly in them.
> But the worst one can do, is protesting against it, because this missing
> belongs to being, which now is nothing but absence (oblivion), but as such
an
> eminent indication. As long as the staying out is not conceived in its last
> consequences, the transition to Dasein cannot be enacted. This would
advocate
> demolition, so it seems. But it is to be done with utmost care and
precision,
> because one needs metaphysics/nihilism/technology in order to turn against.
> Otherwise one enters the postmodern space where everything can be said
> indifferently.
Rene, I need to consider this last section above at length (I'll come back
on this soon), but immediately the notion of an extremely care-ful (caring?)
demolition as preparation for the transition to dasein (the promise I
referred to above?) is an intoxicating one. But, how does metaphysics twist
out (verwindung) of itself? Thanks. And thanks for this whole response.
regards
michaelP
>
> regards
> rene
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---