*Dasein. * The Gerundialisation of Philosophy. 04
Heidegger’s Phenomenological Obnubilation.
The initial reification, which occurs when we first observe an occurring
object, leads us to conclude that this is the actual way in which the object
exists. Such a perspective of disassociation can be improved with a closer, more
careful examination using other of our sensors. We may feel the surface of
the object, hold it up to the light, and touch the outer surface with our
tongue to taste it. We can weigh it in our hands and compare it with other objects
of similar or dissimilar size, visually compare its shape with similar or
dissimilar entities, strike it with another object to listen to its sound, etc.
Eventually we may arrive at a stage where we are in the position to render
our version of a truthful account of the way that the object exists.
The confusion of Husserlian and Heideggerian ontology resides in their
inability to understand the nature of entitic truth. Truth can be defined as being
a correct descriptive correspondence between that which exists in the state
of observing, and that which is observed in the state of existing in the way
that it exists. If the observer describes an object, which exists in the way
that it exists as corresponding to something, which does not exist in the way
it exists, it is a falsehood. If an observer describes an object existing in
the way it exists as something existing in the way it exists, then it is a
truthful description.
If this fact is grasped we may proceed.
Now not only is the truth of entitic actuality to be found in the correctly
observed object existing in the actual way it exists, the truth of entitic
actuality also resides in the observer existing in the actual way that he or
she exists as an observing subject too. Therefore for the observer who
describes an object existing in the way it exists as something existing in the way it
exists, then that is the truthful description of actual way it
observationally and perceptually exists for the observer.
The juxtapositioning of these two entitic truths is therefore the “best match
” objective realisation of the subject's subjective impressions and the
object's objective reality.
Heidegger and Husserl's inability to understand or grasp a proper
understanding of *Being* in the ontology of occurrence precludes them from the
development of a dynamic *best match* ontology in the AITist sense above, and
condemns them to the aridity of a static phenomenological isolation.
The fact that each human being on the face of the earth achieves another
version of “best match” verity, proves that the notion of the truth of the
*Whole of Being* via the dead idea of *Dasein* was dead in the water before it
ever got the chance to take off.
The stupidity of believing that the undertaking of *object givenness*
uncovers the complex of Being to such a degree that the assignment establishes an
elemental basis for all things which result from the human perception of such
a transcendental revelation, suggests that we are IN CONTROL of the Being of
all beings is to elevate individual human beings from the recipients of such
giveness to the GIVER of such givenness - to the level of Gods - which was
perhaps his original intention?
Regards,
Jud
Personal Website:
_http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/index.htm_
(http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/index.htm)
E-mail Discussion List:
nominalism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
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Heidegger’s Phenomenological Obnubilation.
The initial reification, which occurs when we first observe an occurring
object, leads us to conclude that this is the actual way in which the object
exists. Such a perspective of disassociation can be improved with a closer, more
careful examination using other of our sensors. We may feel the surface of
the object, hold it up to the light, and touch the outer surface with our
tongue to taste it. We can weigh it in our hands and compare it with other objects
of similar or dissimilar size, visually compare its shape with similar or
dissimilar entities, strike it with another object to listen to its sound, etc.
Eventually we may arrive at a stage where we are in the position to render
our version of a truthful account of the way that the object exists.
The confusion of Husserlian and Heideggerian ontology resides in their
inability to understand the nature of entitic truth. Truth can be defined as being
a correct descriptive correspondence between that which exists in the state
of observing, and that which is observed in the state of existing in the way
that it exists. If the observer describes an object, which exists in the way
that it exists as corresponding to something, which does not exist in the way
it exists, it is a falsehood. If an observer describes an object existing in
the way it exists as something existing in the way it exists, then it is a
truthful description.
If this fact is grasped we may proceed.
Now not only is the truth of entitic actuality to be found in the correctly
observed object existing in the actual way it exists, the truth of entitic
actuality also resides in the observer existing in the actual way that he or
she exists as an observing subject too. Therefore for the observer who
describes an object existing in the way it exists as something existing in the way it
exists, then that is the truthful description of actual way it
observationally and perceptually exists for the observer.
The juxtapositioning of these two entitic truths is therefore the “best match
” objective realisation of the subject's subjective impressions and the
object's objective reality.
Heidegger and Husserl's inability to understand or grasp a proper
understanding of *Being* in the ontology of occurrence precludes them from the
development of a dynamic *best match* ontology in the AITist sense above, and
condemns them to the aridity of a static phenomenological isolation.
The fact that each human being on the face of the earth achieves another
version of “best match” verity, proves that the notion of the truth of the
*Whole of Being* via the dead idea of *Dasein* was dead in the water before it
ever got the chance to take off.
The stupidity of believing that the undertaking of *object givenness*
uncovers the complex of Being to such a degree that the assignment establishes an
elemental basis for all things which result from the human perception of such
a transcendental revelation, suggests that we are IN CONTROL of the Being of
all beings is to elevate individual human beings from the recipients of such
giveness to the GIVER of such givenness - to the level of Gods - which was
perhaps his original intention?
Regards,
Jud
Personal Website:
_http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/index.htm_
(http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/index.htm)
E-mail Discussion List:
nominalism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
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