I think I want to push the Husserl/Heidegger parallel a bit
farther than David Schenk does.
I don't agree with David's statement that "Husserl took
intentionality to be absolutely basic. Intentionality did all the
explaining; nothing explained _it_." That is a fair statement of
Husserl's position at the time he wrote the _Logical Investigations_,
but in his lectures and manuscripts from the decade following LI (the
very material that Heidegger later edited), Husserl moved beyond this to
a new level of phenomenological analysis. He began to examine not just
the way objects are intended in acts of consciousness, but also the way
the intentional acts themselves are given in internal consciousness. It
was this latter which Husserl referred to as "internal time-
consciousness"--a sphere he described as "perhaps the most important in
all of phenomenology." In the _Ideas_ he went so far as to characterize
it as the "true and final absolute." So it seems clear to me that Husserl
does somehow want to account for intentionality in terms of a deeper level
of temporal awareness.
What I'm suggesting is that Husserl's move from intentionality to
internal time-consciousness is paralelled by Heidegger's move from care
to temporality. Care in Heideggerian phenomenology is the structural
analogue of intentionality in Husserlian phenomenology. And just as
Husserl wants to derive intentionality from a more basic level of time-
consciousness, so Heidegger wants to base care on the deeper stratum of
temporality. And doesn't Heidegger's contention that Dasein is always
past and futural parallel Husserl's assertion that the now always
includes both retention and protention? There are differences, of
course, even beyond the basic fact that Husserl is describing noetic
consciousness, while Heidegger is exploring pretheoretical existence.
But the strucural parallels are too striking too ignore.
There is evidence that Heidegger himself view the matter in these
terms. In 1928, he wrote: "That which Husserl still calls time
consciousness, i.e. consciousness of time, is preciseley time itself in
the primal sense."
If I'm right about the basic structural parallel with Husserl,
perhaps further light could be shed on some of those mysterious
Heideggerian formulations you cite by looking for further parallels in
the details of their analyses of temporality.
-- Phil Miller
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
------------------
farther than David Schenk does.
I don't agree with David's statement that "Husserl took
intentionality to be absolutely basic. Intentionality did all the
explaining; nothing explained _it_." That is a fair statement of
Husserl's position at the time he wrote the _Logical Investigations_,
but in his lectures and manuscripts from the decade following LI (the
very material that Heidegger later edited), Husserl moved beyond this to
a new level of phenomenological analysis. He began to examine not just
the way objects are intended in acts of consciousness, but also the way
the intentional acts themselves are given in internal consciousness. It
was this latter which Husserl referred to as "internal time-
consciousness"--a sphere he described as "perhaps the most important in
all of phenomenology." In the _Ideas_ he went so far as to characterize
it as the "true and final absolute." So it seems clear to me that Husserl
does somehow want to account for intentionality in terms of a deeper level
of temporal awareness.
What I'm suggesting is that Husserl's move from intentionality to
internal time-consciousness is paralelled by Heidegger's move from care
to temporality. Care in Heideggerian phenomenology is the structural
analogue of intentionality in Husserlian phenomenology. And just as
Husserl wants to derive intentionality from a more basic level of time-
consciousness, so Heidegger wants to base care on the deeper stratum of
temporality. And doesn't Heidegger's contention that Dasein is always
past and futural parallel Husserl's assertion that the now always
includes both retention and protention? There are differences, of
course, even beyond the basic fact that Husserl is describing noetic
consciousness, while Heidegger is exploring pretheoretical existence.
But the strucural parallels are too striking too ignore.
There is evidence that Heidegger himself view the matter in these
terms. In 1928, he wrote: "That which Husserl still calls time
consciousness, i.e. consciousness of time, is preciseley time itself in
the primal sense."
If I'm right about the basic structural parallel with Husserl,
perhaps further light could be shed on some of those mysterious
Heideggerian formulations you cite by looking for further parallels in
the details of their analyses of temporality.
-- Phil Miller
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
------------------