--- I don't know if these comments are helpful, nor even if
they hit your question head on at all, but I thought I'd
toss them in.
I am trying to work out some thoughts on the relationship between
language and discourse in Heidegger and Derrida, and I would like to get
some comments and suggestion on the line I'm pursuing.
I find it helpful to start with Saussure's distinction between
language (_langue_) and speech or discourse (_parole_). For Saussure,
speech is possible only on the basis of language. Language is the pre-
existing, underlying system of differences which makes speech possible.
--- Is "system of differences" an adequate designation here?
While it is clear that it is a necessary condition for
language, it seems mistaken to fixate on this to give the
"essence". I.e., is it a reduction to that particular
differential condition of possibility? What about sonority
and graphicality? What about transmission, etc.? Those are
all elements (as necessary), if insufficient.
When we speak, we make meaningful expressions by playing upon this
system; we make use of the system of differences--though of course we
don't actually understand it as a system. The understanding of the
system is achieved only in linguistic science.
The Heidegger of BT has a very different view of the relationship
between speech or discourse and language. For him, language is founded
on discourse, rather than the other way around. From his
phenomenological perspective, it is discourse that comes first; language
is a kind of deposit or sediment that discourse leaves behind. "The way
in which discourse gets expressed [die Hinausgesprochenheit der Rede] is
language" (BT 204).
---In Heidegger, Discourse gets expressed *by means of*
language. There is difference between "in" and "through" (as
way or means). So, for Heidegger, the way discourse, but
*not* language, gets expressed, is language. The *event* of
that expression is not language, but involves language. The
*event* of that expression *is* discourse, which involves
language and being there. (It seems to me that *discourse*
is the way that language as totality gets instantiated).
Heidegger says that Discourse gets expressed (discourses as
verb), put out, actualized, "happened", in or by means of
"language", according to Heidegger. If discourse is
something which "gets expressed", then "discourse" is a
general category in certain ways. Discourse, ontologically
speaking, is a general category like "temporality". Just as
temporality temporalizes, discourse discourses.
---But Heidegger says, "the *way* in which discourse gets
expressed is *language*", *as totality*. This might just be
wrong. Rather, the *way* discourse gets expressed is things
like assertion, hearing, and keeping silent, *accessing* and
*using* the totality of language within the thrown-there, as
the "bank" or general category of Dasein's "hows". Language
*as totality* is the way language as such *is*, and *because
of this being* it is accessible to compilation and
collection, as being already collected in certain ways, of
which the dictionary is a derivation. Even when the
"totality" that is language is released from the reifying
tendency to collect word-Things, this totality is not the
*way of expression*. It looks like Heidegger is problematic
here.
In other words, discourse is what we experience in
everyday existence, not language; language may indeed be the object of
linguistic science, but the philosophical task to is to explain language
in terms of discourse, not to explain discourse in terms of language.
--- The "in terms of", that "philosophcal task, might not be
what Heidegger is up to. Remember, though that we *always*
know what Heidegger is up to: Being. He may be developing an
"entire complex" which co-involves language (which he
mistakenly characterizes as way, and less problematically as
collectible things) and expression (as "out there in the
world"). In that case, though, it might be that Heidegger is
not trying to reverse priority in the way you suggest,
although he is quite explicit that discourse is the
existential-ontological *foundation* of language. I think
there *is* a centrism, but what the centrism is might not be
"phonocentrism" per se, but more on the order of a centrism
concerning *priority* structures as opposed to
equioriginality or conconstitution. But he is not fixating
on discourse as such. We *know* what his primary fixation
is: Being. And the site of being that is Dasein is fully
invoked in his discussion of discourse and language.
But what about Derrida: is he more Saussurian or more Heideggerian
in his view of the relation between language and discourse? To me he
seems more Saussurian. Of course he criticizes Saussure (and Heidegger
too) for his "phonocentrism," i.e. for making speech prior to writing.
But this has to do with what is prior within the realm of discourse; it
does not challenge Saussure's more basic thesis that language as the
system of differences is prior to all discourse, spoken or written.
Indeed, it seems to me that Derrida's "differance" is simply a
radicalization of Saussure's notion of difference: if meaning is created
by playing on an underlying system of differences, Derrida argues, then
meaning must always be deferred. The meaning of what is said is never
fully present to the speaker, and thus all speech is "writing" (as it
has traditionally been conceived).
But if I'm right that Derrida is simply working out the
implications of a Saussurian view of language, isn't his apparent
radicalism really only apparent? Isn't he implicitly accepting the
authority of linguistic science, rather than questioning its
presuppositions? Doesn't Heidegger give us a more philoscphically
nuanced treament of discourse precisely because he starts with the
everday phenomenon (discourse) rather than with the scientific construct
(language)?
Comments and suggestions welcome.
-- Phil Miller
--- It seems to me that "equipriomordiality" would be the
way out of the chicken or egg game that comes from the
"broader basis and intentionally instantiated instance" (to
make up a description of the scene involved here). The
business of "founding" as such would seem to be very
important, and it is always at work in BT, either directly,
or in critique of the "foudation" assumptions of prevalent
concepts and regional ontologies. It might be simply that
Heidegger, in deconstructive dialogue with prevalent
tendencies, bears too many of the structures he is
resisting, such as "origination" and "priority", at least in
this case?
Some thoughts...
---
************************************************************************
"It is only after one ceases to reduce public affairs to the business of
dominion that the original data in the realm of human affairs will appear, or,
rather, reappear, in their authentic diversity." -- Hannah Arendt
Crises of the Republic; lying in politics, civil disobedience on violence,
thoughts on politics, and revolution. Hannah Arendt [1st ed.] New York,
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich [1972] pages 142-143
Tom Blancato
tblancato@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Eyes on Violence (nonviolence and human rights monitoring in Haiti)
Thoughtaction Collective (reparative justice project)
521 Main Street
PO Box 495
Harmony PA 16037
412-453-0211
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
------------------
they hit your question head on at all, but I thought I'd
toss them in.
I am trying to work out some thoughts on the relationship between
language and discourse in Heidegger and Derrida, and I would like to get
some comments and suggestion on the line I'm pursuing.
I find it helpful to start with Saussure's distinction between
language (_langue_) and speech or discourse (_parole_). For Saussure,
speech is possible only on the basis of language. Language is the pre-
existing, underlying system of differences which makes speech possible.
--- Is "system of differences" an adequate designation here?
While it is clear that it is a necessary condition for
language, it seems mistaken to fixate on this to give the
"essence". I.e., is it a reduction to that particular
differential condition of possibility? What about sonority
and graphicality? What about transmission, etc.? Those are
all elements (as necessary), if insufficient.
When we speak, we make meaningful expressions by playing upon this
system; we make use of the system of differences--though of course we
don't actually understand it as a system. The understanding of the
system is achieved only in linguistic science.
The Heidegger of BT has a very different view of the relationship
between speech or discourse and language. For him, language is founded
on discourse, rather than the other way around. From his
phenomenological perspective, it is discourse that comes first; language
is a kind of deposit or sediment that discourse leaves behind. "The way
in which discourse gets expressed [die Hinausgesprochenheit der Rede] is
language" (BT 204).
---In Heidegger, Discourse gets expressed *by means of*
language. There is difference between "in" and "through" (as
way or means). So, for Heidegger, the way discourse, but
*not* language, gets expressed, is language. The *event* of
that expression is not language, but involves language. The
*event* of that expression *is* discourse, which involves
language and being there. (It seems to me that *discourse*
is the way that language as totality gets instantiated).
Heidegger says that Discourse gets expressed (discourses as
verb), put out, actualized, "happened", in or by means of
"language", according to Heidegger. If discourse is
something which "gets expressed", then "discourse" is a
general category in certain ways. Discourse, ontologically
speaking, is a general category like "temporality". Just as
temporality temporalizes, discourse discourses.
---But Heidegger says, "the *way* in which discourse gets
expressed is *language*", *as totality*. This might just be
wrong. Rather, the *way* discourse gets expressed is things
like assertion, hearing, and keeping silent, *accessing* and
*using* the totality of language within the thrown-there, as
the "bank" or general category of Dasein's "hows". Language
*as totality* is the way language as such *is*, and *because
of this being* it is accessible to compilation and
collection, as being already collected in certain ways, of
which the dictionary is a derivation. Even when the
"totality" that is language is released from the reifying
tendency to collect word-Things, this totality is not the
*way of expression*. It looks like Heidegger is problematic
here.
In other words, discourse is what we experience in
everyday existence, not language; language may indeed be the object of
linguistic science, but the philosophical task to is to explain language
in terms of discourse, not to explain discourse in terms of language.
--- The "in terms of", that "philosophcal task, might not be
what Heidegger is up to. Remember, though that we *always*
know what Heidegger is up to: Being. He may be developing an
"entire complex" which co-involves language (which he
mistakenly characterizes as way, and less problematically as
collectible things) and expression (as "out there in the
world"). In that case, though, it might be that Heidegger is
not trying to reverse priority in the way you suggest,
although he is quite explicit that discourse is the
existential-ontological *foundation* of language. I think
there *is* a centrism, but what the centrism is might not be
"phonocentrism" per se, but more on the order of a centrism
concerning *priority* structures as opposed to
equioriginality or conconstitution. But he is not fixating
on discourse as such. We *know* what his primary fixation
is: Being. And the site of being that is Dasein is fully
invoked in his discussion of discourse and language.
But what about Derrida: is he more Saussurian or more Heideggerian
in his view of the relation between language and discourse? To me he
seems more Saussurian. Of course he criticizes Saussure (and Heidegger
too) for his "phonocentrism," i.e. for making speech prior to writing.
But this has to do with what is prior within the realm of discourse; it
does not challenge Saussure's more basic thesis that language as the
system of differences is prior to all discourse, spoken or written.
Indeed, it seems to me that Derrida's "differance" is simply a
radicalization of Saussure's notion of difference: if meaning is created
by playing on an underlying system of differences, Derrida argues, then
meaning must always be deferred. The meaning of what is said is never
fully present to the speaker, and thus all speech is "writing" (as it
has traditionally been conceived).
But if I'm right that Derrida is simply working out the
implications of a Saussurian view of language, isn't his apparent
radicalism really only apparent? Isn't he implicitly accepting the
authority of linguistic science, rather than questioning its
presuppositions? Doesn't Heidegger give us a more philoscphically
nuanced treament of discourse precisely because he starts with the
everday phenomenon (discourse) rather than with the scientific construct
(language)?
Comments and suggestions welcome.
-- Phil Miller
--- It seems to me that "equipriomordiality" would be the
way out of the chicken or egg game that comes from the
"broader basis and intentionally instantiated instance" (to
make up a description of the scene involved here). The
business of "founding" as such would seem to be very
important, and it is always at work in BT, either directly,
or in critique of the "foudation" assumptions of prevalent
concepts and regional ontologies. It might be simply that
Heidegger, in deconstructive dialogue with prevalent
tendencies, bears too many of the structures he is
resisting, such as "origination" and "priority", at least in
this case?
Some thoughts...
---
************************************************************************
"It is only after one ceases to reduce public affairs to the business of
dominion that the original data in the realm of human affairs will appear, or,
rather, reappear, in their authentic diversity." -- Hannah Arendt
Crises of the Republic; lying in politics, civil disobedience on violence,
thoughts on politics, and revolution. Hannah Arendt [1st ed.] New York,
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich [1972] pages 142-143
Tom Blancato
tblancato@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Eyes on Violence (nonviolence and human rights monitoring in Haiti)
Thoughtaction Collective (reparative justice project)
521 Main Street
PO Box 495
Harmony PA 16037
412-453-0211
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
------------------