A number of people made helpful comments on my previous message
regarding Robert Faulkner's criticism of Heidegger in FRANCIS BACON AND
THE PROJECT OF PROGRESS. Here are my thoughts on each of them:
1. Lois Shawver wants to know
>where in this text you are reading "Heidegger's diagnosis
>of the origins of modernity".
See pages 15-16. Faulkner relates Heidegger's account of modernity to
the explanations offered by other "historically oriented writers"
(11ff.). Where Hume and the philosophes had seen modernity as a natural
consequence of the rise of commerce, and where Hegel had viewed it as a
dialectical transformation of Christianity, Heidegger considers it to
be an inevitable outcome of the philosophical tradition initiated by the
ancient Greeks.
2. Christopher Rickey suggests the following explanation of Heidegger's
neglect of Bacon:
>To use an old distinction, Bacon was an empiricist and
>Descartes, Heidegger's central whipping boy, was a
>mathematical idealist (of sorts), and Heidegger felt that
>science was mathematical and not experimental in its
>roots; he even explicitly says this somewhere. Given
>that, Bacon would have held little interest for him.
It may be true that Heidegger neglected Bacon in part because he
supposed him to be an empiricist, but Faulkner himself is reluctant to
apply this term to him. He points out that Bacon explicitly presented
his New Organon as an "art of interpreting nature" (261). Bacon insists
that we arrive at truth not by relying on ordinary experience, but by
putting questions to nature and forcing the answers, by deliberately
seeking the laws that will give us power over nature. This seems to
imply recognition of the fact that human purposes are somehow an
ingredient in what is to be called truth.
Additionally, Faulkner makes the interesting claim (9f.) that Bacon in
fact saw an important role for mathematics in the new science. The
"laws of action" he sought were to be formulated mathematically, perhaps
using new, as yet undeveloped branches of mathematics. Faulkner goes so
far as to speculate that Bacon's proposals may have spurred the
development later in the century of analytic geometry and calculus. [By
the way, he refers in passing to a book by David Lachterman entitled THE
ETHICS OF GEOMETRY, THE GENEALOGY OF MODERNITY. Is anyone familiar with
it?]
3. 90DOSS@xxxxxxx comments that
>modern science, for Heidegger, is mathematical not in the
>sense of formulating its entities in terms of number (not
>primarily, anyway), but it the sense of the Greek
>mathesis, of projecting a guiding plan upon reality
>before approaching it as a subject of investigation. I
>don't see any a prior reason why Bacon's being an
>empiricist should lock him out of consideration.
This seems to me to be a very important point. Faulkner would certainly
agree that Bacon's science is mathematical, not only in the ordinary
sense, but also in the sense of a _mathesis_, as understood by
Heidegger. The existence of secret powers or latent qualities in
things--powers which will enable humanity to rule over nature--is
projected by Bacon in advance of the actual development of the natural
science which will uncover them.
4. 90DOSS@xxxxxxx also makes the following comments:
>I'm not familiar the book in question, but I'd like to
>point out that indicating contingent particular
>historical causes does in no way necessarily invalidate
>an eschatology. For instance, adopting the Heideggerian
>paradigm under discussion, pinning the origin of the
>modern technological worldview on Bacon and on his
>personal agenda still leaves open the question of why
>this particular move in intellectual history took place
>at precisely this point and not at an earlier and later
>date. Asking this question then seems to bring up the
>corollary, 'What historical forces existed at the time
>which permitted or, possibly, required that this move be
>made?' which, if it is seriously entertained, leaves the
>door open to eschatology.
This comment seems to address the central issue. Was modernity
"necessary" in some sense, or was it the result of human choices?
Faulkner says in his first chapter that "an aim of this study is to
question the plausibility of Heidegger's influential diagnosis. Might
the seventeenth-century turn be crucial, not derivative?" (16).
If I understand him correctly, Heidegger is saying that modern
technological science was inevitable, or at least the inevitable outcome
of Greek philosophy. The detached, theoretical attitude toward nature
discovered by the Greeks (and the understanding of truth and being that
went with it) already implied a tendency toward domination of nature.
Modern science and technology were simply actualizations of this
previously latent tendency.
Heidegger would probably criticize Faulkner for ignoring or downplaying
the continuity of Baconian science with ancient and medieval science.
And justifiably so. What Bacon proposed was precisely a "reform" of the
sciences and arts; his project would have been impossible had science
not somehow existed already. Moreover, it seems clear that Bacon's
reform presupposes Greek ontology: not the Platonic-Aristotelian
ontology of forms, but the Democritean ontology of atomic elements--
which itself has roots in the Parmenidean equation of truth and being
with contemplative thinking. (Bacon praises the ancient materialists
for removing God, mind, and final causes from nature, though he faults
them for not investigating the laws of motion more closely.)
Still, to say that Greek philosophy made Bacon and modernity _possible_
is not to say that it made them _necessary_. It could still be argued
that the 17th century turn was a corruption or distortion of what the
Greeks discovered, not an inevitable development of it--that Bacon
exploits the theoretical stance toward nature opened up by the Greeks in
ways that have nothing to do with the Greeks themselves.
The crucial question, I suppose, is whether Heidegger succeeds in
showing that the tendency toward domination was already inherent in
Greek philosophy, even though it didn't yet manifest itself in the form
of a technological science.
5.. Christopher Stewart Morrissey comments:
>It's hard to see how Bacon's "self-conscious plan"
>presents any difficulty. I suppose Heidegger would say:
>How could have Bacon conceived of his plan if he hadn't
>already forgotten Being? Didn't his forgetfulness of
>Being already make him "self-conscious"?
If Faulkner is right, Bacon's self-consciousness is ultimately a moral
(or rather: amoral) one, not a theoretical one. Bacon's aim of
establishing a science that would dominate nature "depended on a
foundation in an amoral and power-seeking self" (261). Would Heidegger
want to say that this amoral self was somehow a product of the
forgottenness of being? It doesn't seem obvious to me that he would.
But perhaps there are considerations here that I'm overlooking.
-- Phil Miller
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
------------------
regarding Robert Faulkner's criticism of Heidegger in FRANCIS BACON AND
THE PROJECT OF PROGRESS. Here are my thoughts on each of them:
1. Lois Shawver wants to know
>where in this text you are reading "Heidegger's diagnosis
>of the origins of modernity".
See pages 15-16. Faulkner relates Heidegger's account of modernity to
the explanations offered by other "historically oriented writers"
(11ff.). Where Hume and the philosophes had seen modernity as a natural
consequence of the rise of commerce, and where Hegel had viewed it as a
dialectical transformation of Christianity, Heidegger considers it to
be an inevitable outcome of the philosophical tradition initiated by the
ancient Greeks.
2. Christopher Rickey suggests the following explanation of Heidegger's
neglect of Bacon:
>To use an old distinction, Bacon was an empiricist and
>Descartes, Heidegger's central whipping boy, was a
>mathematical idealist (of sorts), and Heidegger felt that
>science was mathematical and not experimental in its
>roots; he even explicitly says this somewhere. Given
>that, Bacon would have held little interest for him.
It may be true that Heidegger neglected Bacon in part because he
supposed him to be an empiricist, but Faulkner himself is reluctant to
apply this term to him. He points out that Bacon explicitly presented
his New Organon as an "art of interpreting nature" (261). Bacon insists
that we arrive at truth not by relying on ordinary experience, but by
putting questions to nature and forcing the answers, by deliberately
seeking the laws that will give us power over nature. This seems to
imply recognition of the fact that human purposes are somehow an
ingredient in what is to be called truth.
Additionally, Faulkner makes the interesting claim (9f.) that Bacon in
fact saw an important role for mathematics in the new science. The
"laws of action" he sought were to be formulated mathematically, perhaps
using new, as yet undeveloped branches of mathematics. Faulkner goes so
far as to speculate that Bacon's proposals may have spurred the
development later in the century of analytic geometry and calculus. [By
the way, he refers in passing to a book by David Lachterman entitled THE
ETHICS OF GEOMETRY, THE GENEALOGY OF MODERNITY. Is anyone familiar with
it?]
3. 90DOSS@xxxxxxx comments that
>modern science, for Heidegger, is mathematical not in the
>sense of formulating its entities in terms of number (not
>primarily, anyway), but it the sense of the Greek
>mathesis, of projecting a guiding plan upon reality
>before approaching it as a subject of investigation. I
>don't see any a prior reason why Bacon's being an
>empiricist should lock him out of consideration.
This seems to me to be a very important point. Faulkner would certainly
agree that Bacon's science is mathematical, not only in the ordinary
sense, but also in the sense of a _mathesis_, as understood by
Heidegger. The existence of secret powers or latent qualities in
things--powers which will enable humanity to rule over nature--is
projected by Bacon in advance of the actual development of the natural
science which will uncover them.
4. 90DOSS@xxxxxxx also makes the following comments:
>I'm not familiar the book in question, but I'd like to
>point out that indicating contingent particular
>historical causes does in no way necessarily invalidate
>an eschatology. For instance, adopting the Heideggerian
>paradigm under discussion, pinning the origin of the
>modern technological worldview on Bacon and on his
>personal agenda still leaves open the question of why
>this particular move in intellectual history took place
>at precisely this point and not at an earlier and later
>date. Asking this question then seems to bring up the
>corollary, 'What historical forces existed at the time
>which permitted or, possibly, required that this move be
>made?' which, if it is seriously entertained, leaves the
>door open to eschatology.
This comment seems to address the central issue. Was modernity
"necessary" in some sense, or was it the result of human choices?
Faulkner says in his first chapter that "an aim of this study is to
question the plausibility of Heidegger's influential diagnosis. Might
the seventeenth-century turn be crucial, not derivative?" (16).
If I understand him correctly, Heidegger is saying that modern
technological science was inevitable, or at least the inevitable outcome
of Greek philosophy. The detached, theoretical attitude toward nature
discovered by the Greeks (and the understanding of truth and being that
went with it) already implied a tendency toward domination of nature.
Modern science and technology were simply actualizations of this
previously latent tendency.
Heidegger would probably criticize Faulkner for ignoring or downplaying
the continuity of Baconian science with ancient and medieval science.
And justifiably so. What Bacon proposed was precisely a "reform" of the
sciences and arts; his project would have been impossible had science
not somehow existed already. Moreover, it seems clear that Bacon's
reform presupposes Greek ontology: not the Platonic-Aristotelian
ontology of forms, but the Democritean ontology of atomic elements--
which itself has roots in the Parmenidean equation of truth and being
with contemplative thinking. (Bacon praises the ancient materialists
for removing God, mind, and final causes from nature, though he faults
them for not investigating the laws of motion more closely.)
Still, to say that Greek philosophy made Bacon and modernity _possible_
is not to say that it made them _necessary_. It could still be argued
that the 17th century turn was a corruption or distortion of what the
Greeks discovered, not an inevitable development of it--that Bacon
exploits the theoretical stance toward nature opened up by the Greeks in
ways that have nothing to do with the Greeks themselves.
The crucial question, I suppose, is whether Heidegger succeeds in
showing that the tendency toward domination was already inherent in
Greek philosophy, even though it didn't yet manifest itself in the form
of a technological science.
5.. Christopher Stewart Morrissey comments:
>It's hard to see how Bacon's "self-conscious plan"
>presents any difficulty. I suppose Heidegger would say:
>How could have Bacon conceived of his plan if he hadn't
>already forgotten Being? Didn't his forgetfulness of
>Being already make him "self-conscious"?
If Faulkner is right, Bacon's self-consciousness is ultimately a moral
(or rather: amoral) one, not a theoretical one. Bacon's aim of
establishing a science that would dominate nature "depended on a
foundation in an amoral and power-seeking self" (261). Would Heidegger
want to say that this amoral self was somehow a product of the
forgottenness of being? It doesn't seem obvious to me that he would.
But perhaps there are considerations here that I'm overlooking.
-- Phil Miller
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
------------------