Hi Paul,
>The arguments against Lack in Deleuze do not seem to
>be directed against the claim that there is a
>phenomena we know as Lack, but rather, granting it a
>constitutive or foundational status. If Deleuze is
>compelled to renounce Lack, it is not because there is
>no such thing as Lack, but rather that Lack is only
>possible under very specific conditions.
D&G use the term 'castration' to refer to the despotic representational
structure of Lack as constitutive and foundational. Therefore, (I have to
agree with Dan), D&G say that castration is not real. It is symbolic (on
the level of the Signifier) and distributes lack in the molar aggregate.
D&G reject Lacan's structuralism, even though they praise Lacan for
overturning Oedipus. AO p. 217, "(And isn't this the strength of Lacan, to
have saved psychoanalysis from the frenzied oediaplization to which it was
linking its fate---to have brought about this salvation even at the price
of a regression, and even though it meant the unconscious would be kept
under the weight of the despotic apparatus, that it would be reinterpreted
starting from this apparatus, the Law, and the signifier---phallus and
castration, yes! Oedipus, no!---the despotic age of the unconscious.)
In AO, D&G say that Lacan brings Oedipus to its autocritique. Oedipus is
imaginary. It is produced by the structural conditions of castration which
revives the depotism of the Signifier under Capitalism. With Lacan, we
come to the point of autocritique which leads us to deny that Oedipus,
castration, or the signifier has anything to do with unconscious material
or production. This autocrtitque leads us to see that castration is not
real. It leads to an 'unconscious' that is the "reverse side" of
structure---that is molecular-machinic rather than molar-structural.
In Chaosmosis, since the question is no longer about bringing Oedipus to
the point of autocritique as it was in AO, Guattari is more critical of
Lacanian structuralism. In the chapter about Machinic Heterogenesis,
Guattari says the Lacanian signifier lacks ontological heterogenesis, and
that it always has a linear discursivity. Therefore, D&G's abstract
machine eludes the structural space described in 'How Do we Recognize
Structuralism'.
Beth
>The arguments against Lack in Deleuze do not seem to
>be directed against the claim that there is a
>phenomena we know as Lack, but rather, granting it a
>constitutive or foundational status. If Deleuze is
>compelled to renounce Lack, it is not because there is
>no such thing as Lack, but rather that Lack is only
>possible under very specific conditions.
D&G use the term 'castration' to refer to the despotic representational
structure of Lack as constitutive and foundational. Therefore, (I have to
agree with Dan), D&G say that castration is not real. It is symbolic (on
the level of the Signifier) and distributes lack in the molar aggregate.
D&G reject Lacan's structuralism, even though they praise Lacan for
overturning Oedipus. AO p. 217, "(And isn't this the strength of Lacan, to
have saved psychoanalysis from the frenzied oediaplization to which it was
linking its fate---to have brought about this salvation even at the price
of a regression, and even though it meant the unconscious would be kept
under the weight of the despotic apparatus, that it would be reinterpreted
starting from this apparatus, the Law, and the signifier---phallus and
castration, yes! Oedipus, no!---the despotic age of the unconscious.)
In AO, D&G say that Lacan brings Oedipus to its autocritique. Oedipus is
imaginary. It is produced by the structural conditions of castration which
revives the depotism of the Signifier under Capitalism. With Lacan, we
come to the point of autocritique which leads us to deny that Oedipus,
castration, or the signifier has anything to do with unconscious material
or production. This autocrtitque leads us to see that castration is not
real. It leads to an 'unconscious' that is the "reverse side" of
structure---that is molecular-machinic rather than molar-structural.
In Chaosmosis, since the question is no longer about bringing Oedipus to
the point of autocritique as it was in AO, Guattari is more critical of
Lacanian structuralism. In the chapter about Machinic Heterogenesis,
Guattari says the Lacanian signifier lacks ontological heterogenesis, and
that it always has a linear discursivity. Therefore, D&G's abstract
machine eludes the structural space described in 'How Do we Recognize
Structuralism'.
Beth