But Chris, if you were to read Deleuzian lines such as "complete determination",
"immediate presentation", and "the Idea" as though Deleuze were a normal,
everyday Kantian, you would have to probably conclude that he's a screwed up
Kantian. But obviously Deleuze takes Kant and twists him through an engagement
with Nietzsche, thereby ending up with something very different. Derrida too is
putting a twist on Saussurian/Hegelian negation. The fact that he starts with
these thinkers (as Deleuze starts with Kant), doesn't mean he should
necessarily be grouped with D's (or D&G's) critique of Saussurian semiotics
(since Derrida himself is, after all, attacking Saussurian linguistics).
Further, the fact that Saussrian linguistics may only represent "the flip side
of an 'objectivist's' or humanist's idea of clear and distinct meaning" doesn't
mean that Derrida's work should be treated as a simple reversal of humanism. The
same should be said of Heidegger: the discussion of onto-theo-logy contains
alot of lines that, taken on their own, could easily be inserted into one of
Hegel's texts. But that doesn't ally Heidegger and Hegel.
I don't know what D&G have written about Derrida directly, if anything at all.
I know that Deleuze does not level the criticisms you are using when he brings
Derrida and differance in via footnote in DIFFERENCE AND REPETITION, concerning
both psychic fantasy and the loss of the origin. Maybe it's time to ask for
clarification: are you using a D&G critique of Hegelian and Saussurian
negativity and then transfering it to Derrida, or is there something they say
directly against Derridian differance?
This is not my favorite position to be in -- defending Derrida over Deleuze. As
I said before, I prefer Deleuze. There's alot that you simply don't get in
Derrida, or very rarely at least (i.e., bodies, forces, etc.). AND I CERTAINLY
DON'T WANT TO REDUCE DELEUZE TO DERRIDA --YEECH!!! TO THAT POSSIBILITY. But I
also think that they way Derrida has been brought into political theory and
philosophy from the literary criticism fields in which he was first received is
often regrettable, and that there's more in Derrida than is usually offered
(even by Derrida himself).
To make my position a bit more clear: what I am objecting to is the reduction
of differance to 'undecidability' and therefore perpetual 'deferral'. This is
not to say differance is not often treated that way, even by defenders. The
reason differance leads to deferral is because it provides both the conditions
of possibility and impossibility for any system of differences (linguistic,
psychological, social, etc.). It forever defers closure while constituting
a system that 'wants' to be closed. Whether differance can be understood as
an 'excess' that deconstructs the system (which would align Derrida more with
D&G) or a 'lack' is one of the points at issue. But doesn't Deleuze's reading
of, say, the eternal return operate on a similar 'logic' to differance? It is
presupposed by the first two forms of repetition but ends up desolving them,
making them appear only once and then no more.
There's a quote near the end of DIFFERENCE AND REPETITION where Deleuze refers
to the issues of 'excess' vs. 'lack'. I don't have the text with me. I'll try
to dig it up later.
Nathan
widder@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
------------------
"immediate presentation", and "the Idea" as though Deleuze were a normal,
everyday Kantian, you would have to probably conclude that he's a screwed up
Kantian. But obviously Deleuze takes Kant and twists him through an engagement
with Nietzsche, thereby ending up with something very different. Derrida too is
putting a twist on Saussurian/Hegelian negation. The fact that he starts with
these thinkers (as Deleuze starts with Kant), doesn't mean he should
necessarily be grouped with D's (or D&G's) critique of Saussurian semiotics
(since Derrida himself is, after all, attacking Saussurian linguistics).
Further, the fact that Saussrian linguistics may only represent "the flip side
of an 'objectivist's' or humanist's idea of clear and distinct meaning" doesn't
mean that Derrida's work should be treated as a simple reversal of humanism. The
same should be said of Heidegger: the discussion of onto-theo-logy contains
alot of lines that, taken on their own, could easily be inserted into one of
Hegel's texts. But that doesn't ally Heidegger and Hegel.
I don't know what D&G have written about Derrida directly, if anything at all.
I know that Deleuze does not level the criticisms you are using when he brings
Derrida and differance in via footnote in DIFFERENCE AND REPETITION, concerning
both psychic fantasy and the loss of the origin. Maybe it's time to ask for
clarification: are you using a D&G critique of Hegelian and Saussurian
negativity and then transfering it to Derrida, or is there something they say
directly against Derridian differance?
This is not my favorite position to be in -- defending Derrida over Deleuze. As
I said before, I prefer Deleuze. There's alot that you simply don't get in
Derrida, or very rarely at least (i.e., bodies, forces, etc.). AND I CERTAINLY
DON'T WANT TO REDUCE DELEUZE TO DERRIDA --YEECH!!! TO THAT POSSIBILITY. But I
also think that they way Derrida has been brought into political theory and
philosophy from the literary criticism fields in which he was first received is
often regrettable, and that there's more in Derrida than is usually offered
(even by Derrida himself).
To make my position a bit more clear: what I am objecting to is the reduction
of differance to 'undecidability' and therefore perpetual 'deferral'. This is
not to say differance is not often treated that way, even by defenders. The
reason differance leads to deferral is because it provides both the conditions
of possibility and impossibility for any system of differences (linguistic,
psychological, social, etc.). It forever defers closure while constituting
a system that 'wants' to be closed. Whether differance can be understood as
an 'excess' that deconstructs the system (which would align Derrida more with
D&G) or a 'lack' is one of the points at issue. But doesn't Deleuze's reading
of, say, the eternal return operate on a similar 'logic' to differance? It is
presupposed by the first two forms of repetition but ends up desolving them,
making them appear only once and then no more.
There's a quote near the end of DIFFERENCE AND REPETITION where Deleuze refers
to the issues of 'excess' vs. 'lack'. I don't have the text with me. I'll try
to dig it up later.
Nathan
widder@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
------------------