> Actually, I like Geof Bennington's formulation
> of the operation of differance: neither A nor B nor both
> nor neither, which, to recall my days as an analytic
> philosopher, is an aporia of identity: a repetition of
> X =/= X? Of course, the question then rebounds: can
> D&G affirm from a critique of identity? Massumi assumes
> it can, as a BOTH/AND of radical empiricism. I'm inclined
> to this, but what happens to difference without negation
> (cf. Descombes' discussion of Nietzsche & Philosophy)?
> Emission of singularities, you say? Well, in that case,
> how the hell does one talk about a reactive force (or
> a sad passion, or a molar identity, etc.)?
This is an important point, I think, and one which is not often
enough discussed; in "postmodern" and "post-structuralist" thought
generally, there seems to be a readiness to do away with conventional
logical truth-values. This is fine, except that
it has to be founded on a sensible critique of logic, otherwise it
does not fulfil its purpose of challenging that logic -- i.e. it's
too easily dismissed as "hippy shit". After all, if negativity does
not imply a negation of positivity (and _vice versa_), then what does
it mean, and how can it be defended? If we want a third truth-value,
which will supplement (in Derrida's sense) "truth" and "falsehood",
what is the status of this truth-value to be? Can these sorts of
formulations really do the work required of them -- a radical
critique of logic and its ontological commitments?
--
Richard Cochrane
Dept of Philosophy
UWCC
Cardiff
Wales
email: senrc@xxxxxxxx
------------------
> of the operation of differance: neither A nor B nor both
> nor neither, which, to recall my days as an analytic
> philosopher, is an aporia of identity: a repetition of
> X =/= X? Of course, the question then rebounds: can
> D&G affirm from a critique of identity? Massumi assumes
> it can, as a BOTH/AND of radical empiricism. I'm inclined
> to this, but what happens to difference without negation
> (cf. Descombes' discussion of Nietzsche & Philosophy)?
> Emission of singularities, you say? Well, in that case,
> how the hell does one talk about a reactive force (or
> a sad passion, or a molar identity, etc.)?
This is an important point, I think, and one which is not often
enough discussed; in "postmodern" and "post-structuralist" thought
generally, there seems to be a readiness to do away with conventional
logical truth-values. This is fine, except that
it has to be founded on a sensible critique of logic, otherwise it
does not fulfil its purpose of challenging that logic -- i.e. it's
too easily dismissed as "hippy shit". After all, if negativity does
not imply a negation of positivity (and _vice versa_), then what does
it mean, and how can it be defended? If we want a third truth-value,
which will supplement (in Derrida's sense) "truth" and "falsehood",
what is the status of this truth-value to be? Can these sorts of
formulations really do the work required of them -- a radical
critique of logic and its ontological commitments?
--
Richard Cochrane
Dept of Philosophy
UWCC
Cardiff
Wales
email: senrc@xxxxxxxx
------------------